PHILOSOPHY

THE JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

VOL. XI. No. 44. OCTOBER 1936

THE ROMANTIC FACTOR IN MODERN POLITICS

PROFESSOR ERNEST BARKER

I

ONE of the marks of our times is a new eruption of the personal. Systems and institutions of politics are clouded over. The impersonal principles on which these systems and institutions depend are still more deeply obscured. Men turn for their inspiration to the living flow of personality. Some leader who has burst from hidden and elemental depths commands a passion of personal loyalty. Leadership has always been a great factor in the history of human communities. The deification of the ruler was the cement of the Hellenistic monarchies and of the Roman Empire which inherited their tradition. It may seem a strange atavism that we should now be apparently recurring, in the twentieth century, to a similar practice. But there are exigencies of contemporary life which explain the new vogue of leadership, and there is a tide of contemporary thought which leads on to the current doctrine of the emergent leader.

Among the exigencies of contemporary life there are two which demand some brief notice. On the one hand, the growth of great populations—particularly in urban centres, where they are divorced from the old outlets of personal emotion—has pushed men in the mass towards new and stirring loyalties, which appear to promise the emancipation of a dormant faculty. A party leader is the immediate beneficiary of this trend; but if the growing volume of his party, and the rising surge of its emotion, lead him to victory, he becomes the leader not only of a party, but also of a whole people. On the other hand, the recent growth of enthroned legis-

latures, sovereign over the executive and its head, and seeking to attenuate personal leadership into a shadow, has provoked a reaction of the executive, and a return of personal leadership, which have carried a number of European countries to the opposite extreme. The leaders of to-day are not only new outlets for old popular passions of personal attachment and loyalty. They are also new incarnations of an old political tradition on the Continent—a tradition of executive power and executive responsibility—which had been overlaid and almost stifled by an extreme form of parliamentarianism.

But the leader is something more than a satisfaction of the personal emotions of a great electorate and a restoration (exaggerated, as all restorations immediately are) of executive power and responsibility. If he were only that, he would be a phenomenon in the world of democratic ideas and practice, produced by causes inherent in that world. He would not represent the incursion of another world. We shall not do justice to his claims, or his significance, unless we realize that he represents such an incursion. He has sprung from roots, and he is grounded in causes, which go beyond the immediate occasions of his emergence. If we are to understand those causes, we must turn to the tides of contemporary thought which run against democracy and in favour of a new idea and practice of the art of political life.

II

There is one tide of contemporary thought which begins with Nietzsche. Nietzsche was not a logical thinker. He was a master of trenchant aphorisms which could cut both ways and might often contradict one another. But he had a general hatred of the slave-morality which was based on the calculus of general advantage, and he had a genuine passion for the master-morality which was founded on the rock of power. Under the head of slave-morality he sets the principle of democracy, as he also sets socialism and Christianity: they all stand for the advantage of the weak, and they all contravene the great hierarchy of nature by which the strong rule the weak. Under the head of master-morality he sets the will to power, which makes a man deploy all the force and resources of his nature and impose himself on the universe. This may seem mere subscription to the doctrine of tyranny; and it is easy to interpret Nietzsche's conception of the superman in that sense. But if it is easy, it is also erroneous. The superman of whom Nietzsche dreamed was really a new super-species, to be achieved in some future age by the intervening travail and self-discipline of strong and chosen spirits, who mastered themselves in order that

their descendants might enter into their labours and master the universe. The "will to power" of which he wrote was not a will to power over other men; it was a will to power over the self, which would ultimately lead to power over the universe in which the self is set. Nietzsche was not an apostle of the national totalitarian State, inspired and controlled by the genius of a dominant personality. He denounced the State as the "coldest of monsters and most frigid of liars": he looked to the emergence of a free *élite* which, transcending the idea of "bovine nationalism," would guide a united Europe first to the dignity of "higher men" and then to the majesty of "super-men." But the effect of a philosophy is often different from the intentions of its creator; and in any case the philosophy of Nietzsche, even if it was not a proclamation of the dictator, was a denunciation of democracy. He saw democracy as a static system, which was content, and indeed designed, to keep men as they were, with uniform rights and liberties which, just because they were uniform, were merely pitched on the level of average humanity. He wanted to see, in place of the democratic form of State, and indeed of all forms of the State, a dynamic surge, beginning immediately with the strong, but ultimately drawing all men in its wake from the level of the average to the height of the maximum. His desire, in its full consequences, ran contrary to all political organization; but it was particularly contrary to democracy because democracy was the current form. And the interpretation of his theory was even more contrary to democracy than was his theory itself. His superman, who belonged to the future, and was a species rather than an individual, was translated into the present, and turned into an individual. Foreign to the State and the nation, and transcending them both, he was fitted into them, and made their mainspring. The interpretation of Nietzsche, if not Nietzsche himself, is a parent of the dictator.

The theory of Nietzsche may be termed a spiritualized form of Darwinism. It is a theory of evolution translated from the sphere of biology to a higher and more spiritual sphere. There is a second current of contemporary thought which shows a similar character. It is a current which begins with Bergson, and may be seen flowing, in different and altered forms, in the writings of Sorel and Pareto. "All morality," Bergson has said, "is in essence biological."[1] In other words it is ultimately a product of the life-force which moves the whole world of creation. In man, and in his moral world, the life-force works in two different ways. On the one hand it arms man with instinct, and creates a primary morality of social pressure which is "a system of orders dictated by impersonal social requirements." On the other hand it arms man with intelligence, and

[1] *Two Sources of Morality and Religion* (English translation), p. 82.

creates a secondary morality of individual aspiration, vested with personal emotion, which is "a series of appeals made to the conscience of each of us by persons who represent the best there is in humanity."[1] This secondary morality of aspiration is the result of a "sudden leap." Individuals emerge "who each represent, as the appearance of a new species would have represented, an effect of creative evolution";[2] or, to express the same point in other words, "life . . . imparts a new impetus to exceptional individuals who have immersed themselves anew in it, so that they can help society further along its way."[3] The emergent individual—strong in the new impetus imparted to him by life—who creates a new morality (or rather adds new truths to the existing morality of aspiration), has something of a Nietzschean flavour. He is, however, in Bergson's view, compatible with democracy. It is he and his associates who discover the ideas of democracy: who vest them with emotion: who make them magnets for the minds of millions. When they forecast and seek to realize the ideas of liberty, equality, and fraternity, they add a new democratic content to morality; and that content becomes a part of its permanent substance, because it involves a higher and finer form of the social cohesion at which life is always aiming. On this view, therefore, the emergent individual is not the master of society. He is rather the servant, who "can help society further along its way." He is not the enemy of democracy. He is its agent.

But if the *principles* of democracy, or the ideas associated with democracy, are thus connected with the emergence of "exceptional individuals," and indeed proceed from that emergence, it is not equally clear that the *process* of democracy is compatible with the role which such individuals are appointed to play. Democracy involves a reliance on time and tentative effort: the philosophy of Bergson is a philosophy of the "sudden leap." Democracy, again, is a matter of discussion and the collaboration of many minds. The philosophy of Bergson assumes that "masses of men have been carried along by one or several individuals": it even allows that "nature . . . must have intended the ruthless leader if she provided for leaders at all."[4] The process of the life-force, as it works in our human field and produces our human morality, is not a democratic process, even if it issues in the creation of democratic principles. It proceeds by sudden leaps or emergences, and the motive force of these leaps is the exceptional individual, who incarnates the appetite of life for some new and original form of individuation, some new variation of species.

The theory of Bergson thus seems to be coloured by an aristo-

[1] *Two Sources of Morality and Religion* (English translation), p. 68.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 79. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 82. [4] *Ibid.*, pp. 241 and 266.

cratic tinge. Sometimes, it is true, the emergent leaders are prophets who freely arise from the depths; but it is also true that they are sometimes members of the upper class, or of the intellectual *élite*, who from a sentiment of justice (or, it may be, personal ambition) espouse the cause and express the views of the rest of society. Georges Sorel, while he was animated by the fundamental ideas of Bergson, preferred to find the leaders who would "help society further along its way" among the working classes. The middle and upper classes lived on the fruits of the past, and for the defence of those fruits: it was only the workers who could produce a new *élite*, and only that new *élite* which could carry men with it in a new leap into the unseen future. The new leaders emerging from their immersion in the life of the working class would incarnate its ideas and its demands; they would vest them with the glow of their own deep personal emotion, and they would communicate that emotion to their followers by preaching the "myth" of the general strike; nor would they shrink from the actual use of a clean and surgical violence, realizing that just as force was naturally used to defend the custom of the past, so it might also, and no less naturally, be used to secure the conquests of the future. There are additions to Bergson's theory, or transmutations of Bergson's theory, in this philosophy. The life of which Bergson speaks in general terms is transmuted into the particular form of the life of the working classes. The general idea of the emergence of exceptional individuals is turned into the particular conception of the appearance of a workers' *élite*. The notion of the sudden leap is charged with the added notion of violence. In a word, Georges Sorel has added elements drawn from Marx to a system of thought which belongs to Bergson. But the additions and transmutations have not abolished the fundamental core. There is still the personalism of the emergent leader, or group of leaders, creating a new morality of aspiration. There is still the emotionalism which, in Bergson's theory, attaches to this morality of aspiration. There is still the leap, under the *élan* of emotion, and under the guidance of the person, into the unseen future.

The doctrine of Pareto, a friend of Sorel, and one of the teachers of Mussolini, is a continuation and a development of the same strain of thought. It is a doctrine of the *élite*, and of the part which is played by force in that circulation of *élites* which characterizes the life of a society. In the course of history some governing *élite* establishes a social leadership by personal qualities and personal prestige. It seeks to retain its position even when it has lost its title. But the presence of a new *élite*, rising from the depths of society, and carrying a new and energetic belief, supported by a myth, impinges upon its position. The social law of the circulation of

élites demands the establishment of the new *élite*: the conservative instincts of social pressure resist. The demand and the resistance create a state of tension; and the ending of this state may involve the use of force, by the leader or leaders of the new *élite*, on behalf of the new belief. The personal coming and going of *élites*, and the role of force in determining the sequence of their succession—these are the themes of a doctrine which has played its part in the making of the doctrine of Fascism.

There is thus, in the writings of Bergson, Sorel, and Pareto, a tide of thought which runs in the direction of personalism. This personalism, if it may be so called, is associated with three other factors—the factor of emotion, which is its natural concomitant; the factor of the sudden leap, which for Bergson is the leap of life itself, through the individual in whom its new impetus is incarnate, towards a fresh variety, but which may be interpreted, or extended, into the simple explosion of pure and immediate personal force; and, finally, the factor of the "myth"—a factor which recurs, in various forms, in all these writers, but which is always connected with the other factors of emotion and the sudden leap.[1] Led by the man; stirred by the contagion of his emotion; prepared for the leap and its contingencies of violence; nerved by the myth—with these auspices, and under this aegis, men can shed the past and move into the future. This may be called a Latin tide of thought, which beginning in France has flowed into Italy and there attained its height and its consummation. Italy has again and again, in the course of its long history, produced great and arresting personalities which have deeply affected its life, and even affected the destinies of Europe. Caius Gracchus, Sulla, and Julius Caesar; Viscontis and

[1] In Bergson the myth belongs to the field of religion. The intellect of man, representing to itself the facts of death and chance, and being dismayed by these intellectual representations, evolves intellectual counter-representations, by means of "a myth-making function" with which it is furnished, in order to arm itself against its own discoveries and to nerve itself for continued activity. This is the origin of the various form of religious myth. But the myth-making function, though it works with exceptional force in the realm of religion, continues its myth-making work in other realms and in different forms (*op. cit.*, p. 168). Sorel can thus assume the operation of this function in the form of the myth of the general strike, by which the leaders of the working class insure and nerve themselves and their followers for the difficulties of the future. Pareto similarly invents a theory of myths, or "enthusiastic derivations" (drawn from social facts, but transcending those facts, and based on sentiment rather than reason, so that they assume the form of religions), by which men insure themselves against the mere calculations of inductive reason and nerve themselves for the leap in the dark. The connection of the idea of the myth with that of the leap is subtly explained by Bergson (*op. cit.*, pp. 167–8): it is more obvious in the theories of Sorel and Pareto.

Sforzas; Eccelin da Romano and Cesare Borgia; Hildebrand and Savonarola; Mazzini and Garibaldi—there is a long list, and the name of Bonaparte may be added to the list. English history is largely a history of the impersonal—of the expansion of precedents: the development of institutions: the slow solidification of a body of law proceeding from the steady activity of the general legal profession, and free from the personal impetus of a would-be maker of codes. Italian history has always shown a more personal character; and this old and historic character still marks the life of contemporary Italy. In a country which has suffered from a long past of disunion, personal figures become the necessary symbols of national unity: in a country largely peopled by an agricultural population, hitherto depressed and uneducated, the leader can find a following which is ready to be led; in a country responsive to personal magnetism, both in the life of art and the life of politics, personality will carry prestige. It is no wonder that the Latin tide of thought which moves towards personalism has found a ready entry into Italian affairs. It is the less wonderful when we reflect that currents of German thought—not only the thought of Nietzsche, but also the general ideas and philosophy of German Romanticism, with all its zest for the factor of personality—have also found their way through the Alps. There is a German as well as a Latin ingredient in the general creed of personalism.

Before we examine that ingredient, we may turn to one of the documents of Italian Fascism which summarizes, in succinct phrases, the core of the Latin version of personalism. This is the preamble to the *Statuto* (or, in other words, the constitution) of the Fascist party, as it was drafted by the Grand Council of the party in October 1926, and approved by royal decree in December 1929. The crucial words of the preamble are those which turn on the position of the leader. "The people recognized the Leader by the marks of his will, his force, and his achievement.[1] The people must receive light and leading from above, where there is the full vision of the attributes to be given and the tasks to be assigned, of function and of desert, and where the only standard is that of the general interest." But the essential factor of leadership carries corollaries and adjuncts. There is first the corollary of emotion or faith. "Fascism is above all a faith, which has had its confessors, and under the impulse of which new Italians to-day are vigorous as combatants." There is next the corollary of struggle, of *élan*, of the sudden leap. "Fascism has always considered itself as being in a state of war. . . . Removed from dogmatic formulas and rigid

[1] The Tibetans recognize their Grand Lama only by external marks. The Western leader is known by the inward marks of his will and force, and the fruits of his achievement.

plans, it feels that life consists in the possibility of continuous renewal." The pragmatism of a "will to believe" in the faith—a will which proves the truth of the faith by simply acting upon it—is also another corollary and adjunct of the creed. The leader; the emotion or faith he inspires; the struggle he leads; the will to believe generated in the struggle, and the action which follows upon it—all these are thus in the foreground. Beyond, in the distant background, stand the law to be ultimately made and the ends to be finally realized. "In the ardour of struggle action always preceded law. Fascism is living to-day in terms of the future; it regards the generations to come as the forces destined to realize all the ends designed by our wills." This is the opposite of the temper of Wordsworth's Happy Warrior,

> Who, in the heat of conflict, keeps the law
> In calmness made, and sees what he foresaw.

It is not mere opportunism; but it is at any rate a homage to contingency and chance. But that homage is always involved in the creed of personalism. The personality of the leader is in the domain of contingency.

The creed of personalism, in this stage of its evolution, not only affects the idea of democracy; it also affects the idea of law. It challenges democracy as a mere impersonal system of many voices —supposed to be blended and attuned, by the method of discussion, in a common harmony of public thought, but really discordant and jangled—and it seeks to substitute for it the personal note of the dominant voice, followed and echoed by the rest. Challenging the impersonality of democracy, it is led to challenge equally the impersonality of law. It forces the impersonal to put on personality: it makes personal action precede and determine law; it turns the general rule into an act of personal will.

The challenge which is thus offered both to the general process of discussion and to the system of general rules of law (two things which are closely connected, and are therefore challenged together) has a long ancestry. It goes beyond contemporary philosophy. It is as old as German Romanticism. Perhaps we may even say that it is as old as the German woods: *ce beau système a été trouvé dans les bois.* We are thus brought back to that German ingredient in the creed of personalism which has already been mentioned, and which must now enter the stage as protagonist of the drama.

III

Romanticism is a word so general and so comprehensive that we may include under it, according to our predilections, everything

which we like—or everything which we dislike. It is primarily a term in the language of art and literature; but it is also a term in the language of morals and politics. If we confine it to the latter of these applications, we shall still find it a Protean term. Originally and etymologically, it seems to signify a return to the Middle Ages and the tradition of their vernacular literature, or "romances." It thus acquires a note of what may be called "antiquarian idealism." The restoration of the past becomes the goal of the future: *antiquam exquirite matrem* is made the motto of life. But a return to the past will not stop at a proximate and particular epoch: it will run back beyond the Middle or intervening Ages to the first and immediate beginnings. From the days of Herder and Schelling, in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, the German Romantics who turned their faces to the moral and political sphere began to speak of the Folk. They went back, like the school of natural rights, to original and primary nature. But unlike the school of natural rights, they did not posit a state of nature with free individuals who had to make social contracts before they could form a society: they discovered the given and existing society of the Folk, or tribe, or stem, already united by the personal bond of a common loyalty. In the early, and also, indeed, in the later Romanticism of Germany, down to the twentieth century, this spiritual bond of a common loyalty was still held to be the ultimate bond. The biological idea of the unity of a common blood (or "race") could only emerge into the foreground with the further development of natural science; and though the Folk was already regarded by the Romantic thinkers as a tribe or stem, possessing a physical quality of consanguinity, and thus sharing the nature of the family, it was envisaged primarily as a spiritual being, which owed its unity to the *spirit* of a common loyalty.

In the Romantic view the Folk is thus a spiritual being (*Volksgeist*), which acknowledges, as such, a common loyalty. To whom, or to what, is the loyalty due? The philosopher gives one answer: the ordinary man, in his simplicity and his personalism, gives another; and it is the answer of the ordinary man which eventually wins the day—even in the theory of the philosopher. The answer of the Romantic philosopher, in its first intention, ascribes the loyalty owed by the Folk to the spirit of the Universe (*Weltgeist*). God is a pervading spirit, who manifests Himself in many ways: each Folk is a manifestation of Him, or, as Ranke said, a "thought of God": the members of each Folk acknowledge Him, in the manifestation of His nature given to them in their area of space and their epoch of time, as the common centre and magnet of their common loyalty. This is a creed of personalism which ends in the superpersonal. It makes the Folk—and the State in which the Folk

issues—into a personal group, united by personal bonds of common loyalty; but it carries this Folk "back into the life of the universal substance," and attaches it to the immanent spirit of a pantheistic universe. There was a simpler form of personalism which appealed to the ordinary man, and which could be discovered by the historian in the cultural records of the early German Folk. This was the figure of the human leader—the *princeps* with his particular body of retainers or followers, gathered around his person in an elementary loyalty; or the *dux* or *führer* of a whole people, chosen and followed by it for his personal quality. Tacitus had written of such figures; they could still be discovered in old popular legends and tales. Nor did they belong only to the past. The leader, with his dynamic personality, was a perennial factor of human life. He was the core and centre of the community: he was the magnet which drew its members together in a common attraction towards his dynamism. The world and its Folks, dissolved by the philosophers into a fluid play of the spirit, were thus solidified again in terms of concrete personality. The Romantic philosophers themselves were ready to make their peace with this process of solidification. The super-personal spiritual force could be depicted as caught in, and reflected by, the leader; and it has thus been said of German Romanticism that "it placed leadership in the hands of great men, from whom the spirit of the whole essentially radiated and by whom it was organized."[1]

This solidification of Romanticism into a doctrine of personal (and, in the last resort, autocratic) leadership may be traced both in the political philosophy and the legal theory of nineteenth-century Germany. In political philosophy the spiritual Folk becomes the living fountain of an organized and canalized State; and the leader who incarnates the spirit of the Folk (and thereby the spirit of the Universe, in the particular manifestation which it has assumed in his particular Folk) becomes the directing and organizing force of such a State. Hegel can thus regard the universal spirit (the *Weltgeist*) as necessarily concrete and solidified in individual personality—concrete generally in all the persons who form a Folk, but particularly concrete in the highest and most representative personality. A modern German writer, whose work appeared in the beginning of 1933, has expressed the significance of Hegel's theory in the following terms[2]: "The highest universality is also the highest

[1] Ernst Troeltsch, in a lecture of the year 1922, translated in an appendix to the author's translation of Gierke's *Natural Law and the Theory of Society*, vol. i, p. 213.

[2] K. Larenz, "Die rechts- und staatsphilosophie des deutschen Idealismus und ihre gegenwarts Bedeutung" (in *Staatsphilosophie*, a part of Abt. IV des *Handbuchs der Philosophie*), p. 168.

individuality. It is in the most perfect union of the universal and the individual that the essence of an historically important personality consists. It follows that the statesman who wills the universal—that is to say, the State—is not only the organ or instrument of the State: *he is the State;* he is, in the instant of his activity, so thoroughly identified with it, that it is active and conscious of itself in him and in his being. On the other hand, since the State is also, at the same time, indubitably something more than any of its temporary representatives, it is true that even the active statesman is never, in himself alone, the State: he needs the complement, the other factor, that is to say the community of the Folk which acknowledges him and recognizes itself in him." These are words which cover and illuminate much of the development of Germany in the nineteenth century—and afterwards. They cover and illuminate the legal theory which found in the person of the monarch *der Träger der Staatsgewalt*—the bearer of the authority of the State. They cover the career of Bismarck—the minister provided by the *Zeitgeist* for the monarch. They cover the coming and the triumph of Herr Hitler—the leader whom, when the monarch was gone, the *Volksgeist* found for itself, and in whom it "recognized itself."

There is a sense in which Romanticism is the negation of personality. It is the negation of moral personality, as such personality was conceived by Kant—the personality which belongs to all men equally, in virtue of the simple fact of their being men: the personality which, true to the nature of its own being, respects its fellow everywhere, and therefore respects the claims of others and its own responsibility for meeting those claims. The rock of moral personality—which is the foundation of the moral law, as that in turn is the foundation of the law of the State and the whole system of the State[1]—is submerged by the waters of Romantic theory. Super-personal forces or spirits emerge in its place: with them, and energized by them, there appear the giant forms of groups, communities, or Folks, driven towards constant development by the working of their immanent spirit; and though we are told that the group exists for the individual, whom it lifts into a larger liberty, we are also told that the individual exists for the group, to which he owes the gift of his life and the debt of his loyalty.

In another sense, however, it may be said that Romanticism is the assertion, and indeed the exaggeration, of personality. It creates new dimensions of personality. It seeks to enrich the world with higher (or larger) group-persons: it insists on the unique and personal individuality of each Folk. Again, it adds a new extension to

[1] "A true theory of politics must begin by doing homage to moral obligations" (Kant, *Perpetual Peace*, Appendix 1).

personality. It emphasizes the idea of *development*: it projects each particular Folk on its own personal voyage of constant becoming and perennial discovery. Law is thus personalized into a matter of fluid personal growth; and we may see the result in the doctrines of that historical school of law which was one of the expressions of Romanticism. "For the historical school of law, the *Volksgeist* is not only the origin and the . . . creator of law . . . it is also the canon of judgment: only that law is 'true' and 'living,' which keeps its connection intact with its particular *Volksgeist*, and has 'grown' historically in the 'organic' development and expansion of this *Volksgeist*."[1] But the personal note in Romanticism not only leads to new dimensions and a new extension of personality; nor is it content with the personalization of law in terms of these new dimensions and this new extension. In the last resort it returns to plain human personality—but it returns on the basis of a fundamental inequality of persons. The leader who is at one with the super-personal force or spirit, and who can thus "will the universal," becomes the residuary legatee of the whole philosophy. He may be the greater and finer leader if he has the sense upon him of his oneness with the Spirit, and of the Universal behind his will; but he is *primus inter impares*, and any sense of responsibility which he feels is not so much to his fellows or equals, as to the higher being and the transcendent cause which he represents in his person. He may cover his position with the form of popular election, and clothe his acts with the form of popular approbation; but this formal homage is not a duty, and he is really an incarnation of the super-personal rather than a representative of true and actual human persons.

IV

The principle of personal leadership which dominates contemporary Germany is not a new and sudden eruption. It has assumed, indeed, a new form by entering into an alliance with the democratic factor of party, and by creating a personal party-following to serve the leader as the immediate source of acknowledgment and recognition. But there is an old substance behind the new form; and even the new form itself, if we see it under the guise of the old institution of the retinue or *Gefolgschaft*, has an antiquity of its own, and is an ancient corollary of leadership. The substance of the *Führer-prinzip* is as old as German Romanticism; and in so far as Romanticism goes back to primitive Germany, it is as old as primitive Germany. In Western Europe men have slowly built an impersonal State, acting through impersonal institutions, and by impersonal rules of law, but acting always to protect the claims

[2] K. Larenz, *op. cit.*, p. 145.

and to guarantee the rights of each human personality. The democratic form of State is the last stage of this building. Across the Rhine the personal has endured, and it has sublimated itself in a philosophy of personal leadership which makes the leader, himself inspired, the inspiration of his people's life.

There is something here which is deeper than the antithesis of democracy and dictatorship. That antithesis does not cover the facts, or express their significance. The leader is something more —and also something less—than the dictator. He is the vehicle of something more than his own individual force and his own individual will. Just for that reason, he puts less trust in himself and his own resources. The leader is not, like the dictator, an absolute antithesis of democracy: he may be said to be rather an alternative form, at once like it and different from it—like it, in seeking to serve as the channel of a people's thought and aspirations; unlike it, in seeking to resume that thought and those aspirations in the single channel of his own personality. From this point of view it may be urged that a truer form of antithesis would be that between democracy of discussion, with a whole people painfully seeking the truth through the organs and institutions of discussion, and democracy of intuition, with a people content to see the truth through the eyes of a "chosen leader" who possesses the higher vision. But to state the antithesis in these terms is to be guilty of giving the name of democracy to something which is not democracy at all. The antithesis between democracy and dictatorship may not cover the facts; but the antithesis between "democracy of discussion" and "democracy of intuition" only serves to conceal them. There is a fundamental division between the doctrine of democracy, as we know it in Western Europe, and the German doctrine of leadership. The one is an impersonal system which, just because it is impersonal, gives the opportunity to every person of expressing his thought and will, and results in the guidance of national life by the combined thoughts and wills of all persons. The other is the personal explosion of a single individuality which, though it may allege its "representative" character, and though it may actually receive a general allegiance in the moment of its explosion, is fatal to the general expression of persons, and inimical to democracy. The impersonal liberates *persons*. The personal liberates *a* person. That is why it may be said, in a paradox, that the impersonal is based on the fundamental rock of personality. That is why it may also be said, in another paradox, that the personal, not being founded on this rock, has to base itself on the misty and impersonal clouds of an assumed Folk-person and its *Volksgeist*.

The general theory of German Romanticism, as we have already had reason to note, has not been active in Germany only. It is one

of the forces at work in contemporary Italy. The stream of Fascist ideas has not only been fed by currents of thought which flow from Bergson and Sorel and Pareto. It has also been augmented by a Romantic current flowing from Germany. Italian thinkers have accepted, and added to the common stock, the doctrine of the higher personality of the People, expressed and realized in the person of its leader. The Italian Charter of Liberty, one of the great documents of Fascism, starts from the assertion that "the Italian nation, by its power and its duration, is an organism with a being, and ends and means of action, superior to those of the individuals, whether separate or grouped, of which it is composed." Assume the "superior organism," and you naturally assume, as its inevitable corollary, the superior person who represents its being and gives "light and leading from above." In the varied and kaleidoscopic theory of Fascism, drawn together and welded into a *dottrina* during the last fifteen years, we may thus trace a German as well as a Latin strain—a German strain independent of the peculiar doctrine of Nietzsche, and derived from the permanent trend, and the general character, of the Romantic theories of Germany.

But the principle of personal leadership has a longer historical pedigree, and a larger and more mature philosophical ancestry, in Germany than elsewhere. The leader and his following belong to the primitive records of the early German tribes; and the doctrine of heroic personality is steadily and deeply imbedded in the history of German thought from the end of the eighteenth century to the present day—all the more because that thought has again and again recurred to the inspiration of pure Teutonic antiquity. Nor is the principle of personal leadership merely a fact of the primitive past, or a factor in the modern thought which finds inspiration in that past. It is a principle which is also illustrated in the general course of German history. If the mediaeval history of England is largely a history of the making of the common law and the evolution of parliament, the mediaeval history of Germany is mainly a history of the achievements and the failures of kings and emperors. The German Reformation is something more than the personality of Luther, but the explosion of his fiery spirit is a great part of its history. Prussia was made by its electors and kings; and when Prussia began to pass into Germany, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, it passed through the spirit and personality of Bismarck. The leader and the following—*Führer und Gefolgschaft*—have played a part in German development for which there is no parallel in our insular history. The great men we have produced seem cut on a smaller scale. . . . Perhaps that is only an illusion; and perhaps the real fact is that they have had to work in co-

operation, or in conflict, with other men who felt themselves to be of an equal temper. . . . At any rate the only votary of Heroes and Hero-worship in the history of English thought was a romantic Scotsman who had steeped himself in German philosophy.

For all its antiquity, the principle of leadership has suffered a change in our times. It has come under the influence of levelling tendencies to which it seems by its nature opposed, but with which it has made its peace. In the past it was only the religious leader who emerged from the depths: the political leader was generally drawn from the heights. To-day the political leaders of the countries which have accepted the principle of leadership are drawn from the depths. They have emerged without advantage of birth or wealth, and espousing or founding a party they have used the popular arts of journalism and propaganda to prove their magnetism and to establish their title. The origin from which they start and the methods by which they arrive can both be acclaimed as in some sense democratic. If they then act, or profess to act, in the days of their power, as representatives of the depths and spokesmen of the people, the acclamation may be redoubled, and their followers may claim that a new and higher form of democracy has been achieved. That claim, for the reasons already stated, is a claim which cannot be sustained. The principle of leadership is not the same thing as the principle of democracy. On the contrary, if the principle of democracy consists in the free expression and the free reconciliation of different views, it is the opposite of that principle. But the matter does not end there. Leadership may be different from democracy, and the opposite of democracy; but it may still have qualities and merits which make it an alternative to democracy It may satisfy human emotions of loyalty which democracy leaves starved. It may provide springs of continuous and concentrated action in which democracy is deficient.

There was never a democracy which was destitute of leaders. The defect which may be charged against it is not the absence of leadership, but the multiplicity of leaders and the refusal of the led to give to any one leader a continuous enough allegiance. The new principle of leadership may claim the merit of providing a single leader, and of providing that leader with the continuous allegiance which enables him to pursue a continuous and long-range policy. But if it may claim that merit, it also suffers from serious disabilities—disabilities which affect the choice of the leader: disabilities which affect his action: disabilities which affect the eventual succession to his office. Under the system of democracy a reserve of potential leaders is steadily accumulated: their powers are tried and tested in the open and public process of debate; and the eventual choice of the final leader is determined by the known

and regular methods of a constitutional system. The new system of leadership abrogates any system of choice; it depends on the spontaneous emergence of a dominant personality; it works in the dark. The continuity of the leader in his office, which is another of the essential features of the new leadership, may affect his action for evil as well as for good, and prove a disability as well as a merit. He has indeed the opportunity of long-range policies; but he also incurs the danger of petrifaction. True leadership demands a fresh and vital impulse; and the period for which any one man can give such an impulse must necessarily be measured by a brief span of years. Democracy is wise in changing its leaders, because it secures a continuity of fresh impulse; it may even be said, from that point of view, to do the truest homage to the nature of true leadership. It is thus ready—sometimes only too ready—to solve the problem of succession. The personal leader who has won his office by a right of emergence can offer no certain solution to that problem. By the very nature of his solitary position, he cannot accumulate a reserve of genuine political leaders from whom his successor may eventually emerge. They would be too dangerous to his power. He tends, voluntarily or involuntarily, to starve the supply of the future, and to leave the succession at the best to mediocrity and at the worst to chance. In its end, as in its beginning and its intervening course, the Romantic principle of leadership defeats itself, and fails to secure its own ultimate aim.

GREAT THINKERS

(IX) LEIBNIZ

Professor LEONARD J. RUSSELL

I

It was in 1686, in what has since been given the title of the Discourse on Metaphysics, that Leibniz wrote the first systematic exposition of his philosophy. The central conception of the Discourse is the conception of individual created substance. Each complete individual in the world is active, but entirely self-contained. In it are to be found traces of all its past activities, and the ground of its present and future activities. Though all created substances are completely independent of one another, yet their activities are in thoroughgoing correspondence, and between them they make up a universe which is a perfect harmony.

The essential nature of an individual substance is mind, or something analogous to mind, which Leibniz calls a substantial form. Its variety consists of perceptions, which in their totality represent the whole universe from the point of view of the individual substance. Its total state at any moment is a harmony of all its perceptions, together with a striving or tendency or appetite towards a new harmony of new perceptions.

Further, each individual substance has an organic body which, as a part of the physical world, changes in accordance with purely mechanical laws, without being interfered with in the least by the mind, or the substantial form, of which it is the body. But the changes in the body correspond with the changes in the mind.

The situation is, however, complicated by the fact that, if it were not animated by a mind or a substantial form, body would not be substantial at all, and the mechanical laws according to which changes in body take place would not be intelligible.

The doctrine seems a strange one and full of difficulty; and I shall confine myself to indicating some of the considerations which led Leibniz to this conception of individual substance, and to bringing out some of the problems in which it involved him. On account of limitations of space I am compelled to leave almost entirely aside the important theological frame in which the thought of Leibniz is set.

II

Leibniz was while still a youth attracted by the views of the atomists of his day; and the general spirit of his philosophy can perhaps best be approached by noting what he approved of in atomism, and what he came to criticize in it.

The first motive underlying atomism was the desire to seek underneath the changes in the world for something permanent and substantial. Ordinary bodies the atomists regarded as built up out of these substantial indivisible unit substances. With this view Leibniz thoroughly agreed.

The second motive, which the atomists of the seventeenth century had in common with the Cartesians, was the desire to give an intelligible account of the causes of events in the world. Everything in the physical world happens through efficient causes, that is, through the motion of pieces of matter in space. Nothing can move but matter, and no piece of matter can change its motion, unless some other piece of matter collides with it. The machinery of all changes in the physical world is impact. This view also Leibniz accepted, and he held it throughout his life.

Leibniz, however, did not think that the atomists went far enough with their own principles. Most of them thought that atoms have some size, and they were therefore compelled to assume that the indivisibility of an atom arose from the cohesiveness of its parts. Leibniz thought that this cohesiveness ought to be explained by mechanical causes; and his earliest essay in physics was an attempt to show that cohesion could be explained without supposing in matter any other qualities than those of occupying space, and being capable of being swept out of its space by any other matter that impinged on it, without offering the least resistance either to motion, or to the separation of its parts. Any other qualities he tried to show were based on varieties of motion.

This early essay was important for Leibniz's development in many ways. Firstly, because it failed in its purpose. It was an attempt to get what might be called a purely geometrical physics, based on laws of motion deduced by a purely logical process from the notion of body as what occupies space, and is capable of being moved in space. The resulting laws, he soon came to see, were not in harmony with the observed facts; and as he could see no flaw in his reasoning, once the premisses were granted, he took the failure as a conclusive proof that the laws of motion must be derived from a conception of bodily substance which involves more than can be discovered in the notions of extension, or occupation of space, and motion.

Secondly, in this essay Leibniz tried to do for motions what the atomists had tried to do for extended body. He tried to show that

every motion is built up out of indivisible units of motion. The indivisible unit of motion he called a "conatus," following Hobbes; a tendency to motion, which gives rise to actual motion in a body if the body is not hindered by having impressed on it a tendency in the opposite direction from another body impinging on it, and which when it does not give rise to actual motion shows itself by exerting pressure on the mobile stuff in contact with it. He took space as (for all practical purposes) full of mobile stuff either actually moving or at rest under pressure as the result of such tendencies. Every tendency in a given direction is communicated to all the bodies in the universe along the line of that direction without being lost by the body which possesses it, and in the end what happens anywhere affects directly or indirectly what happens everywhere else: so that nothing is actually at rest during the shortest interval of time imaginable.

Thus Leibniz replaced the atomic picture of changeless atoms moving through empty space—in which nothing happens inside an atom, and nothing happens in space where there is no atom—by a picture of space filled with motions and pressures, of variety everywhere, with a delicate responsiveness to what happens everywhere else.

Thirdly, in this doctrine of the indivisible element of motion Leibniz found his first conception of the nature of mind. The mind is an indivisible system of such tendencies, held together in a unity. Being indivisible, it is indestructible, and in it are preserved all the tendencies that have ever been impressed on the point of its body that it occupies, so that it reflects in its multiplicity all the variety of changes in the world. It is unnecessary to go into the details of this view—which can be taken as in some sort a prophecy in miniature of Professor Alexander's mental space-time—but it is important as showing how anxious Leibniz was to get a picture of the universe in which there was nothing dead, nothing without variety, no happening anywhere which did not have a corresponding effect everywhere. It shows too his feeling that the ultimate substances of which bodies are made are essentially the same in nature as minds.

III

This last point is important. The development of Leibniz's views during his stay in Paris (1672–1676) and in the later years up to 1686 is very closely connected with his criticism of the Cartesian view that there are in the world two distinct kinds of substance, having no common nature, the one consisting of extension and the other of thought. Against this view Leibniz always insists that we have not an adequate account either of extension or of thought,

that bodily substance involves more than extension, and that perhaps there is a closer connexion between thought and body than the Cartesians suppose.

Various lines of investigation pursued by Leibniz confirmed him in these objections to Cartesianism. I can note only a few of them, very briefly.

(i) His logical studies caused him to question the Cartesian principle that whatever I clearly and distinctly conceive to belong or not to belong to a thing, I can truly judge to belong or not to belong to it—the principle which is the basis of the distinction between mind and body, and of the identification of body with extension, mind with thought. My idea of a thing is clear, if I am able to recognize the thing wherever I come across it, even if I am not able to give a detailed account of a sufficient number of characteristics of the thing to enable anyone else to identify it. If I can give such an account, my idea is distinct as well.

Leibniz regards this as insufficient as a basis for truth. Ideas are far more complex than anyone realizes. We have not yet begun to touch the fringe of their complexity. Only the most strenuous and long-continued efforts at analysing them into their ultimate constituents will make us alive to this. As a help for this, we need a suitable symbolism, as suitable for its purpose as the Arabic numerals are in arithmetic, or as the symbols in the infinitesimal calculus which Leibniz himself had discovered. The Ariadne's thread that we need to guide ourselves through the labyrinths of the problems of thought—the *filum meditandi*—involves a double effort (i) to find suitable symbols to express our thoughts as so far analysed and (ii) to carry the analysis still further, improving our symbols in the process. To our present lack of suitable symbols and of adequate analysis is due the unsatisfactory situation in philosophy. Until we can settle disputes by adequately symbolising the data, and drawing conclusions from them by calculating, we can be sure of the inadequacy of our analysis.

It is not enough then for our ideas to be distinct. If we are to discover truth we need adequate ideas; and we can be certain that an idea is not adequate until we have carried its analysis sufficiently far to enable us to judge from the analysis that it contains no self-contradictory elements, and is therefore a possible idea.

(ii) Leibniz was already studying the nature of extension from this point of view in Paris. There is a long dialogue on the "labyrinth of the continuum" that he wrote in the Thames on his way from England to Holland, at the end of 1676, which foreshadows the conclusion that no real substance can be a continuum. A perfect continuum is something ideal; and hence if extension is real, it is not continuous, and *vice versa*. Again he had already discussed with

Huygens in Paris the possibility of determining absolute motion of bodies in space, concluding that there was no means of doing this.

On both these grounds Leibniz soon concluded that there is something imaginary in our account of extension, when we consider it as an existing whole, and that therefore the essence of matter cannot, as the Cartesians thought, consist of extension.

(iii) Again the Cartesian principle of clear and distinct ideas shows its inadequacy when applied to determine the nature of thought. For if there is more in our minds than we are clearly and distinctly aware of—and there must be if, as Leibniz was already convinced, our minds reflect everything that is going on in the entire universe—then the Cartesian principle is of very doubtful value. For what in us is obscure and confused affects our feeling of certainty. Many ideas seem distinct to us because we do not notice elements that are contained in them obscurely. Our only safe line is that of analysis of concepts.

Thus the Cartesian account of the mind seemed to Leibniz to err by over-simplification; and the sharp separation between mind and body seemed to him dubious.

(iv) Of the two, mind and bodily substance, the latter was the more liable to doubt. In his discussions with the Abbé Foucher, Leibniz agreed that I cannot doubt my own existence as a thinking being, nor can I doubt that there is a variety in my thoughts; but that when I consider the reasons which lead me to conclude that there is an external world outside me, these reasons are not such as to give complete certainty. I can distinguish dreams from waking life only by the greater consistency of my waking life; and this distinction is not completely conclusive, even though it would be carrying doubt too far actually to doubt the reality of the external world. The fact that doubt about the external world cannot be set at rest completely is an indication that our conception of body contains something not completely analysed; and the main value of developing these doubts and trying to answer them lies in the encouragement it affords to further analysis. This is the chief purport of Leibniz's correspondence with Foucher.

(v) It is here, I think, that we can find the significance of Leibniz's studies of the laws of motion, and of his measure of force. They are essentially parts of his endeavour to get a clear account of the nature of matter. That Leibniz substitutes mv^2 for the Cartesian mv as a measure of the force of a moving body is of relatively minor significance; what is important is the light that his method of reaching a measure throws on the nature of bodily substance.

Any measure must be based on homogeneous units. Now a body, whether regarded as a volume or estimated by its weight, can be

taken as built up out of homogeneous units. But a speed of two feet a second cannot be taken as built up of two speeds, each of one foot a second. Hence we can get no direct measure of the force of a moving body, since we cannot get any homogeneous units of force. We are therefore compelled to estimate a force indirectly, by considering some effect it is capable of producing, which can be measured in terms of homogeneous units. Our measure of force then depends on the general principle that a cause is equal to the total effect it can produce. But this principle cannot be derived from the notion of body, or of motion, or from a combination of these notions. Nor is it an identical proposition, to be derived from the notions of cause and effect. It is a principle of perfection, depending on the activity of God in the world.

Again, if mv were the measure of force, we should be encouraged to take motion as a real entity. But on a closer consideration, we see that since motion takes time, it can never exist all at once, and therefore is not a true entity at all. Further, a body's motion is after all only relative; you cannot say of two bodies moving relatively to each other, which is really moving. A body does, however, possess force at any particular moment, exercising pressure even when it is not obviously moving. And it is clear that what mv^2 measures is something much more fundamental than the measure itself. There is no object which even thought can apprehend, of which mv^2 can be directly seen to be the measure. And mv^2 considered as something in a body at a particular moment is clearly something accidental, for the body can lose motion, giving it to another body. Being accidental, it must be a temporary modification of something substantial. It is this more substantial thing, whose temporary modification is measured by us as mv^2, that we must take as the substance of body. Since it is essentially a cause, producing effects, it must be an active substance. Leibniz calls it a substantial form, and in accordance with the views developed in his earlier studies, regards it as analogous to mind. He still maintains his old view that for the determination of actual changes in bodies, efficient causes alone—i.e. impacts—must be taken into consideration. Substantial forms have to be posited only for the sake of justifying the use of the principle of the equality of cause and effect, on which the laws of motion themselves depend. Thus Leibniz insists that everything in nature happens through mechanical causes, except the laws of mechanical causation itself.

I cannot go into the complicated considerations involved in Leibniz's dynamics, with their many obscurities and faults; the point I want to stress is his conclusion that the essence of body cannot be found in extension and motion, but must be found in something analogous to mind.

Thus once more the sharp distinction between mind and body which the Cartesians endeavoured to make, breaks down.

IV

So far I have tried to bring out the various lines of inquiry which Leibniz pursued in his search for the notion of created substance. The results are partly positive, partly negative. Negatively, the sharp distinction between mind and matter cannot be upheld. Neither extension nor motion can constitute the essence of bodily substance. Again our minds are more complex than we think, and may involve matter in ways we are not clearly aware of. Clear and distinct ideas are not enough to form a basis for our conception of substance. Positively, the essence of bodily substance is something formal, akin to our own minds. Every simple substance is indivisible, containing an infinite variety, a great deal of it not clearly perceived, which mirrors the world of bodily events, so that to all changes in the world of bodily events correspond changes in simple substance. There is this infinite variety in our own minds; but we are clearly aware of only a very small part of it.

A further point, insisted on by Malebranche, was fully approved by Leibniz, viz. that no created substance can affect, or be affected by, any other created substance. Thus mind cannot act on body nor body on mind. But Malebranche concluded that God is the sole direct agent in the universe, producing all changes both in matter and in minds. Leibniz could not agree to this. Creatures are not the mere repositories of God's daily deeds. While God is the sole ultimate agent, He is not the sole agent, but carries out His purposes by making created substances active, putting into them, in so far as they are not capable of reflection and thought, the law of their activity, and in so far as they are capable of reflection and thought, giving them a responsible nature, capable of acting freely in accordance with what seems to them to be their good.

It is clear that this view, taken along with the conclusions already reached, leads straight to the conception of a simple created substance as completely self-contained so far as all other created substances are concerned, affected directly only by God; the conception we meet for the first time in the Discourse on Metaphysics.

The clear expression of this conception he owed to his logical studies, especially those between 1679 and 1686, which were published for the first time by Couturat. In these studies the effort at analysis of propositions and of concepts, and the effort to provide suitable symbols for the expression of concepts and of propositions, go very closely together. The analogy of multiplication of numbers was never far from his mind, and he tried to symbolize propositions by

the help of this analogy, so as to find a way of expressing propositions, whether universal or particular, and whether affirmative or negative, in such a way that you could see from an examination of their symbols, without any consideration of their subject-matter, whether they were necessarily true, or necessarily false, or whether it was possible that they should be either true or false. A necessary proposition is one in which when explicitly expressed a predicate is attributed to a subject of such a nature that the notion of the predicate is contained in the notion of the subject. The proposition which is the logical negation of a necessary proposition is an impossible one. Again a proposition in which a predicate is attributed to a subject of such a nature that the notion of the predicate, while not contained in the notion of the subject, is yet not incompatible with that notion, can be said to be a possible proposition, though, of course, the proposition which denies this is equally possible. (Leibniz was aware that in strictness what we have called possible propositions are not propositions at all, since they do not conform to what he often stated as the primary truth, viz. that every proposition is either true or false.) But the most important kind of proposition with which Leibniz endeavoured to deal lies between absolutely necessary propositions and bare possibles. He called them contingent propositions, and in them, he thought, the notion of the predicate is contained in the notion of the subject, not in the straightforward way in which the notion B, say, is contained in the more complex notion AB, or in which 7 is a factor of 56, but in a more complex way. He helped himself out by the analogy of incommensurable numbers. Two numbers are commensurable when their ratio can be expressed by a fraction whose numerator and denominator are finite whole numbers; incommensurable numbers are numbers whose ratio cannot be so expressed, although in their case a series of fractions each with whole numbers as numerator and denominator can be found, which come ever closer and closer to expressing the ratio, so that we can get such a series of fractions differing from the ratio by an amount less than any amount we care to mention, however small it may be. E.g. the square root of 2 is a number whose square is exactly 2. Now the square of 1·4 is 1·96; the square of 1·41 is 1·9881; the square of 1·414 is 1·999396. As we take more decimal places in extracting the square root we get a number whose square is closer and closer to 2. By taking enough places we can make the difference between 2 and the square of our number as small as we please; but however many places we take, we shall never get an exact expression of the square root. Something analogous to this Leibniz found in propositions expressing actual fact. It is, e.g., true that I am at the moment of writing this seated in my chair; this is true of me, and thus it is connected with my complete notion,

indeed contained in it, but it cannot be extracted from my notion by any finite analysis. All that can be done is to give more and more reasons, taken from my personal nature and my past history, and so on, which will make it more and more certain that, being the person I have been and am, I shall do my present writing sitting down rather than standing up. But since the reasons are infinite, even though this fact is contained in my notion, it is not so contained as to make it necessary that I should be sitting down at present, although it is so contained as to make it certain that I shall.

There are then for Leibniz two ways in which a predicate is contained in a subject, one way which involves necessity, and one way which only involves determinateness, or certainty. Although God from the beginning of the world has foreseen with complete certainty that I shall in the present circumstances do my writing sitting down, and although the rest of the universe is so arranged that my position fits in perfectly with it, this does not prevent me from acting freely in choosing to sit down.

Until Leibniz had settled this point satisfactorily in his own mind (however unsatisfactory it was to some of his contemporaries, and however unsatisfactory it may seem to modern readers) he was unwilling to take the next step, and define an individual substance as he does in the Discourse on Metaphysics, as entirely self-contained apart from its continual dependence on God, its whole history, whether it is said to act or to suffer, depending on its own nature.

V

As we have seen, Leibniz in his early writings defined thought as the harmony of variety. He retains this view in his conception of an individual substance. Thus at any moment the state of an individual substance contains an infinite number of perceptions held together into a unity. These perceptions represent or express the entire state of the universe at this moment, from the point of view which the individual occupies in the universe. But in addition to this, there is in the substance at any moment an active tendency to the production of new perceptions, held together in a new unity, which express the next state of the universe. This active tendency Leibniz in his later writings calls appetition. Thus perception and appetition are the two basic features of all substance.

In his later writings Leibniz distinguishes three main grades of created substances. The lowest are those to which he applies the term monad simply, or entelechy, or sometimes life (*vie*). They are bare principles of life animating the lowest organisms, and have merely perception. The next are those in which some perceptions stand out clearly, and are capable of being attended to and remem-

bered. He calls them souls (*anima, âme*): they have *sensio*, clear sense impressions, and animate organisms with sense organs capable of producing definite impressions. They include animals. The third range of substances includes those which in addition to perception and sense have also intellection, apprehension of concepts and universal principles. Of these he uses the term mind (*mens, esprit*). Substances of the first two grades express the created universe. Those of the third grade express God as well. Only they are moral creatures. All created substances have spontaneity, but in the highest substances this spontaneity is freedom. For since they are capable of reflection, their activity is not a mere blind tendency to a new harmony of perceptions, but depends on their choice of what appears to them to be the best. In the divine economy the lower creatures serve the higher. The higher are privileged to become, through the bestowal of God's grace, citizens in the city of God.

Each monad represents or expresses the whole world at each moment, and through its own spontaneous striving, without any outer influence, reaches at the next moment a representation of the whole world at the next moment. This correspondence between expression and thing expressed can only be explained by supposing it to have been pre-established by God at the beginning of things. Leibniz holds that in this argument we have an important proof of God's Existence. All the facts of experience show the appearance of interaction between individuals. But individuals cannot interact. The apparent interaction is only correspondence. But the correspondence is so constant and so detailed that it cannot be fortuitous. It requires a being who can foretell all the contingent actions of free creatures: and this is possible only to an infinite intellect. It requires also that the being possessing this infinite intellect shall have been responsible for admitting to existence such creatures, and such creatures alone, as he foresaw would maintain this correspondence. In short, it requires an infinitely intelligent creator. This argument of course does not involve that God should be good: it leaves God's goodness to be settled by other considerations.

VI

There are two obvious points of difficulty in this conception of an individual substance: firstly how an individual can be said to act if it does not interact, that is if what it does has no effects beyond itself, and secondly how it can be said to act freely if everything it does, down to the smallest detail, can be foreseen from the beginning of things. To the second difficulty Leibniz always replies by his distinction between what is necessitated and what is certain but contingent. It is only if this distinction be accepted that the first

difficulty can be met. Action is possible without any interaction only if the rest of the universe independently of me is so arranged as to adjust itself at each moment to what I shall do. This adjustment requires that what I do shall be certain, but not that what I do shall be necessitated. And it requires that I shall continually do something, i.e. that I shall continually act. What difference does it make to the possibility of my acting, Leibniz asks, whether this adjustment takes place through my action, or whether it takes place independently?

Any fuller reply to both difficulties involves a consideration of the representative nature of perception, since as we have seen the activity of the monad consists in its passing from one harmony of perceptions to a new harmony of new perceptions. Now the accounts Leibniz gives of perception are in language that implies that each monad is situated in a bodily organism, which is a part of the world of bodily substances, and as we shall see the whole notion of bodily substance is in danger of having to be jettisoned if the account of the monad is accepted. In dealing with his account of perception this must be kept in mind: the account will require reinterpretation if there should in the end turn out to be no real bodily substances, i.e. if there should in the end turn out to be nothing in the entire created universe but monads and their perceptions.

Leibniz's account, then, is somewhat as follows. It is essential to an idea that it should represent or express something beyond itself. There is no need for the idea to be like the thing it represents. We may compare ideas in this respect with words. For words to convey meaning it is sufficient that each word should correspond with a single meaning and each meaning with a single word.

So far, then, an idea must have a constant relation with what it expresses or represents.

This, however, is not sufficient, and taken by itself misses out an important element in Leibniz's thought. As we have seen, he regarded the discovery of suitable symbols as one of the most important tasks for man in his efforts to understand. In algebra the symbol x^2 is fitter to represent the square of an unknown quantity than the symbol Q (*quadratus*); and this notion of fitness must be added to the notion of constant relation, in giving an account of the representative nature of ideas.

God did not put in us ideas bearing merely a constant relation to the things they represent. To do this would have displayed His power, but not His wisdom. Ideas have the characteristic we are always trying to secure in our symbols, of being more fitted to represent their objects than any other ideas would be.

Thus Leibniz was asked by Bayle, why God gave us the idea of pain to represent or correspond with a state of imperfection in our

organism. Why did He not give us the idea of the remedy for the imperfection, along with a vivid desire to use the remedy? Leibniz's reply is to the effect (i) that the idea must be fitting to represent its object, (ii) that the relation between the idea and its object must be such that the state of the mind at one moment, fitly representing the state of the world at that moment, must, by laws which are natural, i.e. fitting to monads, give rise to a state of the mind at the next moment which fitly represents the state of the world at that next moment, while the state of the world must follow from its previous state by laws which are natural, i.e. fitting, to bodily events.

This notion of fitness plays a large part in Leibniz's thinking. The word Leibniz mostly uses in his later writings is *convenientia, convenance.* Our word convenience, which includes only the notion of utility, is inadequate as a translation. The *convenable* is intermediate between what is necessary and what is arbitrary. The laws of motion of bodies are an illustration. They are "natural" to bodies, not in the sense that they can be deduced from the nature of body (in which case they would be necessary) nor in the sense that they are arbitrarily established by God (which would require a continual miracle on God's part), but in the sense of being suitable to bodies. Leibniz sometimes speaks of what is natural to bodies as what we can conceive as capable of explanation by efficient causes, sometimes as what belongs to the natures of things. But even the simplest laws of efficient causes are laws of *"convenance,"* as can be seen in the special case of motion in a straight line. A body continues to move in a straight line with uniform speed unless it is constrained by some other body to change its motion. This is neither "geometrically" necessary, nor purely arbitrary. It is a consequence of the supreme principle of perfection, the principle of sufficient reason. Of all the possible alternative laws of motion (e.g. that it should bend to left or right, in a circle of this or that radius or in a curve of any other shape, or that it should increase or diminish speed in any way), this law is the most reasonable. The specific form of the principle of sufficient reason which applies in this case is the principle of maximum determination, which is one of the principles by which Leibniz's conception of the "natural," the "fitting" is rendered precise.

Now all this applies to the representative nature of ideas. Firstly, there is no created monad without an organism; and each organism is adapted to receive and register the effects produced on it by whatever is happening in the entire universe. If it has definite sense organs, some of these effects are registered clearly, though a large number of them are registered only in a confused way. The perceptions of the monad fit these effects; the clear effects are perceived clearly, the confused ones confusedly. When the organism is advancing

to a condition of greater perfection in any respect, the monad feels pleasure; in the reverse case, pain. The desires of the monad represent the tendencies in the organism.

God's problem here was to find representations which should, though evolving within the monad through the spontaneous activity of the monad in a "natural" way, continually preserve their character of being fit representatives of the changing state of the organism.

Since some monads are minds, a second condition comes into play. Minds have apperception, self-consciousness, reflection. They are free, responsible, moral agents. Their activities are guided by choice of what appears best. They are inhabitants not only of the realm of nature, but also of the realm of grace. And the laws of nature are such as to be fitting for the attainment of God's purposes in the realm of grace. Morally evil or sinful acts, for example, are connected with changes in the physical world which tend to have physical consequences connected with pain or suffering, while the opposite is true in the main of morally good acts. This is, of course, a general tendency; where there are exceptions to it, we can be sure that they contribute to enhance the total harmony of things.

Thus, in determining what characteristics perceptions must have in order to be representative of the things perceived, God has at least these considerations in view. It is not enough to say that representation involves a "constant" relation between a perception and the thing perceived.

If this view is correct, it becomes easy to see why the monad has no need of any "windows" through which to "look out" upon the world. For it has its perceptions within it; and these perceptions, carefully attended to, explored, thought about, will lead it to knowledge of the world, and of God, and of God's purposes in the world, at least as far as is necessary to enable the monad to play its part in the whole evolution of things. Leibniz sometimes calls the monad a "living mirror" of the universe; but he sometimes uses another word which emphasizes rather more the close connexion between the monad and the universe. He calls it a "concentration" of the universe. It is by virtue of the fully representative character of its perceptions that it is so.

Further, perceptions do not arise in our mind apart from our activity. It is we who produce them. In one passage in a draft of a letter to de Volder (which, however, was not actually sent) he speaks of mind as an ideating substance, the source of its ideas. Mind is not a storehouse of ideas. Its activity is to be regarded as a kind of imitation, in the limited way possible to it, of God's creative activity

Again, it is true that Leibniz explains the dependence of one creature on another in terms of explicitness of representation, so that if the substance A represents or expresses a state of affairs

more explicitly than the substance B, A is said to be active, B to be passive, or to be dependent on A, in regard to that state of affairs. But in this he has no intention of explaining *away* the fact of dependence. The dependence is not brought about through direct interaction, but is involved in God's entire design.

When then Leibniz says that the lower monads serve the higher, he means that God, foreseeing what a particular higher monad will do in its free action, arranges things at the beginning of the world so that the lower monads will evolve in a corresponding manner. Every higher monad is partly responsible, through its free acts, for the entire course of the universe.

So much then for the activity and the freedom of the monad.

VII

There is only one further point on which I shall touch, very briefly. Adequate treatment would require a series of articles. If the ultimate complete created substances are monads, what is the status of bodily substances? Are there really any such things? A substance must be a unity, and all body, even the smallest conceivable, is divisible. The problem of bodily substance is then the problem of how something divisible can also be a unity.

This problem Leibniz never solved. But he did not think it a meaningless problem; he thought that an endeavour to solve it was useful, as a means of getting further light on the nature of things.

Certain points he was quite definite about. In the first place, we are not certain that there are any substances beyond monads. What we call the world of bodies in space, outside our minds, may in the end turn out to be only well ordered appearances in our minds. There is a great deal to be said for this view, and Leibniz was often inclined to accept it. He says in a letter to Des Bosses, that it is a very satisfactory view philosophically, although he does not think it is capable of being reconciled with the mysteries of the Christian faith.

In the second place, if there are any bodily substances, they must be organisms. Ordinary inorganic bodies are pure aggregates; their unity depends only on our way of looking at them. But organisms do have a closer unity. An organism can gain and lose bodily parts without ceasing to be an organism; and there is much evidence to show that every organism is indestructible. The parts of an organism are themselves organisms or aggregates of organisms.

In the third place, monads must be present in a bodily substance, because otherwise it would contain nothing substantial at all. But no monad by itself, and no collection of monads, could make an aggregate into a unity: and even an organism is, as regards its body,

an aggregate, even if we should be able to show that it is not a mere aggregate. A monad cannot act on anything outside it so as to unify it.

Hence, fourthly, if we are to solve the problem of showing how there can be bodily substances, we shall need a new conception, beyond that of the monad; a conception of a new type of unity. And unless we can work out this new conception satisfactorily, we shall be forced to conclude that there is nothing substantial, and hence nothing real, outside monads.

This new conception Leibniz calls the conception of a substantial bond, a *vinculum substantiale*; and it is only in the correspondence with Des Bosses that Leibniz explores the possibilities of such a *vinculum*: something that would make organisms real substances, and that would in consequence "realize phenomena outside minds." He never reaches a clear account of it. He suggests that such a *vinculum substantiale* would "require" monads and organized bodies, although monads and organized bodies are not "parts" of it. We can perhaps express this in more recent language by saying that the *vinculum substantiale* would be a unity of higher order, "founded on" monads and organized bodies.

The most explicit discussion of this point is contained in a letter to Des Bosses of May 29, 1716; I can only mention here his statement that such a substantial bond would not involve any modification of the monads it joined (since monads cannot be affected from the outside) nor could it consist in an ordinary relation between the monads (since ordinary relations are not real outside the things they relate). To conceive of it at all requires that we shall be able to conceive of predicates and modifications that do not belong to a single monad, but that arise from a number of monads taken in common or conjointly; if there is a real substantial bond between monads, it will be the subject of such predicates and modifications.

Leibniz did not give himself wholly to this line of exploration. It would have needed, as we see, a new type of unity distinct from monads. It would have given the possibility of explaining a true unity which was extended. But perhaps it was too late for Leibniz to follow it out. He was distracted by other problems and by bodily illness. The new notion would have involved a transformation of the entire logic through which his conception of the monad was formulated.

I do not think, however, that he ever gave himself wholly to the alternative view that phenomena are not "realized outside monads." His main point was that unless we can give some account of the unity of bodily substance far more satisfactory than that given either by the atomists or the Cartesians, we shall have to conclude that so-called bodily substances are only appearances to monads. There are more passages in his writings in which he presents the two

alternatives than passages in which he definitely states his adherence to one. And the bulk of his writings are in language which taken in its straightforward significance involves the view that organized bodies, when you take them along with the monads necessary to make them real, are true substances. The description of inorganic bodies and of aggregates of organisms in general as, when considered as unities, only *phenomena bene fundata*, belongs to this view that organisms are true substances, and belongs to this view only. If organisms are not true substances, then the whole world of body becomes only a set of well ordered appearances within the monad —a very different conception from the conception of aggregates of bodily substances when taken as unities, as being *phenomena bene fundata*.

A full discussion of the situation would involve a discussion of his view of the monad as containing both matter and form, in the light of his dynamical conceptions.

Whatever the outcome of such a discussion, we must conclude that the attempt of Leibniz to give a satisfactory account of "bodily substance" fails to reach completeness. The "substantial forms" he introduced into bodies some time round 1680 showed themselves inadequate for the purpose. The *vinculum substantiale* he did not succeed in carrying beyond the preliminary stage of a purely tentative conception.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF J. S. HALDANE

WILLIAM McDOUGALL, F.R.S.

In a little book of 155 pages the late John Scot Haldane gave the world his final message.[1] Much as his friends and admirers must regret his recent death, we may rejoice that in these few pages he has succeeded in presenting in clear and unmistakable fashion the philosophy which, throughout his long life of highly successful detailed research in physiology combined with equally effective and untiring application of his findings to practical problems, he slowly developed into the outlines of a comprehensive and rounded system.

In the combination of highly successful and notable achievement along these three lines Haldane stood unique among his contemporaries. And indeed it would be difficult to point to any other figure in the whole history of intellectual endeavour who could rival him in this remarkable combination. History can show several great figures who have achieved greatly along two of these three lines; such as Helmholtz, Kelvin, and Pasteur, distinguished in both pure research and practical applications; such as Fechner, Ostwald, and Driesch, equally eminent as laboratory workers and as philosophers. But whom can we place alongside Haldane as having made contributions of distinguished excellence in all three fields?

Haldane had set forth his philosophical views in earlier publications; in several small books and in a number of articles and addresses.[2] In none of these did he achieve the clearness and completeness (in outline) of this last effort. There can be no doubt that the somewhat piecemeal fragmentary presentation of his philosophy in this scattered series was one factor which has made against understanding of it and adequate recognition of its importance. I must confess that, although I had carefully read all of these earlier presentations, I had never felt quite sure where Haldane stood philosophically, how to place him as a philosopher in relation to other philosophers; and I venture to think that my failure was in some degree excusable; partly on the ground of the fragmentary

[1] *The Philosophy of a Biologist.* Oxford Press, 1935.

[2] Haldane first struck the note of the philosophy here presented in brief form in an essay of 1883 (*Essays in Philosophical Criticism*). The other books in which he has developed his views are *Mechanism, Life and Personality* of 1913, his Silliman Lectures of 1915, his Gifford Lectures of 1928, his Donnellan Lectures of 1930 (*The Philosophical Basis of Biology*). References in this article to these earlier presentations are indicated by dates of publication.

nature of Haldane's presentations of a very difficult and subtle cosmogony, partly on the ground of certain obscurities and ambiguities of expression pervading all of them. If such was the effect upon myself, who approached Haldane's writings with complete sympathy for his radical repudiation of the mechanistic biology (as well as with affectionate admiration for the man) much more must appreciation of his philosophical position have been difficult for all the many biologists who still insist, in one sense or another, on the necessity of mechanistic interpretation of all biological facts.

Some of those obscurities and ambiguities of expression are not completely absent from this last work; but in spite of them, Haldane has succeeded in drawing the outline of his system not only clearly but also persuasively. So much so that I, for one, am at last convinced; not convinced that it is the one and only possible system, and therefore to be accepted as final truth; but convinced that it is a tenable system and, in fact, the only tenable alternative to a thoroughly dualistic theory such as is implied by the terms "vitalism" and "animism."

It may, I think, be helpful to some of the many puzzled readers of fragments of Haldane (I have heard a professional philosopher of the first rank assert that he could not make out what Haldane was driving at) if I try to set forth very concisely and in my own way the essence of Haldane's view as I now seem to grasp it. I begin with negative definition, by asserting what it is not.

Haldane rejects decisively both Mechanism and Dualism (Animism and Vitalism). This, of course, is only a first approximation to a definition; for nowadays almost every self-respecting biologist, psychologist, and philosopher does likewise; and the theories which claim to fall into this third or neutral[1] class, i.e. to be neither mechanistic nor vitalistic, differ widely from one another. There is considerable ambiguity about the status of these theories, arising from the ambiguity of the words "Mechanistic" and "Vitalistic." Nevertheless, four sub-classes of theories claiming the intermediate or neutral status, neither mechanist nor vitalist, may be distinguished. (1) The *Gestalt* psychologists claim to be classed here with an insistence which reflects the somewhat questionable nature of their claim. It is claimed also by (2) many of those biologists (Ritter, Schaxel, Ungerer, Bertalanffy, etc.), who call their view organismal or organicist. Again it is claimed (3) by many of those who, like S. Alexander, Lloyd Morgan, C. J. Herrick, H. S. Jennings, R. S. Lillie, and C. D. Broad, accept the doctrine of emergent evolution. All members of these three groups equally repudiate both Mechanism and Vitalism, including those who, like Herrick, boldly assert that

[1] The adjective neutral is not altogether satisfactory here; but I can find none better; and, in adopting it, I am following the lead of Dr. William Stern.

conscious activities are radically different from mechanistic processes and that "consciousness makes a difference," and who, therefore, in a sense accept psycho-physical interaction. And a fourth sub-class consists of those who accept mechanism as a methodological necessity for the working biologist, while rejecting the wider implications of such strictly mechanistic biology, leaving to the philosophers the task of reconciling their mechanistic biology with some cosmogony from which mental activity, purpose, value, spirit, and even some degree of human freedom, are not excluded (Needham *et al*).

Haldane cannot be placed in any of these four groups. He stands apart from all of them in one very fundamental respect; namely, all of them assume that the inorganic realm can validly be interpreted in mechanistic terms, because all its events are, as they believe, intrinsically of mechanistic type. Haldane on the other hand insists that mechanistic interpretation of inorganic events, although it has proved very useful and successful up to a point, is radically at fault; because, as he maintains, such events are not in their intrinsic nature mechanistic. He holds that the mechanistic interpretation of the physical world has been achieved by a process of abstraction; which, like all abstraction, leaves out of the picture it draws certain aspects which must be included in any completely true and adequate account. He insists that, if we had before us any such account, we should find that the differences which we all (mechanists and vitalists not excepted) commonly recognize as marking off living organisms from inorganic things would have no place in it; that the gulf between living organism and inorganic matter would be abolished, not by the assimilation of organisms to physical systems of the inorganic type (as commonly accepted by science and by common sense), but by the assimilation of the latter to the former; that, in fact, all things would be shown to be living organisms; that life (or the distinguishing attributes of living things) would be revealed as present throughout every part of reality, in all constituents of the universe.

This is the keynote of Haldane's world-view; and it sets him apart not only from all mechanists and vitalists, but also from most other philosophers. For Haldane's view is not to be identified with the idealism of Berkeley, nor with that of the Hegelians. In fact, as he rightly insists, it does not fall into the class of Idealisms; it is rather a form of Realism. And among realisms its affinity is not with the realism of Plato and its modern derivatives, according to which the most real things are the highest or thinnest abstractions, the "ideas" or "essences." Its affinities among systems or world-views are with those of Leibnitz, Kant, Fechner, Paulsen, Ward, and Whitehead. With Kant, because Haldane holds that our perception reveals only phenomena behind which lies the noumenal world of realities; with

Leibnitz, because he holds that those realities are entities which differ from ourselves in degree of development rather than in kind; with the psychical monism of G. T. Fechner and of Paulsen, because he holds that all reality is mental, psychical, or spiritual; with Ward and Whitehead, because he insists that our way of thinking of such things as physical systems located in space-time is arrived at by processes of extreme abstraction, processes which inevitably yield very inadequate accounts of the physical world, disguising the fact that it also, truly conceived, is a world of organisms.

Although Haldane makes, I think, only one reference to Whitehead (but that once with approval) the affinity between them is very close. In fact, there would seem to be only one great difference between them; namely, Whitehead goes with the neo-realists in repudiating the distinction between primary and secondary qualities (which Galileo and Locke made one of the foundations of modern science), insisting with them that the acceptance of secondary qualities of perceived things as subjective, as inherent not in the object, but evoked only as experiences of the perceiving subject, that this acceptance inevitably involves materialism and universal mechanism. Haldane, being a physiologist, is too well aware of the difficulty, or, as I would say, the impossible nature, of this cardinal feature of Neo-realism. He takes the opposite line in face of this problem, and, rightly, I think, makes both primary and secondary qualities subjective, products of the active reactions of thinking beings to the impressions reaching them from without (for Haldane —from other members of a world of universally interacting beings like themselves).

What Haldane and Whitehead have in common is the insistence on the organic and vital nature of what is commonly called the inorganic or physical realm. "The apparent physical world thus appears as a biological world of lives, . . . what had appeared as physical reality appears for biology as biological reality." Further: "The world of our experience becomes now a psychological or concrete spiritual world of personalities. In short, this world is a concrete spiritual world. The conception of it as a physical world is an abstraction of great practical use for certain limited practical purposes, but not more than a very partial representation of experience" (p. 150). "For we are free to conclude that when we examine more completely what we at present call the inorganic world we shall find in it phenomena which are the same as those of life" (p. 70). And that Haldane, like Leibnitz (and a few moderns, James Ward, Wildon Carr, Eugen Bleuler, and myself), accepts a monadic theory of human personality is made clear in the following: "A person is the expression of unity embracing what may be regarded as the separate personalities of innumerable cells or groups of cells

present in the living body, but is no less real on this account" (p. 120).[1]

Having made ourselves clear as to the central core of Haldane's world-view, let us see what are its strong and its weak points? What are the arguments by which he seeks to establish it, and which seem to him so final as to justify complete confidence in its truth? What advantages does it bring in the way of harmonizing our experience?

Haldane reaches his position in the main by the process of ruling out all alternative possibilities. In the first place, he insists very strongly on the truth of the functional wholeness or unity of each organism. He points out that even the most mechanistic biologist does in practice recognize and use this truth as a guiding principle in research and interpretation; that every organ and every physiological process is only to be fully understood in terms of the role or function it discharges in contributing to the co-ordinated maintenance of the life of the whole organism. But the organicists and the Gestaltists also insist on this truth.[2] How, then, does Haldane's argument lead beyond the organismal view (of which the Gestalt view is but a variety)? And does he offer sufficient grounds for the confident rejection of dualism or vitalism? For these, Organicism and Dualism, are the two alternatives which he must show to be untenable in order to establish his own view.

This part of his argument is two-fold. First, he accepts, with the emergentists, the continuity of evolution of living ogranisms in and from a world in which life (as we commonly recognize it) was lacking. But "the rejection of the mechanistic conception of life carries with it the rejection of the theory that life has originated out of mechanical conditions." And referring to the emergentism of Alexander and of Lloyd Morgan, he writes: "It seems to me that this conception only hides away the gap which exists between mechanical and biological interpretation" (1935, p. 73). Now these

[1] In a lecture before the Congress on the History of Science (1932) Haldane, after referring to the recent developments of micro-physics, said: "Atoms seem now as if they had properties similar to those which the vitalists attributed to living organisms; and even their external activities cannot be described in terms of the Galilean conception. It looks as if, while we shall retain the old physical and mathematical conceptions for practical purposes, more fundamental physical and mathematical conceptions were assuming similar characteristics to those of biology." And in 1931 he wrote: "It might be . . . that if we knew enough we should have to regard the behaviour of plants, or of individual cells in our bodies, or even the behaviour of atoms or molecules, as conscious behaviour."

[2] Haldane seems to overlook the fact that every machine exhibits wholeness in the same sense. Each part can be understood and interpreted only in terms of its relations to other parts and to the function of the whole machine; and the working of each part is dependent on that of all the other parts in harmonious co-operation.

two propositions taken together, would, if they were firmly established, suffice to compel the acceptance of some such world-view as Haldane's. But continuity of evolution is denied by all thoroughgoing dualists (and perhaps 50 per cent of all persons competent to form an opinion in this difficult field are dualists, including many of the greatest intellects of the present and the past); and the emergence of life and mind from a merely physical world is asserted by contemporary thinkers as competent as Alexander and Lloyd Morgan. These propositions cannot, then, be established as truths by mere emphasis of assertion. In the nature of the case no crucial experiment is possible. We seem to be at a deadlock, and must proceed with open minds by the slow methods of science, rather than by the hasty methods of metaphysics on which Haldane too much relies.

Secondly, beside assertion of continuity of evolution Haldane offers one other argument against both Organicism and Dualism (Vitalism), namely: "Vitalism in any form has the same fundamental defect as the mechanistic theory of life. It assumes that a living organism and its environment can be separated in observation and thought, when they cannot be separated" (1931, p. 31). And in the same book he asserts that Vitalism "has failed because we can show by observation and experiment that it is impossible to distinguish within the organism any influence not dependent on that of environment, direct or indirect" (p. 111). This argument, which Haldane uses again and again to refute at one blow[1] both mechanism and Vitalism, is, however, a *non-sequitur*. And not only that: it is not to be intelligibly reconciled with Haldane's frequently reiterated assertion of the unity of the organism, or of its life; as, e.g. "the whole which we call the life of an organism" (1931, p. 29); "structure and activity are regarded . . . as an indivisible manifestation of the unity which is called the life of an organism." "The whole which we call the life of an organism." "We are dealing with an indivisible whole when we are dealing with a life"; and "each life being a unity expressing itself in co-ordinated maintenance of detailed structure and activity."

It is true that many of these assertions of the unity or wholeness of the organism are followed by the assertion that "This unity

[1] For example: "Human life ceases almost at once if the oxygen supply to the central nervous system is cut off, or if the latter is reached by some very poisonous substance. . . . Facts such as these, which may be multiplied indefinitely, make vitalism an altogether inconsistent hypothesis" (p. 36). And: "The mistake of the vitalists and of the essentially similar 'organicist' or 'organismal' biologists, was . . . to separate a living organism from its environment. The maintained co-ordination is present, just as much in the relations between organism and environment as in the relations between the parts of an organism itself. We cannot separate in space the phenomena of life from those of its environment."

extends over its relations to environment as well as over the mutual relations of its parts"; or that "the life of an organism must be regarded as an objective active unity which embraces its environment" (p. 149). Now Haldane, no matter how admirable his aims, cannot be allowed the privilege of eating his cake and keeping it intact. The words "extending over" and "embracing" as here used are highly ambiguous. I submit that, if each organism (or its life) is a unity and has wholeness, it cannot at the same time be (in perception, observation, thought, and space) inseparable from and indistinguishable from its environment; its unity or wholeness cannot "embrace" or "extend over" or include its environment. In short, Haldane uses the unity and wholeness of each individual organism (as expressed in the maintenance and restitution and reproduction of itself as a specific co-ordination of its structural and functional details) as the proof that its life processes cannot be explained in terms of physics and chemistry (and such actively maintained unity and wholeness are just the facts which the vitalist insists on as requiring some ground wholly different from anything perceptible or inferrible in the inorganic world). And then he turns round and, in asserting that the organism cannot be distinguished from its environment (and in using this assertion to disprove Vitalism and to prove that the environment is of the same intrinsic nature as the organism), he virtually denies the unity and wholeness of the individual organism.

These are, I think, the principal weaknesses of Haldane's argument. But others of secondary importance may be pointed out.

Haldane weakens his presentation by indulging in language reminiscent of the old-fashioned metaphysician who believed that the nature of the world, of man, and of God, could be sufficiently revealed by a process that was called "the analysis of concepts." Again and again he writes of the axiom of life;[1] and frequently he implies that the conception of life is somehow given us ready-made and adequate (like Descartes's innate idea of God) so that we have only to use it in order to solve aright by a deductive process all biological problems. Whereas, of course, there is no biological axiom; and an adequate way of conceiving life is not the starting-point, not an axiom, nor even a clearly definable postulate, but rather the final aim of all biological endeavours, one not likely to be achieved for many years to come.

Of more importance is the criticism that Haldane, while finding the chief error of all other schools of thought in their acceptance of abstractions as concrete realities, is himself open to the same reproach in his treatment of biological problems. He separates psychology

[1] "The existence of life is the most fundamental axiom of biology" (1931, p. 31).

from physiology, recognizing that physiology, in neglecting the mental aspect, is treating organisms abstractly. Yet in treating of the greater part of biological problems in this abstract manner, he avoids, or in part neglects or ignores or abstracts from, just that realm of facts which most strongly suggest the necessity of the vitalistic or dualistic assumption, the facts, namely, of goal-seeking or of purposive activity.

We all, mechanists, vitalists, and neutrals alike, are familiar with and make use of two types of explanation; namely, explanation in terms of mechanistic causation, and explanation in terms of goal-seeking activity, of purposive or teleological causation. We differ in that the mechanists profess to know, or to believe, or to have faith, that, in principle and at some remote future date, explanations of the second type will prove to be resolvable into specially complex forms of the former type. Haldane, of course, rejects this assumption. Yet, although presumably accepting the reality of purposive activity (as a form of causation or influence radically other than mechanistic process), he leaves it out of account in his discussions of the co-ordinated unity of the organism.

Further, Haldane insists that we must use the conception of the unity and wholeness of the organism as an indispensable guide in all biological research and in all interpretation of biological processes. But he offers no *explanation* of that unity and wholeness of the functions of a complex organism comprising many parts and organs; a unity which must be a unity of reciprocal influences, of activities of the parts and of the whole constantly working upon one another. And a central problem never touched upon by Haldane is—What is the nature of these activities, these causal influences? Are they mechanistic, or purposive, or of some unknown and never-yet-conjectured third kind?

Haldane, in thus confining himself to interpretation of biological processes, and without specifically repudiating all attempts at explanation of them, simply avoids the problem of explanation in terms of activity, of reciprocal influence, of causation. "Biological explanation or description is essentially different from physical explanation or description, and aims at the discovery by observation and experiment of specific maintained relationships in phenomena" (p. 68). And: "When we find that any detail of structure or activity enters into the co-ordinated life of an organism we have reached the biological interpretation or perception of this detail; and it is this kind of interpretation that biological science seeks" (p. 66). Again, the aim of the physiologist "is to exhibit the phenomena as manifestations of the unity of the life of the organism. . . . Biological explanation is just the finding of this place" . . . "the place of every detail of activity and structure in the maintenance of life."

Thus Haldane, although he does use the word "explanation," does not mean by it explanation in terms of causation or influence, but means only such explanation as consists in discovering the fact that each part and process contributes to the maintenance of life. The words "cause" and "causation" hardly occur in his books I believe; and equally conspicuous by their absence are the terms "teleology," "purpose," and "purposive activity."

Haldane, then, would have the biologist rest content with ascertaining *that* any particular organ or process plays a part in, or contributes towards, the maintenance of life; and seems by implication to forbid him to inquire *how* that part is played. And just here is the feature of his whole scheme which repels, I venture to think, the great majority of his biologist readers, leaving them with the feeling that Haldane is "all up in the air." The endeavour to explain (in the sense of understanding the sequence of events in terms of causation) has been the very breath of science, of biology no less than of physical science. When, then, Haldane seems to repudiate causal explanation in biology, while necessarily recognizing its immense role in physical science, he is up against a principle of proved value, one essential to all scientific research, and one deeply rooted in the nature and experience of all men.

I suspect that Haldane, though I cannot find explicit evidence of it in his writings, entertained, like so many other men of science, the fallacy that causation is necessarily mechanistic; and that it was this false belief which led him to exclude all discussion of causation from his books.

And the trouble goes further than ignoring the problem of causation in the more specifically biological phenomena, such as the processes of development, restitution, and heredity. For Haldane seems to accept causation as a valid and necessary principle of explanation in physical science, and even to accept it as valid and useful up to a point in biology. He even seems to say that all biological processes may validly be regarded as caused or determined by physical and chemical action as commonly conceived in physics and chemistry. Thus: "The more deeply we probe into the conditions which determine any physiological phenomenon, the more clearly does it appear that it is dependent on what are generally interpreted as physical and chemical conditions. This is so, however strikingly the phenomenon may illustrate the co-ordination which is so characteristic of life, and however obscure may be the actual causal connection between the phenomenon and the material change or 'stimulus' which initiates it." And: "While we can always discover or indicate conditions in the environment which determine both organic structure and co-ordinated physiological activity, we can never demonstrate the existence of any factor other than what may be regarded

as physico-chemical which determines this action. What still remains mysterious is the specific co-ordination of activity, and corresponding organization of structure. These are characteristic of all life, however lowly an organism may be" (1928, pp. 70, 73).

Now it is just this mysteriousness (this lack of understanding in terms of causation) of vital processes which leads the vitalist and the dualist to postulate some agency of an order radically different from all physical events. How, then, does Haldane deal with this mysteriousness? He merely extends it to the inorganic realm. After insisting again and again that the specific co-ordinated activity by which complex wholes maintain themselves is the essential phenomenon of life, and that this remains *mysterious*, he goes on to assert that a similar mystery pervades the inorganic realm. "Co-ordinated activity is inherent in matter," he writes. "When we examine more completely what we at present call the inorganic world we shall find in it phenomena which are the same as those of life. . . . An atom, or even an electron, or light quantum, is for recent physics something of which the existence, like that of a living organism, is an expression of ceaseless co-ordinated activity, incapable of being interpreted in mechanical terms. . . . The conception of wholeness must therefore be introduced in physics as in biology" (p. 71). Nevertheless: "No degree of physical and chemical complication brings us in any way nearer to the phenomena of life or conscious experience." And: "Life is, however, not something apart from physical reality, but only the same reality seen and interpreted more fundamentally" (p. 77).

Thus life remains a mystery which Haldane seems to forbid us to hope to resolve in any other way than by recognizing (with Smuts) that the same mystery of wholeness pervades equally the inorganic realm. Can, then, any man of science be expected to rest content in face of this mystery, as Haldane seems to demand that he shall? Surely not!

I remark in this connection that Professor Max Planck, who, as Haldane points out, is "the originator of one of the great new directions of discovery in physics" (the quantum physics), and who himself insists that "the conception of wholeness must therefore be introduced in physics as in biology," is nevertheless a stout upholder of the fundamental necessity for science of the endeavour after causal explanation and indeed of "strict determinism." I remark also that Köhler, the leading Gestaltist, claims to explain the wholeness of physical as well as of biological wholes in terms of field-forces, in terms of reciprocal influence, that is to say, causally; and that the possibility of such explanation of wholeness is implicitly assumed, if not asserted, by the organicists.

Further, I suggest that the specific maintenance of co-ordinated

wholeness (which Haldane insists upon as the leading and most essential phenomenon of living things, and by the extension of which to molecules, atoms, and even electrons, he seeks to abolish all radical difference of nature between living organisms and the wholes of the "non-living" realm) that this is by no means the only or the most distinctive peculiarity of living things. Goal-seeking processes or teleological activities are their most distinctive and fundamental peculiarity; and the co-ordinated activity which maintains and expresses the wholeness of each organism may with good ground be suspected to be only one of many forms of such teleological activity, activity analogous to the purposive striving with which each one of us is familiar in his own person.

That analogy affords the only clue hitherto suggested for the understanding and causal explanation of vital processes; and not until such attempts to apply it as those of August Pauli and Eugen Bleuler shall have been renewed, pushed to the limit, and found unworkable shall we be justified in resigning ourselves to impotence in face of the universal mystery of "co-ordinated activity." And not until we can discover in the inorganic world some indications however faint of that teleological causation (so familiar to each of us in his own person and the evidences of which we observe in a multitude of phenomena of the organic realm) shall we be justified in believing, with Haldane and Whitehead, that there is no radical difference of kind between the processes of the organic and those of the inorganic realm.

Haldane's neglect of teleology is not total. But his recognition of it is implicit rather than explicit, and not altogether logical. "Life," he tells us, "thus appears as a constant struggle against what is not life but only physical chaos. It is, however, only in this struggle that life can manifest itself as life. Life becomes meaningless if we regard it as other than a struggle against unco-ordinated chaos." And, "Personality represents a constant active struggle to realize itself."

Now active struggling implies striving towards a goal, even when the struggle can be described as directed against something. We do not describe a mountain stream as struggling against the rocks which resist its progress towards the sea. Even the poet does not assert that the water is striving to reach the ocean as its goal; he is content to say: "Even the weariest river winds somewhere safe to sea." And has not the modern physicist made plain to the meanest intelligence that the movement of the water towards the sea is caused by the curvature of space-time! But how can Haldane describe life as a struggle against the unco-ordinated chaos of the physical world, consistently with his doctrine that the physical world, equally with the world of life, is pervaded by the mystery of

co-ordinated activity maintaining wholeness, and is in fact also alive?

One other feature which pervades all Haldane's endeavour to exhibit the inorganic as essentially of the same nature as the realm of living beings calls for critical comment. Namely, his language constantly tends to confuse the distinction between the experiencing and the experienced; between the "ing" and the "ed," as Alexander puts it; between, on the one hand, the activity of experiencing, perceiving, apprehending, conceiving, or thinking of, any object and, on the other hand, the object experienced, perceived, apprehended, conceived, or thought of. He can, of course, find abundant precedent for this in the writings of metaphysicians, some of whom seem to regard such confusion as a meritorious achievement. Yet the clear drawing and constant observance of this distinction is the first requirement of all profitable philosophizing.

This is a serious charge, and, since this confusion occupies a prominent place in Haldane's argument, it must be substantiated by citations, as follows: "The universe which is capable of being perceived is the only universe which has any meaning for us" (p. 21). "The whole world of our physical experience is a world of perceived experience, and non-existent apart from perception" (p. 28). (Here I would draw attention to the regrettable ambiguity of the expressions "physical experience" and "perceived experience.") "Our whole universe is a universe of perceived phenomena in which all that is perceived embodies what is part of ourselves" (p. 98). "The perceived universe is thus only a 'phenomenal' universe, and it is only this 'phenomenal' universe that is represented in the universe of physical science." From these statements about what we perceive, he passes to the equally, or still more, questionable assertion that "the conception of a visible and tangible universe independent of mind is without meaning!"

These and similar assertions might seem to imply that Haldane is a subjective idealist. Yet he stoutly asserts that he is a realist; that what we call the physical world exists as objective reality, that "beyond it (the perceived universe) there must be a 'noumenal' world of real existence, but which cannot be perceived." Now this will not do—no matter how much countenance such assertions receive from similar statements by other philosophers. The noumenal world is the world that we perceive, no matter whether our perceiving and our conceiving are shaped little or much by our constitution, no matter whether the phenomena (or appearances to us of the noumenal world) have but little or much correspondence with the noumena. Surely the chief aim of Haldane as of all scientific thinking of the wider kind (commonly called philosophical) is to correct, step by step in conception, the distorted phenomenal picture of

noumena which we acquire through perception, to the end that we may constantly approach more nearly to an adequate account of things as they are.

This part of Haldane's argument may, I think, fairly be explicated as follows: Our perceiving activities are determined only partly by the nature of the things perceived and largely and to an unknown degree by the constitution of our organs and powers of perception and conception. These activities, therefore, lead us to represent or think of perceived things in ways which are infected with our own nature. These ways of thinking or representing the world about us are then called phenomena, and are said to constitute a phenomenal universe; and this, further, is called "the perceived universe" and identified by Haldane, quite illegitimately, with "the universe of physical science." In this way Haldane seeks to make it appear that the noumena (including all the things dealt with by physical science) partake of our own nature as living beings. The illegitimate step is achieved, or its illegitimacy obscured, by the use of the ambiguous expression "the perceived universe," and by way of identification of the latter with the equally ambiguous "phenomenal universe" and with the equally ambiguous "universe of physical science."

More concisely the argument runs: Our thinking of the universe (or the universe as we think it) is infected with our own nature; therefore the universe itself and all that is therein partakes of our own nature, and all things are living things and even consciously active things. When stated in this bald and concise fashion the fallacy is obvious; but the argument is not less fallacious (*pace* Kant and Haldane) when wrapped up in the traditional jargon of noumenal and phenomenal universes. It arises largely from an old error of psychology, the error of speaking of perceiving and conceiving as though they were the activities of two distinct faculties; whereas they are but two forms of thinking distinguished merely by the fact that impressions on the sense-organs are not directly concerned in conceiving as they are in perceiving.

Yet another feature of Haldane's exposition must, I think, repel many of his readers; though it may seem to others his chief merit. Namely, Haldane, having to his own satisfaction proved that the so-called physical realm is similar in nature to the realm of life and mind, proceeds at once to identify the whole with God, thus making his scheme a kind of Pantheism. The step may be justifiable; but it is a big one; and Haldane does little or nothing to justify it. And this arbitrary introduction of a designation loaded with obscure traditional meanings cannot but have the effect of making his motives suspect; must lead the reader, or some readers, to suspect that his desire to pursue and reveal truth is at least complicated and

rendered impure by the desire to bring science to the support of traditional religion.

One last criticism and I have done my worst. A novelty of this volume is the introduction of certain observations in the field of vision, phenomena of visual contrast and others allied with them, which Haldane has studied in the last few years. Many years ago I became very familiar with the phenomena with which Haldane is here concerned, and from which he derives a new and additional argument for his view. I am strongly of the opinion that his descriptions are not quite accurate, and that, even if they were so, they would not support the weight of the argument which he bases upon them.

If I have criticized severely Haldane's argumentation, it is because it seems to me that he is ably presenting a case of the greatest interest and importance, the case for a world-view which, as I said at the outset, is the only tenable alternative to a vitalistic and thoroughly dualistic view, and therefore deserving of the most thorough and impartial scrutiny. I can see no logical impossibility in this view, and no facts which will support any argument that would make it untenable. Such criticism as I have advanced may be summarized by saying that Haldane seems too determined to prove his case at all costs; too ready to put forward weak and ambiguous arguments in its support; too ready, like so many modern philosophers, to reject Dualism merely because he does not like it and has a strong preference for his own rival view, a dislike which leads him to be content with slight and flimsy arguments for the refutation of it.

SPIRITUAL LIFE: SANTAYANA'S APPROACH TO ESSENCE

CORNELIA GEER LE BOUTILLIER

I

THERE is no such opposition between mind and spirit for Santayana as for Descartes existed between matter and mind, provoking him to uncompromising fireside dichotomy. For spirit is born out of an achieved harmony, Santayana says, and this harmony is the psyche. There can be then, it will be seen, no direct opposition. Actually, mind yields spirit. But there is some degree of conflict, precisely the conflict between ethereal flying and material wings, the one achieved through the agency of the other, but checked by their weight.

Spirit is an emanation from that natural life in which body and mind together engage. It is an emergent from nature, not contra-natural, but as it were hyper-natural, the dividends of life, perhaps, life outstripped: "life looking out of the window," Santayana says, with its tasks done. Spirit is thus seen as a departure from nature. But in thus departing she goes not empty-handed, with any wistful after-looks or *arrière-pensées*. Joyously, rather. Empty-handed, in a sense, yes. As having nothing and yet possessing all things

This notion of possession is persistently stressed. "The difference between the life of the spirit and that of the flesh is itself a spiritual difference: . . . the one is anxiety, inquiry, desire, and fear: the other is intuitive possession."[1] I shall take up later the relation between spirit and essence. Here I shall say somewhat prematurely of this point that it is essence which is thus the spirit's ultimate possession: the thing desired and loved "after it has been detached from the world that besets and threatens it," that thing in its eternal essence, out of which the stress and the doubt of existence have wholly passed."

The life of the spirit is the life of freedom, the life that responds to nature's charms, to her colour, her cadences, her music: the poetry that sums these up and calls them evanescent and calls them also beauty. Spirit is not created art. Spirit is the poised brush; it is gazing; it is listening. Spirit is sensitivity that asks not why nor whether, that simply enjoys and through enjoyment may give rise to creativity. Spirit thus described as airily embracing in silent

[1] *Platonism and the Spiritual Life*, p. 42.

rapture insubstantial essences must itself be essence and insubstantial too. Contrasted in general with the world's effort and confusion, its aimlessness and its aims, its meretricious victories and its smarting defeats that are yet so meaningless, as Santayana reminds us, *sub specie aeternitatis*, spirit is light, inconsequence, the mind at play. The world harbours spirit; it is hospitable to that extent; but it harbours it grudgingly. The world, "mortal, tormented, confused, deluded forever," is shot through, says Santayana, with beauty, with love, with glints of courage and laughter. "In these the spirit blooms timidly and struggles to the light among the thorns."

Spirit for Santayana is the ante-room to essence. Spirit, which is ultimately addressed to Pure Being, is not itself this Pure Being, he says; it is not essence, but looks to it. Yet we shall fail to understand Santayana here if we do not see that in his view of spirit he thinks of spirit as involving nature and yet escaping from it, as having both a footing in nature and a winging in the sky. We reach the airy ante-room to essence only by way of the busy household below, its well-worn corridors, its service stairs. Spirit, indeed, like the lowly tasks it escapes from, is not debarred from any life, at any time. Ingenious youth knows no substitute; age cannot wither it. Santayana dangles it irresistibly before us. "One of the great things always possible is spiritual life."

II

In the *Realm of Essence* Santayana distinguishes four, as he calls them, "avenues of approach" to essence, four sectors in which spirit may be operative: scepticism, dialectic, contemplation, and spiritual discipline. These all, as he says, "lead to the discrimination of essence."[1]

For scepticism Santayana claims a high degree of spirituality just because it is detached from nature, pure of natural involvement, holding as it does that "this alleged order of appearance and this extended experience are themselves only dreamt of." Scepticism sees nothing but "the thing in its eternal essence out of which the stress and doubt of existence have wholly passed." In *Scepticism and Animal Faith* he says in this vein: "The sceptic, then, as a consequence of carrying his scepticism to the greatest lengths, finds himself in the presence of more luminous and less equivocal objects than does the working and believing mind; only these objects are without meaning, they are only what they are obviously, all surface. Scepticism therefore suspends all knowledge worthy of the name, all that transitive and presumptive knowledge of facts which is a form of belief; and instead it bestows intuition of ideas, contem-

[1] *The Realm of Essence*, p. 14.

plative, aesthetic, dialectic, arbitrary."[1] And even more explicitly he says: "There are certain motives . . . which render ultimate scepticism precious to a spiritual mind, as a sanctuary from grosser illusions."[2] Thus scepticism shuffles off the coils of nature and stands free: "all that is sordid or tragic falls away, and everything acquires a lyric purity, as if the die had not yet been cast and the ominous choice of creation had not yet been made."[3]

Yet in another sense scepticism has its earthbound aspect too, as Santayana might be willing to admit. Scepticism is freedom if taken in one sense, frustration if taken in another. Scepticism indeed turns back upon nature, but only after having searched for nature and pleaded with it and been foiled. For scepticism looks to nature first, then, disappointed, looks away. By questioning nature, it sheepishly admits a bond; by denying nature, in hang-dog fashion it affirms it. So scepticism is, in Santayana's way of speaking, of the mind and of the spirit both. It is a flower-strewn detour around nature: as this it is spiritual. But it is a cul-de-sac as well, with nature at the end of it vanishing into thin air. So there are two facets, two faces, to this scepticism. One looks for essence and, in revelling, is free; the other looks for nature and, not finding it, is blocked. Scepticism taken thus gives evidence of an ebb and flow, a flux; it does not "burn with a hard, gem-like flame" as its proponents would have us think. It takes cognizance of nature by denial; takes leave of her by innuendo. It has a natural aspect and it has a spiritual aspect.

The other three approaches to essence, namely, dialectic, contemplation, and spiritual discipline, embrace a flux too, as scepticism does, or what might be thought of as an ascending scale of concerns, the lower reaches of which are natural and not spiritual, the higher reaches of which are free of nature and belong to the spiritual realm. Santayana discriminates these three again in *Platonism and the Spiritual Life*, where he has been discussing "Socratic logic" and ethical values, and where he says that if Plato's "sense for the eternal" had been absolutely direct and pure, he would have seen the eternal in the "figments of sense"[4] no less than in those of logic or ethics. He would have seen sensual forms, that is, as actualization of eternal essences no less truly than logic is an actualization of the eternal dialectic of Ideas or than ethics at its peak might be an actualization of eternal values. Here Santayana in speaking of Socratic logic means what elsewhere, in its higher, more spiritual reaches, he has called "dialectic," and in speaking of ethics means what, in its higher, more spiritual reaches, he has called "spiritual discipline," and in speaking of the apprehension of the "figments

[1] *Scepticism and Animal Faith*, p. 70. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 40.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 67. [4] *Platonism and the Spiritual Life*, pp. 87 and 88.

of sense" means what, in its higher, more spiritual reaches, he has called the "contemplation of essences." I will quote the passage in full. "Spiritual insight has been frequent among Platonists, and may, indeed, have been at the root of that trance-like vision of essences which enabled Plato to turn the general terms of Socratic logic into individual and immortal beings. But, if his sense for the eternal had been absolutely direct and pure, he would have seen the eternal in the figments of sense no less than in those of logic and ethics: for all forms equally are essences, and all essences equally are eternal." That is, in their spiritual scope, contemplation and dialectic and spiritual discipline are spiritual "approaches" to essence. But all three of them have lower, natural reaches also, and as these they might be called, not "approaches" to nature or the world, because they are completely entrenched in it, but throughfares of the world for mind. The "figments of sense," Socratic logic, and ethics, are actually, for our minds, such throughfares. Knowledge. Logic. Value. These are our minds' ways of dealing with the world of nature. Through knowledge we perceive the world. Through logic we discern or express its relations. Through value we appraise it. There is another concern of mind with nature, and we call this metaphysics. But Santayana has already disposed of this, in his character of sceptic, by denying it. Scepticism is a repudiation of metaphysics.

III

Of these three approaches, let us take first knowledge. For Santayana knowledge is not an immediate act of the mind by which the mind without intermediary can grasp its object. Santayana sees a preliminary step there in which the mind discerns an essence, in which the object is apprehended not as an existent thing at all, but "detached from the world that besets and threatens it." In this moment of intuition the object rushes into the mind and is possessed by it, not questioned as to its existence at all, but in its freshness, with felt impact of essential clearness. This experience, Santayana says, is spiritual, and it is inevitable. In the Preface to the *Realm of Essence* Santayana expresses this notion as follows: "Intuition, or absolute apprehension without media or doubt, is proper to spirit perusing essences."[1] This means that, related to knowledge besides the "beyond" which Santayana terms contemplation, there is a prior step, as one might say, purely sensuous, leading into the thoroughfare of perception. This is the spirit's intuition of an essence. He describes it quite fully: "An essence, then, is no abstraction, no unrealizable generality, but any actual aspect which anything can

[1] *The Realm of Essence*, Preface, p. xi.

wear, determining its nature, or revealing it to an attentive mind. The sweetness I may taste is not dependent in the order of knowledge or being upon abstraction from anything else. In my experience it is very likely the *first indication* (italics not in the text) I have of any substance called sugar existing near me, to be appropriated or investigated further."[1] For Santayana this immediate perusal of essence is the same intuitive experience as contemplation; and contemplation is, in a deeper sense, the ultimate apprehension of essence: knowledge, that is, in a spiritual sense eclipsed. Neither of these intuitions, the immediate or the ultimate, represents abstraction: intensification, rather. Santayana gives as an example of this "approach through contemplation," the following instance. "As I was jogging to market in my village cart, beauty has burst upon me and the reins have dropped from my hands. I am transported, in a certain measure, into a state of trance. I see with extraordinary clearness, yet what I see seems strange and wonderful, because I no longer look in order to understand, but only in order to see. I have lost my preoccupation with fact, and am contemplating an essence."[2] It must be clear that a distinction can be drawn here between the spiritual experience of an essence which was "very likely the first indication" of a substance to be known and this more remote experience of essential beauty which comes not as a "first indication," but as a result of losing all indications, of *losing* one's "preoccupation with fact." Santayana insists that it is not a difference in kind, but in degree.

The contemplation of essence, then, for Santayana, as an experience of pure spirit, is both the purlieus of that world from which spirit alone can be free, and the spirit's own way out of it. Essence introduces us to knowledge, and essence frees us from it. Essence is both immediate and ultimate, and these twain are one. Indeed, Santayana says so: "When spirit is free and collected, it has no life but this spiritual life, in which the ultimate is the immediate."[3] This is what Santayana means, too, when he says: "The notion that knowledge is intuition, that it must either penetrate to the inner quality of its object or else have no object but the overt datum, has not been carried out with rigour: if it had, it might have been sooner abandoned."[4] Knowledge is not intuition: "Intuition lies at the opposite end of the gamut."[5] Knowledge is concerned with the existent figments of sense; intuition can both contemplate the "datum" and also penetrate to its inner quality. Knowledge lives in the middle ground of fact. Intuition lives in the ultimate and in the immediate. This is the realm of beauty.

1 *The Realm of Essence*, p. 40. 2 *Ibid.*, 6.
3 *Platonism and the Spiritual Life*, p. 50.
4 *Scepticism and Animal Faith*, p. 85. 5 *The Realm of Matter*, p. 40.

"This experience," says Santayana, "in modern times is called aesthetic"—not the knowing of any existent objects, but the free play of mind in that life of the spirit in which the ultimate is the immediate and existence is not even thought of, in which beauty bursts upon us, to be recorded as art or not, to be proclaimed as art or not according to whether or not the spirit gives us utterance. Nature does not create art; she suggests it. Spirit does not create art; she provokes it. Man, his senses alive to nature's fragrances and dead, in a sense, to her existence, his mind lost in contemplation of eternal essences, is spiritually empowered to bring the two worlds together through art: the clearness of sensual sting and the coolness of spiritual peace.

IV

Logic is the second one of the thoroughfares of mind which Santayana discriminates. This is the science by which, either for ourselves or in discourse, we express the internal relations of our world and posit external relations for it. In *The Realm of Essence* Santayana has made clear that the internal relations of nature are of no interest for spirit. Logic is distinctly a thoroughfare of this world: essences elude implication. "Implication and impossibility," he says in a marginal caption, "hang on an accepted order in nature."[1] "The absence of all material implications leaves every essence equally innocent, inviolate, and profound." Implication, denoting, as it does, physical inclusion, or descriptive equivalence, or logical inclusion of parts in a whole, has no persuasiveness for essence, nor for spirit which is addressed to essence. "Nature gives play to logic in so far as continuity, repetitions, or fulfilments are found in her"; but spirit is not curbed by continuity, nor repetitions, nor fulfilments. Spirit is free. Conversely, spirit has no such power over facts as logic has. Nor does she want it. Spirit looks on while logic springs the trap, and is indifferent to the catch as to the kill. So much for the logic of existence.

Yet, as in the case of scepticism and as in the case of knowledge, we find again in logic a dual emphasis. In one aspect logic hangs thus upon an accepted order in nature; in another it is free. "Existence is accordingly not only doubtful to the sceptic, but odious to the logician. To him it seems a truly monstrous excrescence and superfluity in being, since anything existent is more than the description of it."[2] But, odious or not, Santayana elsewhere states that the logician carries existence like a bee in his bonnet, even if it cannot be a feather in his cap.

Religion is, for Santayana, a dialectic of the imagination, that

[1] *The Realm of Essence*, p. 82. [2] *Scepticism and Animal Faith*, p. 48.

tries imaginatively to express the degree and character of man's relatedness to the rest of nature, or to the spiritual world "beyond" nature. In its lower reaches religion is concerned with interests entirely non-spiritual. But Santayana distinguishes two functions in religion: this lower, natural concern which in its religious aspect he calls piety, and the higher intuitive interest which he calls again contemplation. "A complete religion needs to look both ways, feeding piously at the breast of nature, yet weaning itself spiritually from that necessary comfort to the contemplation of superhuman and eternal things."[1] "Spirit on its part actualizes, in an intuition which is through and through poetical and visionary, various movements, rhythms, potentialities, and transcendent relations which physical life involves but which are not parts or moments of its moving substance." Thus religion partakes of both these functions, the pious and the contemplative; these may be distinguished; they cannot for religion be divorced. Santayana takes religion, too, then, to exemplify his assertion of these two differently directed, differently "weighted" reaches within that process of mind which discerns or posits relations.

For logic in general, as I have said, as well as for religion, there are also, in the last analysis, these two. The higher, more intuitive concern of logic Santayana calls dialectic. But by this approach (because dialectic can never entirely free itself from the psyche) he says that the realm of essence cannot be reached. Contemplation from knowledge could wrench itself free and win through to essence. But from dialectic there is no such thing as aesthetic detachment even where essence is the goal. "Dialectic evidently involves transition; it is progressive; but any actual transition transcends the realm of essence (where every term traversed must always maintain its intrinsic character) and proves that an existential and moving factor is at work, namely attention and whatever may be the organ of attention and of its movement. In a word, a psyche is involved. . . ."[2] The transitions are discursive, their necessity is merely physical; but they lead to intuitions in which essences appear having intrinsically a logical complexity corresponding more or less perfectly to the stages of discourse which preceded; this correspondence, so far as it goes, makes the validity of dialectic a validity which cannot be intrinsic to the essence reached in the conclusion, since it is the validity of a process, of a series of substitutions and identifications."[3] The postulates of dialectic are rooted in animal faith which alone dares to assert consistency and which alone dares to lean on continuity. Dialectic is a means to an end and many and

[1] *Platonism and the Spiritual Life*, p. 48.
[2] *The Realm of Essence*, p. 96. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 102.

devious are its expedients. "It is instrumental," Santayana asserts; "when successful and finished, it yields to intuition."[1] "Dialectic, then, while ostensibly following ideal implications absolved from any allegiance to facts or to actual instances of reasoning, secretly expresses a material life."[2] What Santayana states about dialectic is tantamount to saying that dialectic is an "approach" to essence but can never be an arrival. Indeed, as John Dewey pointed out when the *Realm of Essence* was published, it is sense which, according to this philosophy, affords the approach to essence which is complete and adequate, "not the desiccated 'sensations' of analytic psychology," Dewey says, "but direct and pregnant realization, in which emotion also is contained[3]": that sensuous intuition of forms, he means, which Santayana places "at the opposite end of the gamut" from knowledge. Dialectic is the intuitive margin of logic which looks towards essences but can never achieve them. It yields an arrival because it yields intuition: but itself can never arrive. "This total intuition will perform the operation of its organ, raising natural life at that point to its natural entelechy."[4] Contemplation, the spiritual off-shoot of sense, yields arrival immediately and ultimately: but dialectic only as intuition can become the mediator for it.

In so far as the dialectic is religious, however, there is on the spiritual side immediacy and ultimacy too, if the impregnation is deep enough. "It is the saints most steeped each in his traditional religion who are nearest together in spirit; and if nature caused them to change places, it is they that, after a moment's pause to get their bearings, would be most at ease in one another's skins."[5] Immersion is both more satisfying and more convivial than sprinkling. When it happens that dialectic does in this way abandon itself to intuition and thus consummate a spiritual union with pure Being, when religion, rising above a docile piety and transcending myth and pageant, sets the spirit free, this ultimate oneness, this final mysticism, means, in Santayana's philosophy, the Spirit's cleavage with the body, and so extinction. For spirit, as he said, is an emanation from the bodily, and no otherwise can it endure. "This absorption, the union or ecstacy of which mystics speak, has always been the goal of religious discipline. . . . The union is sacrificial, like that of an insect in its bridal flight. In it the spirit loses its self-consciousness, the sense of its own or any other separable existence: and it loses this existence actually, because it cannot attain that ecstacy without dropping all con-

[1] *The Realm of Essence*, p. 104. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 99.
[3] *The New Republic*, February 15, 1928, Vol. LIII.
[4] *The Realm of Essence*, p. 106.
[5] *Platonism and the Spiritual Life*, p. 36.

nection with its body—that is, without dying. Yet, if in the act of union with pure Being the spirit drops the separate existence which it had before, it drops only what it wished to drop; its separation consisted in not yet having attained perfect intuition, which must be without a natural centre or personal perspectives. On attaining that intuition the spirit abolishes itself by passing into that which it wished to find. Whether saved or lost, liberated or dissolved, the soul ceases to exist equally; but this fact does not touch the interests of the spirit seeking liberation, whose office, even from the beginning, was worship, not thrift or self-assertion."[1]

V

Value is the third one of the world's mental thoroughfares discussed. This, as I have said, in its higher reaches becomes for Santayana "spiritual discipline." Particularly in his little book, *Platonism and the Spiritual Life*, Santayana successfully tilts against the notion that values in general belong to the spiritual life. Values in general are distinctly and definitely not spiritual, Santayana points out, but are the work of mind. Applied values are the mind's judgments on existent things. They shift and change; they are played upon by all sorts of relative forces. Values themselves are relative, never unconditioned because, unconditioned, they could not be values. "For felt values, taken absolutely and regarded as unconditioned, are all equally genuine in their excellence, and equally momentary in their existence." At this point Santayana reminds us with his own subtlety that St. Thomas Aquinas goes so far as to say that to the sinner God becomes an evil—"the Christian God, he means, for I suppose the reprobate might still find a friend in Bacchus or Venus." Thus these earthly values are at the opposite pole from the care-free thing that spirit is, and always have been. "Spiritual life is not a worship of values. . . . It is disintoxication from their influence." Spirituality waives values; it is concerned only with Being in its purity and not in relativity. The Platonist is very far from worshipping essences, when he sees the workaday world as "sharing" in eternal values, as embodying them, furnishing forth goodness and beauty and truth as goods and beauties and truths. The Platonist may make this genuflection with his mind; but spirit bows the knee to no such linkèd sweetness. For these are chains, however sweet, and spirit is not held. "It is the essence of spirit to see and love things for their own sake, not for the sake of one another, nor for its own sake." Every existence as valued is a forged link. How could spirit care for existence, which has to "verify itself from moment to moment

[1] *The Realm of Essence*, p. 61.

and must always remain temporal, no matter how long it lasts?" Spirit is not concerned with morality at all or with comparing and valuing. "What should the spirit care if moralistic metaphysics ceased to invade the field of natural philosophy, venturing there upon some guesses flattering to human vanity?"[1]

Santayana defends the Platonic dualism in so far as it places the Ideas in some realm remote from nature. For thus are the Ideas endowed with creativity. And even as revealed in a felicitous conjunction of matter and form which we call aesthetic, beauty is still a "homeless essence," not imprisoned: if captured for a second, in the next second free and never to be recaptured again in that precise conjunction. Santayana elsewhere says: "When for a moment some value is realized, all potentiality and material efficacy are left far behind: we are in the realm of actuality, of music, of spirit; and the value actualized lives and ends in itself."[2] The value actualized: the essence which we spiritually yearn for, which we spiritually can possess, actualized in our world if only for a second. As actual this would be transient; as spiritual, timeless. As actual this would be relative; as spiritual, free. This is an experience of pure spirit. Moral values in this sense may be spiritual too. "They lie in the joy of having done *this* (italics in the text): they are a passage into essence." There is a kind of eternity here from which the world is an abstraction and an interlude strange to spirit, strange to the "homeless essence," but in which the mind is entirely at home.

The approach to essence which enables us to understand essential values Santayana has called "spiritual discipline." Spinoza called it blessedness: the intellectual mood of detachment by which we see the world under the aspect of eternity. Santayana's three approaches, through the higher reaches of knowledge, of logic, of ethics, are actually one approach. In contemplation, in dialectic, in spiritual discipline, the immediate is the ultimate: spirit. "It is the gift of intuition, feeling, or apprehension: an overtone of animal life, . . . the fountain of grace."[3] By this discipline we may be weaned from the life of the flesh to the life of the spirit.

There is, then, for Santayana, an immediacy to spiritual values and an ultimacy to them, just as we found there was both immediacy and ultimacy to the spiritual reaches of other throughfares of mind. There is the immediate apprehension of beauty or goodness or truth as non-existent or as for an instant actualized; there is the ultimate apprehension of these essences as beyond ordinary experience, achievable by spirit only; and between these two, the immediate and the ultimate, which are really one, there lies the world, with its

[1] *Platonism and the Spiritual Life*, p. 55.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 7. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 47.

allure, its instability, its hollowness, and with its troubled, shifting, and passionate values. Values have also the double function we noted in the other "approaches"; they are rooted in nature, and as such are earthbound and transient; but they exhibit also an empyrean flowering which is eternal and which is wholly spiritual.

VI

We see this duality of the spiritual again in *The Genteel Tradition at Bay*.[1] Here Santayana, having openly renounced the Black Art of Metaphysics, surreptitiously stirs the cauldron and renders out a half-hearted hypothesis: nature against a shifting background of the infra-natural and the super-natural. "I am far from wishing to deny," he says, "that the infra-natural exists, that below the superficial order which our senses and science find in the world, or impose upon it, there may not be an intractable region . . . of idiocy and accident. . . . All this underlying chaos, however, if it exists, has nothing to do with that supernatural sphere—a sphere and not a medley—to which morality and religion may be tempted to appeal. . . . There is nothing impossible in the existence of the supernatural: its existence seems to me decidedly probable." Here is the sceptic's olive-branch held out not only to nature but to the possibility of a world beyond. But it is only offered in fun, and is not meant to be taken seriously. Like many a flag of truce, the tender would be more embarrassed than gratified to have it honoured.

So sense still stands as the only sure road to essence. The way of dialectic must be mediated. The way of discipline is momentary. The way of the sceptic tempts, it would seem, to the open fields of faith.

Santayana's position, as always, arrests us. What he tells us, he tells us so beautifully and so fortuitously that we all but believe. In so far as we are of the world, we look askance at his singing; in so far as we are of his spirit, we try to find the key. Santayana's spirit, unlike Paul's, sees the world not as dross, but under the aspect of eternity; not as polluted, but as crystalline, to be seen and to be seen through, to be lived in so that we may live beyond it. In living beyond it, in living the spiritual life as Santayana defines it, we may discover it to be a life of these many facets. Here we may know the emancipation of the sceptic as, tongue in cheek, he waves good-bye to nature. Or we may join the artist in his reverie as he cries to essence, "Make me thy lyre," and thrills to all the gleaming surfaces, the harmonies, the poetry of life. We may learn here the "last secret" of the truly religious, standing in the cool of the day

[1] *The Genteel Tradition at Bay*, p. 31: The Appeal to the Supernatural.

before that not impossible door, for Santayana left open "towards the infinite." We may kneel in unentangled worship of those eternal values which have no earthly counterpart. These all, we shall find to be not different but akin, not at variance but in accord. Or so we are told. For there is communion here, as Plato said there was, and for Santayana community. And if we ask ourselves in any amazement if this can possibly be all there is for spirit, let us withdraw our question before we utter it. For this is not the spirit whose fruit is love, joy, peace, longsuffering, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, meekness, self-control: against which there is no law. This is the spirit of laughter and the spirit of radiance, the spirit of music and the spirit of freedom. This is a kind of aesthetic *fiesta* against which the law has voiced its heavy displeasure. But this spirit is elusive. It is quicksilver; it is waterfalls. It may be pursued. But it cannot be imprisoned.

If this analysis seem heavy, is it not in part because there is something elemental about spirit, like quicksilver? And something that laughs at analysis, like waterfalls? "Spirit bloweth where it listeth and continually undoes its own work."[1] Consistent Santayana's definition of the "spiritual life" is up to a certain point. This is a trick it learned "from the sad flesh itself" which finds it easier to be consistent than not—up to a certain point. Beyond this point perhaps we should not press it.

[1] *The Realm of Essence*, Preface, p. x.

SCHOLASTICISM

FELIX HOPE

THE quickening of interest in the great philosophical figure of Aquinas which has taken place during the last few years is a well-attested phenomenon. Of recent years there has been a distinct recognition that this mediaeval period was a most important time in the development of the human race, and that it has many urgent lessons for a modern age which has begun to realize that science and industry and mechanical efficiency have not succeeded in building such a perfect society as the optimistic Victorians had hastily hoped.

The famous Encyclical of Pope Leo XIII in 1879, urging the faithful to restore the "golden wisdom" of St. Thomas, has had an effect not only on the faithful but also on lay writers of the humanist kind. For in spite of its abstract conception and detachment from the theories of modern psychological and physical science, the Thomistic view of things still possesses that kind of immortality and truth which belongs to the unchanging concept Man and to his ineradicable desire for beatitude.

Few people who have any extensive acquaintance with Catholic thinking would challenge the assertion that one of its main characteristics, especially when it deals with human nature, is common sense. To the eccentricities of a particular age, or country, or clique, it presents the experience of humanity—*quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus.*

The Christian revelation, in the Thomist system, is the manifestation to the world as a whole of a truth of divine love which is yet more than metaphysic to the philosopher, or mysticism to the saint. In it, in terms the simplicity of which all can apprehend but the wealth of which none can exhaust, God is revealed as a unity of life and love. His knowledge of Himself—His thought of thought—lives, *lumen de lumine,* as an actual man. By being made manifest to men's senses, He wins them to love of His invisible excellence. Identifying Himself with what He has created, He completes both man's destiny and man's knowledge. But more, He captures men's hearts. He is, in the words, not of a theologian, but of Pierre Loti, *le maître des consolations inespérées, et le prince des pardons infinis.* His spirit of informing love dwells for ever, *lux beatissima,* in the society of His chosen. By that light St. Thomas tested and perfected the doctrines of Aristotle. He established between religion and philosophy a harmony which invites the admiration not only of the

Christian who recognizes the intrinsic merits of reason, but also of the philosopher who realizes that the excellence of reason points beyond itself to the insight of the lover and the mystic.

The name "Scholastic" is derived from the Greek word which means "ease." The scholastic is, therefore, the man of leisure, who, freed from the cares and worries of providing for his material needs, can devote himself in tranquil detachment to the pursuit of wisdom. The word assumed various meanings in later Latin, until in the Middle Ages it meant anyone engaged in a teaching capacity; and as philosophy figured on the curriculum of the mediaeval schools, the name "scholastic philosophy" or "scholasticism" arose.

There are two great principles, says Professor de Wulf, in the light of which we may seek a synthetic interpretation of the philosophic facts which the history of the Middle Ages presents to us. They are, first, that there were in those days systems of philosophy distinct from theology, and second, that Scholasticism is not the whole of mediaeval philosophy, but the best part of it—the collective inheritance of the majority of the thinkers of the West, which survived in spite of the fierce opposition that it encountered throughout the centuries.

Another striking characteristic of Scholasticism is its impersonality. Progress, in philosophy as in everything, was looked upon as the work of humanity at large, not of the individual. St. Thomas says that what a single man can bring to the perfection of knowledge is little, but that from the work of many there comes a wonderful increase. The mediaevals looked upon the succession of human individuals as a growth and development of one great human family. They appreciated the wisdom of Cardinal Newman's dictum that if we can see farther than the ancients, it is because we stand on their shoulders. If they could add a single stone to the edifice of human progress, they were content to do so and step quietly aside.

Probably the most prolific source of philosophic error is the ambiguous word. The ambiguous word is a characteristic of every language in the world. It is an instinct of human nature to indulge in metaphor, personification, and the other figures of speech. This, together with the impossibility of putting a separate label upon every idea is responsible for the multitudinous ambiguities of language. These ambiguities cause little or no trouble in ordinary conversation or in literature; but they constitute a formidable obstacle to philosophic analysis.

A second source of error is the confusion of thought with thing, of formal with material object, attributing to things distinctions which we have in our thoughts about things.

A third of error is the confusion of the fact of a thing with its

nature, cause, and mode of operation, to say that we do not know *that* a thing is, because we cannot explain *what* it is, or *why* it is, or *how* it acts and behaves.

A fourth source of error is the demanding an explanation of the obvious, the concluding that a thing is questionable because some one has questioned it. Some persons ask the question, "Why?" when they should first have asked themselves, "Why not?" For example, "Why do we assent to self-evident principles?" Common sense tells us that the question "Why?" is out of place unless there is some conceivable positive answer to the question "Why not?"

A fifth chain of error is the inadvertent limiting of the application of universal principles. This is the mistake committed by those who impugn the cogency of the argument from design for the existence of God. If all men, including the opponents of this argument, in the daily routine of life unhesitatingly pronounce certain combinations of phenomena to be evidence of design, it is against reason to doubt that evidence in the case of phenomena which point to the existence of a Supreme Intelligence. The agnostic does not allow the abstract possibility of an accidental coalescence of parts to interfere with his absolute certitude that a complicated printing-press is the work of intelligence. All we ask of him is that in his reasonings about the existence of God he apply the rules and principles upon which he relies for the attainment of certitude in his everyday life.

A sixth source of error is undue eagerness for finality in the solution of problems. This is a very common failing of the human mind. The mind is impatient of delay, and rushes to conclusions without sufficient data or without a sufficient examination of the data at hand.

Scholasticism defends against the idealists the existence of an external world; against the sceptics, the validity of the sense-perceptions by which we apprehend the external world and the validity of the intellectual processes by which we interpret things and reason about them. It teaches the essential difference between living and non-living matter, and from the nature of vital activities it concludes to the existence in living things of a vital principle or soul. It sees in man not merely the power of sense-perception, but from the nature of his intellectual processes concludes that he is animated by a principle which is immaterial and spiritual—a rational soul which, by giving life to the body, constitutes the human personality, and yet does not depend upon the body for its existence. In that soul it recognizes, from an examination of human actions, the faculty of free will. It holds that the intelligence, by reasoning from the facts of experience, can establish the existence of a Supreme and Infinite Spiritual Being, who is the First Cause of

things, the Creator of the universe, the Founder of the cosmic order, and the end of man. In the domain of human action, Scholasticism holds that there is a natural distinction between good and evil, and that our duty to do good and avoid evil is absolute.

To put it technically, though very inadequately, Scholasticism is a dualist realism, built up by a confident reliance on the value of intellect.

In his *Dichtung und Wahrheit* Goethe tells the story of his first entry to Strassburg Minster: "I seemed suddenly to see a new revelation; the perception of beauty in all its attractiveness was impressed on my soul." M. De Wulf, from whose *Philosophy and Civilization in the Middle Ages* I borrow the quotation, points the story's moral. Goethe had been educated in the traditions of Classicism: "among the detractors of Gothic architecture," as he phrases it himself. That revelation of the Minster's beauty opened a vista which led back, past the Renaissance, to mediaeval art, and M. De Wulf reminds us that art is not the only legacy which we inherit from the Middle Ages. His book is a plea for Scholastic philosophy: that *sententia communis* which dominated European thought during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and which, as he shows with singularly imaginative erudition, was rooted in a civilization that made both architecture and philosophy possible, even natural. Mediaevalism is the fashion nowadays. Shall we learn to be mediaeval in our thought as well as in our canons of art? The question sounds paradoxical enough; but the list of books that deal with mediaeval philosophy grows yearly longer.

It is widely assumed in our day that Catholics are people whose ideas, when they have any, spring from loyalty and love rather than from intelligence and independence, and whose lives are ruled by authority rather than by reason. The very opposite is, of course, the case. And those who try to read St. Thomas, with its presentation of truth, will never fall into that particular delusion again. It is your up-to-date modern who says, "one feels," "one likes to think," "one can't help thinking." St. Thomas says, "this is necessary," or "this is impossible." He proves, he does not declare. Most honest readers of St. Thomas feel tempted to think that if he has a fault it is, perhaps, that he tends to believe too much in reasoning, rather than too little.

Western civilization is at a crisis; most will admit that our central problem is our incapacity to assess the implications and order the material achievements of the colossal progress of the positive sciences. We are confronted by a mass of material for thought and for use, and must confess ourselves overwhelmed by it. Increase of knowledge is not the same as increase of intelligence, and their divorce has been emphasized by the philosophical developments

of the last century. Positivism led us to believe that the concrete would satisfy us by its own laws and exigencies—a philosophy denying its own right to independent existence. Idealism taught us to leave phenomena to the scientist and consider the thought-processes of the subject. By the end of the nineteenth century the phenomenalism of Kant and the idealism of Hegel had deprived metaphysics of any authority as the objective science of the *passiones communes entis*. But man is a metaphysical animal, and if he cannot integrate objective reality by a metaphysics explicit and true, he will integrate it by a metaphysics implicit and false.

The Great War revealed our anarchy of values. Empiricism has carried on in its old unintelligent way, presenting us with more and more of the food it cannot teach us to digest. Idealism has made two brilliant attempts to bring order into anarchy: through Marx, the left wing of the Hegelian tradition underlies the communism of Lenin; while through Croce and still more through Gentile, the right wing has been a chief formative influence upon Fascism.

Empiricism is self-condemned; idealism is ill at ease when the task is an ordering of objects. Political authority is wielded by classes who have not learnt the humanist traditions. And all over the West symptoms are discernible of what Wust calls "the return of metaphysics"; it is becoming increasingly recognized that realist metaphysics alone can reintegrate our "anarchy of values" and enable us to order the material development.

Neo-Kantianism, in more than one form, has separated religion from reality. It has seemed to many during the last hundred years to provide a possible basis for Christian apologetic. Thomism quite definitely will have nothing to do with the kind of separation between religion and metaphysics which leads to an ultimate discontinuity between faith and reason. God is the Source and End of all reality.

When St. Thomas speaks of "desire," he is not thinking of any mere wish or conscious appetite. To tell a plain, carnal man that the real meaning of his life is the desire of God is obviously not true, in that sense. Desire, in the vocabulary of St. Thomas, is the tendency of all being to its perfection, to its proper good, to the unity of its being. All being tends to return to its source. The finite is not perfect but imperfect, not completely, but only potentially, real and actual. It implies, therefore, a tendency beyond itself; an urge, as it were, towards a final end, a more perfect reality, to the pure actuality from which it came forth, which is God. No existing thing is ultimately intelligible apart from its goal.

There are two divisions, scholastic and anti-scholastic. John Scotus Erigena is the father. Of the former—the chief exponents are Anselm, Alexander of Hales, Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventura, and

Duns Scotus. Much as these differ among themselves on many grave issues, they are united as against John Scotus and his school in absolutely rejecting any theory of the universe which implies a community of being between God and His creatures. The issue, then, is between what is, in effect, if not in intention, a pantheistic view of the universe and the pluralism which in fact ultimately triumphed over it.

Philosophy, in the sense in which the word is used when Scholasticism is contrasted with other philosophies, is a systematic and fundamental explanation of human knowledge. "Knowledge" is here used in the twofold sense of knowing and what is known. Knowledge is called human, when its attainment is within the natural competence of mankind. It is obvious from the definition that there can be only one system which deserves the name of philosophy; or if we wish to put it so, there can be only one *true* philosophy. If two rival theories are advanced which disagree in their explanation, they evidently cannot both *explain* human knowledge. Only one of them can in reality be an explanation. It will, however, be convenient to have a definition which will apply to all the systems that go by the name of philosophy. Philosophy, then, may be defined as an attempt at a systematic and fundamental explanation of human knowledge. If the attempt succeeds, it is true philosophy.

But the question arises, How are we to judge whether the attempt is a success or a failure? What is the test of a true philosophy? There must be some test applicable to all systems of philosophy, or we shall have no reason for adopting one rather than another. It is easy for a philosopher to fall into the error of fancying that his system is true because it is consistent. And when he does so, he will interpret facts in the light of his theory and deny those facts which cannot be reconciled with it. Internal consistency is very far from being an infallible criterion of a true philosophy. It is possible to start with a few false principles and deduce from them a mass of doctrine which will be consistent with itself and with the initial principles. But in spite of its consistency the system will be false. Suppose there were two such systems, each containing a coherent body of teaching, but one contradicting the other: we could not choose between them and we should have to pronounce them both true.

St. Thomas is one of the world's outstanding philosophical masters. He stood at the apex of mediaeval thought, and, surveying the whole range of metaphysics up to his own day with an amazing breadth and calmness of judgment, he produced a coherent synthesis of the whole, in which contributions from every school of thought were ordered in relation to St. Thomas's central belief, derived from

Aristotle, in the concrete reality of things and the reality of our capacity to know them.

He will never be put off with the contention that we only know our own ideas: our ideas would be valueless unless they truly represented objective external facts or "beings." "His point of departure is not the idea of truth, but the fact that being is perceived by the senses"; "Metaphysics attains to a concept of the ego, of the world, and of God, by starting from experience." He is therefore in full accord with science and with common sense in insisting that our sense impressions provide the raw material for valid comprehension of external fact by intellectual process. "In the order of knowledge, then, our thought is enclosed between two points. At the point of departure we have an initial cognition of being; at the point of arrival we find nothing else than a perfected cognition of this same being." This sanity of attempting to deal with real things and no chimeras runs through all St. Thomas's thought on every subject which he touches. It determines equally his solution of the logical problem of universals and his doctrine of the existence of nature of God and Creation.

Aquinas's extraordinary clearness and balance may also be illustrated by his treatment of the relation between Faith and Reason. Among his predecessors and contemporaries some confused the two, and others either the one or the other. St. Thomas simply accepted both and demarcated their respective natures and functions.

Probably nothing more divides modern thought from the philosophies of St. Bonaventura, St. Thomas, and Scotus than the serene self-confidence with which all mediaeval thinkers take intellect for granted. God is the source of intellect, and intellect governs the world: man sets out to conquer the world by intellect, and in his own mind re-creates the external world.

But what is Scholastic Philosophy? There have been various attempts at a definition, and in the works of many philosophical writers who professed to give an account of it, Scholasticism, instead of being defined, has been caricatured and loaded with abuse. We shall succeed in defining Scholastic Philosophy, if we bear in mind the purpose of definition. This purpose is to mark off from everything else the thing denoted by the term to be defined. This purpose is achieved by fixing upon a group of characteristics which is permanent in it and is not found elsewhere. In searching for such a group of characteristics it is not unusual to start with what is called a nominal definition.

A *nominal* definition of Scholastic Philosophy is the philosophy developed from the teachings of Aristotle by the great theologians of the Middle Ages and elaborated in the Catholic universities and seminaries of the succeeding centuries. The following may be set

down as a *real* definition: Scholastic Philosophy is the philosophy which teaches the certitude and objective validity of human knowledge acquired by means of sense-experience, testimony, reflection, and reasoning, and distinguishes an objective and a subjective element in universal ideas. By "reflection" is meant both psychological reflection and ontological.

The foregoing definition marks off Scholastic Philosophy from all other systems of philosophy, so far as they are *systems*. It indicates where Scholastic Philosophy differs from them in fundamentals. It picks out those characteristics which, in the comparison of philosophy with philosophy, are of the most far-reaching importance and have the widest application. There is scarcely a system of philosophy which does not somewhere coincide with the teachings of Scholasticism; but often this will be in some tenet which, though of momentous consequence in itself, has not such a universal influence upon philosophic thought as the doctrines indicated in the foregoing definition.

Until comparatively recent times, we are told St. Thomas received little recognition in this country and suffered almost complete neglect outside the Church, so that "no one save a Catholic thought of studying his system from the point of view of pure philosophy and truth." But there is distinct evidence that St. Thomas was studied by non-Catholics in this country and elsewhere, quite independently of the revival movement and at a time when his philosophy was comparatively neglected in many Catholic schools. Thus, in his famous *Biographia Literaria* (published in 1817), we find Coleridge writing as follows:

"In consulting the excellent commentary of St. Thomas Aquinas on the *Parva Naturalia* of Aristotle, I was struck at once by its close resemblance to Hume's essay on association. The main thoughts were the same in both, the order of the thoughts was the same, and even the illustrations differed only by Hume's occasional substitution of more modern examples. I mentioned the circumstances to several of my literary acquaintances, who admitted the closeness of the resemblance and that it seemed too great to be explained by mere coincidence; but they thought it improbable that Hume should have held the pages of the Angelic Doctor worth turning over. But some time after Mr. Payne, of the King's mews, showed Sir James Mackintosh some odd volumes of St. Thomas Aquinas, partly perhaps from having heard that Sir James (then Mr.) Mackintosh had in his lectures passed a high encomium on this canonized philosopher, but chiefly from the fact that the volumes had belonged to Mr. Hume, and had here and there marginal marks and notes of reference in his own handwriting. Among these volumes was that which contains the *Parva Naturalia*, in the old Latin version, swathed and swaddled in the commentary aforementioned!" (p. 105).

Here we have three eminent non-Catholic philosophers in the eighteenth, or early nineteenth, century independently studying and praising the philosophical writings of St. Thomas.

This fact shows how precarious are such judgments as that of Mark Pattison in another connection: "All the grand development of human reason, from Aristotle down to Hegel, was a sealed book to him"; for of all the English philosophers Hume was the least likely to have concerned himself with the scholastic system.

In his popular *History of Mediaeval Philosophy* (second edition, 1859), Frederick Denison Maurice devotes many pages to St. Thomas.

"Albert's name is surrounded with a traditional haze. Most people have a vague notion that he was half school-man, half magician; they scarcely know whether he passed among his contemporaries for a servant of God or of the evil spirit. On the contrary, Thomas Aquinas has abundantly fulfilled his master's prophecy of him. The bellowings of that bull have been heard through all countries and in all generations; there is more than a feeble echo of them in our own. He has governed the schools, moulded the thoughts of all Roman Catholic students, given a shape to the speculations of numbers who have never read any of his writings and to whom his name is rather a terror than an attraction" (p. 184).

In our own times we have seen a more obvious revival of Thomism. After considering the systems of Gioberti and Rosmini, the Vatican gradually decided to make Thomism its official philosophy. The result has been far-reaching. In Italy, where, as ever, Dante is studied, Scholasticism accompanies the neo-Hegelianism of Croce and Gentile. Cardinal Mercier was the leader of the revival in Northern Europe. He founded the school of Louvain, and he rewrote his lectures in a considerable volume. Scholasticism regains its hold on Germany, and is beginning to arouse respect also in Great Britain. D'Arcy's work is a valuable addition to this literature. Stressing the distinction of act and potency in all contingent reality, St. Thomas's valuable contribution of the theory of analogy, and his vigorous intellectualism, the author carries these principles through the various branches of philosophy and shows how St. Thomas with unwearying skill erected upon them the cathedral of his thought, giving to posterity a shrine where all, regardless of creed, might worship truth.

The outstanding claim is that Thomism was "not for an age but for all time" and that it has been so "canonized" by successive Popes (without, however, being pronounced infallible) that St. Thomas may rightly be called "the Common Doctor" of the Church. "His light, because it is spiritual, and his philosophy, because it is true, still continue with their essential grandeur and essential efficiency to-day as in the time of St. Louis."

In the preface to the French translation and the text of the *Summa* edited under the auspices of the *Revue des Jeunes* we find this gentle boast. "The time is past when Victor Cousin could congratulate himself on having unearthed on the quays of the Seine, in a bookseller's stall, the works of a 'certain Aquinas' who, to his great astonishment, showed signs of originality and depth." To-day an awakened Scholasticism and able pens are setting forth the merits of St. Thomas's *Summa* for the world to view.

As a thinker, St. Thomas is first and foremost a classifier and systematizer, and it is this characteristic which helps to explain his rather dubious position of seeker after truth and Christian apologist combined, both of which positions he maintained with complete intellectual honesty. This does not mean that he accepted all that was handed down to him, whether by Aristotle or by Christian tradition; "if it be true" which he appended to his remarks on Ptolemaic cosmology should be enough to exonerate him for this accusation. He simply believed that there were forms of knowledge higher than reason but not irrational, and that this knowledge was furnished, in the last resort, by Christian revelation—a point of view differing in degree but not in kind from the modern semi-religious "faith" in reason which Professor Whitehead has argued to be the foundation of modern science.

The important claims of Thomas Aquinas as a philosopher, apart from whatever position he may occupy as a saintly personality or as the exponent of a particular religious system, is beginning to be heard again with renewed ardour on the lips of the intellectual.

If, as Emerson so well puts it, "we only believe as deep as we live," in no one's career was the golden thread of doctrine more closely woven into the tissue of a perfect life as in that of St. Thomas of Aquinas. For St. Thomas study was not an interruption of his prayer and loving contemplation but, like a telescope, it only brought nearer to his eyes the flaming sun of God's love.

Aquinas, like a modern empiricist, begins with the *tabula rasa*, and the immediate sense impressions, but, unlike him, sees no reason to stop there and to call a halt. For where Aquinas breaks with realism is in his belief that the mind can penetrate to an ultimate end beyond matter and "tend" from the material origin to God, thus fusing together both the Greek teleological tradition and the modern philosophical trend towards origins deriving from Locke and Hume. It is, however, precisely in the difficulty of determining the exact nature of this relation that the external mystery begins, and Dr. O'Mahony expresses it in the following manner:

"The God of St. Thomas is not the *prima materia*, the one being of which multiplicity is the outer phenomenon. Neither is He the form which unites immediately with the finite, nor yet is He the

one unique substance that upholds all being. God is transcendent. He is being identical with itself in the fullness of all perfection. The finite as a mere participation in being is in a position of total dependence in His regard, and it is in this total dependence that characterizes the finite most immediately. Yet God is not to be absolutely opposed to creation; the total dependence of the finite on Him requires an intimacy which is ineffable."

Now, because God is the supreme Good, and because it is of the essence of goodness to impart itself, the world of multiplicity was created and thus became at once part of God's necessity as "being" and the product of His free act as creation. Yet the created things are in potency only, and they yearn to return to the creator, thereby manifesting the "divine discontent" which is apparent in all things which are only "becoming." So the whole universe tends back to its centre, and in the hierarchy of creatures which form the universe it is man who is the peak and coping stone, for in him alone the *amore* inherent in all things becomes conscious. Man, in fact, on his intellectual side, is the mediator between nature and God, and as such has a twofold end and a twofold potentiality, natural and divine, both of which have their meaning in the human quest of beatitude.

The spirituality, the immateriality of the soul, lay in the notion that the simplicity of the soul of man was only immortal because it was not material, because it was not extendant in space; and this spiritual nature of the soul was rationally inferred by the Catholic philosophers of the Scholastic school from its characteristic activity. A number of experiments had been carried on of recent years in the physical laboratories, the results of which might be considered to form a strong corroboration of the view of the Scholastics that the soul is spiritual and simple and therefore immortal. The phenomena which gave this conformation dated from 1879, since when a mass of demonstrable evidence had been compiled in support of what was known as "imageless" thought in opposition to the view previously held that thought was the direct result of sensations. The latter view, which had been held by what were called the Associationists, had been the stronghold of materialism which the coming of the third mental element known as "imageless thought," was not steadily undermining.

The philosopher, taking up the subject where the physicists left it, could take as the easiest hypothesis to fit the facts that if "imageless thought" could not be conceived in material terms then it must be spiritual, and if the function was spiritual, then that of which it was function must be spiritual also. The human soul, like "imageless thought," could not be touched, seen, or heard, but like "imageless thought," it had to be conceived as nonsensorial and nonmaterial, and because of its certainly manifested peculiar and characteristic

activity it was, therefore, of a spiritual nature. Thus, they got to the Scholastic reasoning of the mediaeval Catholic philosopher through the modern physical laboratories.

For St. Thomas the road to intelligibility lies through the senses of man, and the pathway to God therefore cannot be jumped, as the mystics thought, by a *saltus mortalis* of immediate intuition, but must be carefully mapped out by the reason. What enables him to go farther than this, however, and what makes him seem abstract to us, is his assumption as an ultimate truth that man is able to know reality, and the doctrine of "being" which he adopts in order to interpret it. With "being" as his definition he sets out to classify all things that are, from God as the limiting concept down to the meanest objects of nature. Yet, although all is "being," there are different grades of "being," and these differ, as in Aristotle, in proportion to their hold on reality. The things which are subject to change are less real than the unchanging, and into the systemized fabric which this reasoning yields, of act and potency, form and matter, substance and accident, the multiplicity of the universe is made to fit. God is supreme act with no potencies, whereas all other beings have potencies to be realized in act. In dealing with the region beyond the world Aquinas uses the instrument of analogy, and by his use of it he is enabled to pass into realms where the subject-matter, although beyond reason, is not, in his opinion, unreasonable. To us the whole fabric appears one of form rather than of content, and it is an important problem of Thomism to-day to define to what extent modern physical knowledge can be dovetailed into the mediaeval scheme.

Is Scholasticism merely a latinization of Aristotle? So Diderot defines it. "It is not so much a special philosophy," he writes, "as a certain dry, still sort of arguing to which Aristotelianism, incrusted by hundreds of puerile questions, has been reduced." And Brucker speaks of Scholastic "Aristotelomania." It is undoubtedly true that Scholasticism is more closely allied to Aristotelianism than to any other system, and that most of the great mediaeval Scholastics commented upon Aristotle. But their commentaries are not those of modern scholarship, which simply expounds a text. They took Aristotle as presenting a good foundation upon which they built their own superstructure, casting out what they thought false or useless and retaining what they approved.

The word "neo-Thomism" may be taken with more than one meaning. It can be applied to the philosophic work of Dominicans and members of other Orders which has gone on at least since the pronouncement of Leo XIII in favour of Aquinas, including the work of such men as Rousselot, Sertillanges, Garrigou Lagrauge, and Jacques Maritain. Or it can be applied to the popularization of

intellectual Catholicism in the life of contemporary Paris. In the latter aspect, if we consider it only as an aspect, neo-Thomism has some of the appearance of a literary and philosophic mode. It represents, beyond its strictly theological import, a reaction against such philosophies as that of Bergson, against Romanticism in literature, and against democracy in government.

Scholasticism perfected an instrument of philosophic exposition that stands unrivalled, and which, compared to the Babel of modern philosophic terminology, where a new writer often thinks it his duty to invent a new vocabulary, is like an Italian sun compared to a London fog.

Another most fruitful idea of Mercier's was to approach with sympathy non-Scholastic thought, to seek in present-day discussion the points on which the old Scholastic teaching could throw most light, and thus insert itself again even outside Catholic circles as a living, up-to-date, and thoroughly critical philosophy. This attitude is now taken for granted; but before Mercier set the good example, it was the fashion in many Catholic circles to despise all modern philosophy as "the pathology of human reason" and to dismiss as absurd puerilities the teachings of Descartes, Kant, Hegel, or Fichte without taking the trouble to gain an exact knowledge of their doctrines. But Mercier followed out the wishes of Leo—*vetera novis augere*, to add new things to the old, to "rethink Thomism" in the light of modern problems. St. Thomas also held that the real exists apart from the mind, and that justice, truth, and goodness exist elsewhere than in the finite beings which share in them.

In spite of his dogmatic reputation St. Thomas has a strong claim to be considered as a rationalist, and, in Fr. D'Arcy's opinion at least, St. Thomas would have desired no other test. Fr. D'Arcy emphasizes the partial antagonism of Aquinas to the more voluntarist Augustinians of his age, and draws attention to the half-way position which he occupies between the mystics on the one hand and the rationalist Aristotelian Arabians on the other hand. This apparent leaning towards the Arabians, and the anti-Christian flavour resulting from it, rendered his philosophy suspect to the mediaeval Church, and the fact that the study of Aristotle had native European as well as Arabian sources did not suffice, for a time at least, to save him from this suspicion. To us, looking back from to-day, it may seem rather that in championing the cause of the intellect against the philosophers who appealed to the heart St. Thomas was not only serving the cause of his Church but also, by returning to an older and perhaps saner tradition, preparing the way for the Renaissance of two centuries later.

Scholasticism, as taught by St. Thomas, is alive to-day because it gives an intellectual answer to the great problem of thought. In

these days of cloudy scepticism men turn with relief to a philosophy which, in addition to sane ethical teaching and a very penetrating psychology, affirms the power of man's intellect to solve such problems as the existence of God, creation, free will, or the fundamental processes of our intellectual activity: and St. Thomas is nowhere more satisfying than on these central truths.

Scholasticism should not be measured by anything extrinsic such as its relation to schools, which was the error of writers of the Renaissance and Reformation periods; nor by its method of exposition, which was a mistake of Foillee, Willmann and Diderot; nor by its temporal environment, which was done by Cousin, Unenberweg-Baumgartner, Erdmann, Picavet, and others; nor by religion as attempted by Manser. Dr. De Wulf compares the historian which identifies Scholasticism with Catholicism to a "man who thinks he can get to know all about the oak tree by describing the composition of the soil in which it grows along with other trees of the forest." Lastly, Scholastic philosophy is not to be identified with mediaeval philosophy. A mediaeval philosopher is not necessarily a Scholastic. John Scotus Erigena, for example, is called the "first of the Scholastics" in a recent study published by Henry Bett through the Cambridge Press. Dr. De Wulf, on the contrary, terms him anti-scholastic. Scholasticism should be judged not extrinsically but intrinsically and doctrinally.

No philosophy is lived apart from its environment. Thought influences civilization and civilization influences thought. If men do not live as they think, they soon begin to think as they live; if they do not suit their lives to dogmas, they soon begin to suit dogmas to their lives.

Human nature remains identical in all its profound needs in spite of the diversity of historic conditions. . . . So in its nature state, Scholasticism was a synthesis wherein were treated all the questions with which philosophy is concerned, and in which the solutions were harmonized, held together, and controlled by one another.

The modern mind is beginning to realize that the Middle Ages can show an art and a philosophy which can stand comparison with what was best in the ancient world, and which far surpasses the modern, and a social framework that in many points surpasses both. No one sneers at them now, unless it be the popular demagogue or the sciolist magazine.

Twentieth-century "reformers" will probably be surprised to find how many of the social theories we take credit for as being creatures of our own civilization were germinally, if not completely, heirlooms from the Middle Ages. With regard to Law and Education, jurists will find bedrock principles furnishing substantial food for pro-profitable thought, pedagogues will learn that their science has not

advanced a great deal since the days of Vincent de Beauvais, Humbert de Romans, Tolomel de Lucca, and especially Mafeo Vegio of Lodi.

A new alternative synthesis arose in the Scholasticism of St. Thomas Aquinas, who built up a complete, rational scheme of knowledge, in which Christian doctrines were blended with Aristotelian philosophy and science. As the survival of Roman Law kept alive the ideal of order through the time of chaos and through the Middle Ages, so Scholasticism upheld the supremacy of reason, teaching that God and the universe can be apprehended, even partially understood, by the mind of man. In this it prepared the way for science, which has to assume that nature is intelligible. The men of the Renaissance, when they founded modern science, owed this assumption to the Scholastics.

Sir Thomas Browne was even a closer exponent of Aquinas than Donne, and the former's continuous inspiration was the *Summa contra Gentiles* of the great Schoolman. Nothing could sound more personal than the melodious confessions of *Religio Medici*; yet when we read such sentences as that "vulgar and tavern musick which makes one man merry, another mad, strikes me in a deep fit of devotion, and a profound contemplation of the first composer," we are reading a transcription from Aquinas. Sir Thomas Browne was avowedly a Schoolman, and it is on Thomism that he builds up his typical paradoxes, such as the famous one:

"I was not only before myself but Adam, that is in the idea of God and a decree of the synod held from all eternity. And in this sense, I say, the world was before the creation, and at an end before it had a beginning."

To a modern reader, then, the interest of St. Thomas lies chiefly in his humanist leanings and the success with which, while holding fast to his intellectual point of view, he harmonizes the Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic ideals with those of Christian asceticism and spirituality. It is no small merit in the thirteenth century to have placed almost equal stress on the body and the mind, and, as man seems not to change very much in the course of years, it is likely that this merit will continue unimpaired in the future.

St. Thomas stands out as a really great scholar, with the greatest respect for all sound learning and a strictly scientific outlook, and as one of the greatest masters of constructive criticism of all times. His extraordinary gift for logical analysis and his no less amazing insight into the facts of common sense cover, but cannot conceal, the profundity of all his thoughts. The fact that he did not spin metaphysical webs out of his own speculation without reference to other thinkers or to the corroboration of experience proves him, *pace* certain modern schools, not only a safer guide, but a greater

original genius. For only a genius can apply other men's work with such transcendent results. And over the whole is cast the mantle of genuine spiritual humility.

If Milton followed the mediaevals, so did Dryden, and nowhere more than in his Anglican confession of faith. But Pope was more of a Schoolman, and some of the best passages in Pope recall the *Divina Commedia*. For when all is said of what the English poets themselves owe to Scholasticism, we have still to reckon with Dante. Eighty years ago Dean Church in a famous essay wrote of him as the most original of thinkers. But when was a scholar so misleading? when was a supreme genius as close a follower as Dante in the train of a contemporary? The great Ghibelline did depart, it is true, from the political philosophy of St. Thomas, but in all other matters the doctrines he states are Thomistic. And Dante is not so much more easy to escape than Plato. Ever the luminary of Italy, he drew France, Germany, and England into his trail of light. Through the centuries reflections, not only of his imagery but of his thought, flash down the avenues of English literature, as Dante's own Matilda flashed among flowers on the poet while melodies played through the luminous air. Translations of the *Divina Commedia* are themselves an addition to our literature. And whenever we meet Dante we are close to St. Thomas Aquinas.

The mind of St. Thomas was a diamond of many facets; it could cut with dialectical precision as well as sparkle with verse. Into the undying list of mediaeval hymns such as the "Stabat Mater," "Jesu Dulcis Memoria," and especially the "Dies Irae," fragments of which fluttered on the dying lips of Sir Walter Scott, and the tenth stanza of which was never read by Dr. Johnson without shedding tears, St. Thomas now enters with his "Lauda Sion," his "Pange Lingua," his "Adoro Te" as the poet laureate of the Eucharist. Ever since the Church approved of that most popular devotion to the Blessed Sacrament, the service of Benediction, the "Tantum Ergo" gives glory to the Real Presence of the Lord in the rhyme of His greatest theologian. In the silence of prayer before the altar, what words rise so spontaneously to the faithful heart as those of the hymn "Adoro Te," which bids sense stand aside and tramples upon all the cavilling of heretics, past, present, and to come, with that all-subduing act of faith: *Credo quidquid dixit Dei Filius.*

In view of these achievements it is not surprising that St. Thomas rose to fame even within the very thirteenth century in which he lived. Stephen, the Archbishop of Paris, called him "The great luminary of the Catholic Church, the precious stone of priesthood, the flower of doctors, and the bright mirror of the University of Paris." He was sought after and coveted as the most distinguished

lecturer by the great universities of Europe, then flourishing centres of learning. He became the attractive model for imitation to all late Catholic scholars and theologians, though never to be surpassed or equalled. Popes and Councils vied with one another in expressing their approval of his method and doctrine as most conformable to the divine plan of Christian truth.

During the Council of Trent the *Summa* was laid upon the altar beside the Holy Bible and the Conciliar and Papal decrees for the safe guidance of the bishops. And lastly, Leo XIII, esteeming St. Thomas as "the special bulwark and glory of the Catholic faith" as "one richly endowed with human and divine science—who like the sun, heated the world with the ardor of his virtue and filled it with the splendour of his teaching," so that reason, "borne on the wings of Thomas to its human height can scarcely rise higher," enthroned him as the angel of Catholic institutions of learning, and called upon the bishops of the Catholic world "to restore the golden wisdom of Thomas, and to spread it far and wide for the defence and beauty of the Catholic faith, for the good of society, and for the advantage of all sciences."

St. Thomas was a man endowed with the characteristic notes of the three great Fathers of Greek Philosophy: he possessed the intellectual honesty and precision of Socrates, the analytical keenness of Aristotle, and that yearning after wisdom and light which was the distinguishing mark of Plato. With a comprehensiveness of purpose which, in our modern times, seems nothing short of stupendous, he laid broad and deep the foundations of his vast system, and with a force and directness, less easily to be attained in the rich confusion of modern thought, compelled every source of knowledge to yield him material for his work. His *Summa Theologica* is a mighty synthesis, thrown into technical and scientific form, of the Catholic traditions of East and West, of the infallible words of the Sacred Page, and of the most enlightened conclusions of human reason gathered from the soaring intuitions of the Academy and the rigid severity of the Lyceum.

Like one of those monumental Gothic cathedrals of the same Middle Ages, the *Summa* is vast, complicated, and yet unified in the heaven-pointing plan by which vault and arch, turret and pinnacle, all conspire to the one general effect of lifting our thoughts from the earth beneath us to the supernatural world above us. Nature and grace, reason and faith, natural and revealed truth are there articulated and subordinated and co-ordinated in such a way that Dante had only to put in verse to make it a harmony in expression as it was already intrinsically a harmony of thought. And although St. Thomas accomplished all this not so much by creating as by transforming and assimilating, what will always remain new

and wholly original in his work is the spirit with which he addressed himself to the task, the sense of completeness which impelled him to leave nothing incomplete.

St. Thomas states the objections to theism with startling vigour and insight and comprehensiveness. It is impossible to prove that God exists, because it is necessary to start by defining what you are going to prove; and it is a contradiction in terms to attempt to define the Infinite. All proof, all argument, implies the existence of a rational order, which itself cannot exist without God. If He exists, all necessity flows from Him; there can be, therefore, nothing on which we could build a demonstration of His existence. The argument cannot start.

Similarly, no relation can be stated, can exist, between the finite and the infinite, so that you cannot argue from the world to God. And if there be a God at all, He must exist of Himself. As philosophers put it, His nature and His existence are identical. It is admitted by all, however, that the Divine nature is inaccessible. We cannot know Him as He is; He is infinitely incomprehensible. That means, also, that we cannot know whether He is. And, lastly, an argument is based upon experience. But God far transcends any possible experience. Therefore we cannot reach Him by argument. Certainly Kant and all the moderns seem children beside St. Thomas when it comes to knowing what are the objections to theism.

"All evidence goes to show that the metaphysics of St. Thomas is independent of any physical theory and that he was quite prepared to jettison the current science if a better could be devised."

Catholics are a puzzling people to whom things are fundamental which to other men seem maddeningly irrelevant; and when the Catholic psyche is disturbed, only a Catholic can hope to treat it aright. For other men will regard religion either as something from which the patient must be set free altogether, or at any rate as something which has too strong a hold upon him, and will treat the patient accordingly. But religion can never have too strong a hold, though it can have a wrong hold; and this is a distinction which only the trained Catholic philosopher can see aright.

Aquinas represents the principles of a "Christian naturalism" which is based on an exact study of phenomena, and accepts the world for what it is genuinely worth. He relegates abnormal spiritual experiences to the background, and, while insisting on the vision of God as being man's last end and full perfection, throws open the opportunity of contemplation to all men, and not merely to the monastic profession. His broad sanity did so much to straighten out the kinks of mediaeval thought and mediaeval assumption.

The *Summa contra Gentiles* was written to show heathens and Jews that the doctrines of the Catholic Church were reasonable in

the sense that they could not be shown to be opposed to reason. Scripture is cited simply by way of confirmation or to indicate what precisely the Church held. It was authoritative for those only who accepted it. The *Summa Theologica* was written for Catholics, and it, too, presupposed the Church. Had it been necessary to prove the Church's position, St. Thomas would have done it. To argue that because he has never done so he failed to realize that the treatise on the Church's position was a vital point is to argue that he was absolutely wanting in the logical sense. The late Dr. Wicksteed makes the mistake of supposing that the two great treatises, the *Summa contra Gentiles* and the *Summa Theologica*, were meant to be exhaustive of the whole theological problem. Readers of the *Secunda Secundae* know how at almost every turn the authority of the Church is taken for granted, or better, that the student is supposed to have mastered the treatise *De Ecclesia*. Thus he remarks that "Faith adheres to all the Articles of the Faith on one only ground, viz., the First Truth propounded to us in the Scriptures expounded in accordance with the Church's teaching" (Qu. V iii. ad 2dm).

That all men desire beatitude was a theme frequent in antiquity, and is one frequent, indeed, to-day; but what is new in Aquinas, in spite of his own Platonic and Aristotelian borrowings, is the stating of the problem as a synthesis of the natural (which is by no means to be despised) and the supernatural, and corresponding distinction of faith and reason. For while the finite must of necessity tend toward the limit which is God, there is nothing at its disposal to raise its thought to God except the finite, and only man with his double potentiality is the link between. Man on one side of his nature is gifted with the capacity of receiving grace from above, and God, by an astounding act of condescension, stoops down to elevate His creature to His own plane. This is the problem which reveals most clearly the Thomistic antinomy of two ends for man, the perfect man known already in antiquity who has reached his own natural perfection, and the other man who tends, also naturally (Aquinas unfortunately uses the same word), to the Divine perfection. The solution is seen in the words of Aquinas himself.

That a shrub becomes a tree is quite in keeping with the very effort of its own nature, but that a shrub becomes a ladder, something else is required. And yet its limited capacity of becoming merely a tree did not prevent its being worked on by man to be fashioned into a ladder. Such is the case of man in regard to the supernatural.

[The above notes have no pretension of being altogether original. Apologies for one's work are generally unprofitable. Still, I wish to point out that I recognize the extent of my indebtedness to many famous books and writers—some of whom are anonymous.]

NOTES ON SOME EARLY EDITIONS[1]

AQUINAS was evidently a favourite with Cranmer, for the late Prebendary Burbidge traced a number of his books, mostly early sixteenth-century editions, printed in Paris, in the British Museum and the University Library, Cambridge. It is especially interesting to-day, when so many monuments of the early printers are being transferred to the United States, to note that a vellum copy of the *Summa de Articulis Fidei et Ecclesiae Sacramentis*, Mentz, *circa* 1460, was, in 1851, one of the few specimens of early typography in the United States; it was knocked down for $20 at the Corwin sale in 1856, and twenty years later reached $162. The Rev. J. Fuller Russell's copy, lent to the Caxton Exhibition in London in 1877, turned up in a sale in New York in December, 1920, and brought $330; there are only about ten copies traced, nearly all in public libraries.

From a sale room point of view the earliest editions of *Secunda Secundae* would seem to be the most precious of St. Thomas Aquinas's works; it was frequently printed before 1500, and forms a substantial folio of which Erasmus is reported to have said, "no man can carry it about, much less get it into his head!" At the Wodhull sale in 1886 a fine copy of the *editio princeps*, Strasburg, *circa* 1466, bound by Roger Payne, brought £37, which is nothing like its value to-day; and on May 1, 1922, a fine copy in the original pigskin, brought $650 at the American Art Galleries in New York. A copy, bound by Derome, of the Mentz edition of P. Schoeffer, 1467—the first with a date—brought £111 at the White sale in 1902—this was bought at Syston Park sale in 1884 for £35—while one of the few copies printed on vellum brought £131 at the Sunderland sale in 1881. The Mantua edition, Paulo de Puzpach, *circa* 1475, of the same work, although it has only a small commercial value, is interesting in connexion with the history of early printing in Mantua; a copy sold for £6 at Sotheby's in 1901 belonged in 1501 to the Convent of St. Maria delle grazie d'Imola.

The *Summa Theologiae, sine ulla nota*, but printed at Mentz by Schoeffer, folio 1463, is a magnificent book, printed with the same types as those used by Schoeffer for his 1462 Bible and his 1468 edition of *Justinian*. William Morris's copy in the original boards with brass clasps sold for only £34 in 1898. One of the rarer of this author's works is the *Super primo Sententiarum*, Venice, 1486, not recorded by Hain; Mr. Henry White's copy of this, printed on vellum, possibly unique as such, brought £101 in April, 1902, and originally belonged to the Monastery of St. Leonard, at Venice—this may have been the copy which was sold for £300 in 1870. What

[1] Partly due to facts recorded in the *Times Literary Supplement*.

may be described as the early "library" edition of St. Thomas Aquinas, the *Opera*, Rome, 1570, in seventeen folio volumes, occurs now and then when old libraries are dispersed; Sir Mark Sykes's set, on vellum, brought 155 guineas in 1824, and three years later the Rev. T. Williams's set, also on vellum, sold for 170 guineas. One of the most interesting manuscripts to come under the hammer was the *Thomas d'Acquin, le livre du Regimen des Princes*, translated by Charles de Saint Gelaye, a folio manuscript of the fifteenth century, on seventy-nine leaves of vellum, with four fine miniatures, half-page size, one with the translator presenting his work to his patron, the Count d'Angoulême; this was in the sale of the Hamilton Palace collection in 1889, and then brought £164.

A SHORT MODERN BIBLIOGRAPHY

MARITAIN: *Saint Thomas Aquinas; Art and Scholasticism; Introduction to Philosophy.*

M. C. D'ARCY: *Thomas Aquinas.*

OLGIATI-ZYBURA: *Key to the Study of St. Thomas.*

DE WULF: *Mediaeval Philosophy; History of Mediaeval Philosophy.*

GIBSON: *The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas.*

PÈGUES: *Catechism of the* Summa.

Various papers published by BLACKWELL, 1925: *St. Thomas Aquinas.*

WICKSTEED: *Dante and Aquinas; Reactions between Dogma and Science.*

SERTILANGES: *St. Thomas Aquinas and His Work.*

Papers read at Summer School, Cambridge, 1924: *St. Thomas Aquinas.*

E. G. GARDNER: *Dante and the Mystics.*

F. J. SHEEN: *God and Intelligence.*

A full bibliography in all languages was published in Louvain about 1923.

FORMALISM AND TELEOLOGY

O. C. JENSEN, M.A., Ph.D.

THE recent discussions on "The Right and the Good" show that the reconciliation between formalism and teleology is still a problem. Some of the contending parties lean more strongly towards formalism, others towards teleology; but neither side has, I believe, done equal justice to formalism *and* teleology. To review the whole discussion is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, I propose to suggest in outline a theory which may possibly harmonize the essential tenets of both parties.

We are indebted to Prichard and Ross for a much-needed renaissance of formalism which stresses certain deep-seated moral convictions of many, if not of all, men. These convictions may be firmly held without being easily expressible; they will therefore not necessarily be stated in the same way by every moralist who is alive to them, but they may be presented roughly as follows: We are not to justify our moral obligations on the grounds that our fulfilment of them is more likely to produce a greater amount of good consequences than any other act open to our choice at the time, and that these consequences are in harmony with our truest and most abiding interests. In so far as it is my duty to do good to others, for example, it is not an appreciation of the value of their good as an end in itself which exerts that influence on my will called a sense of obligation, nor is my obligation to be justified on the grounds that their good is also my own good in that it satisfies my benevolent impulses. It is because an act is *right* that I am under an obligation to do it, and justified in doing it. Wherein its rightness lies is a question I need not answer just yet.

For my act to be morally good, I must do what is right from a specifically moral motive. This motive, in the ethical sense, is not some good beyond the act, such as the happiness of others; nor is it, in the psychological sense, the benevolent impulse which is the spring of such altruistic conduct. Such motives indicate very admirable traits of character, but their value is not that of moral worth. Prichard calls such motives virtuous, but not moral. Ross calls them moral, but admits that they are inferior in moral value to the sense of duty, which is for him *the* moral motive. But the distinction is important whatever words we use to denote it.

I propose to retain this formalistic tenet, perhaps in a modified form, and to combine it with the apparently incompatible teleological

tenets, viz., that the rightness of an act is conditioned by the value of its intended consequences, and that it is only *the good* which can furnish us with a reason and justification for doing anything at all, and which can place us under an obligation—I would add, however, that this good need not be the greatest amount of good consequences. With regard to the relation between right, duty, and the moral good, and also the question of the relevance of motives in judging whether an act has been a dutiful one or not, my views will be given as I proceed with the development of my theory.

Instead of the distinction between the right and the good, I prefer to distinguish between the good-will and the good-willed, between the morally good and the beneficial results which are the objects of the good-will. Later on I shall correlate this distinction with that of the right and the good. I prefer to distinguish between the good-will and the good-willed rather than between the right and the good, because the former distinction draws attention to *character* as a fundamental concept in moral philosophy. It is because the Neo-Intuitionists tend to view acts apart from the character which expresses itself in the acts, that they come to hold the theory that an act of duty, unless done from a moral motive, may have neither intrinsic goodness, nor be productive of any good, and yet be obligatory. It seems to me that if the right act is not obligatory on the grounds that it is likely to produce the best consequences, it can be obligatory only in virtue of the goodness of character it involves. Moral goodness is a goodness of disposition, a direction of the will, and may be applied to the act expressive of that disposition, or to the character whose will is so disposed. The good-willed, or the consequences aimed at by the good-will, involves values other than the good-will, such as the development of knowledge, the creation and appreciation of beauty, the satisfaction of our need for social intercourse, for food and shelter, and so on. The good willed by the good man is the all-round development of human capacities, and the all-round satisfaction of human needs, which require to be adjusted and organized in relation to each other in accordance with their importance. The good-willed is therefore a complex *end*, involving a harmonious adjustment of the different goods of life and the adjusting and organizing of the various interests and pursuits of the different members of the human race. This good-willed must of course include the good-will on the part of all members to promote and maintain this complex end. The good-will is itself complex, involving such traits of character as unselfishness, justice, disinterestedness, self-control, constancy of purpose, etc.

So far, I have considered the moral life from the point of view of the end towards which moral effort must be directed. Before passing to the good-will itself I will guard against a possible criticism. I do

not mean that, before any man can do his duty, he must work out for himself, and *ab initio*, what effect his conduct will have on mankind as a whole. Years of civilization have marked out the limited areas in which we can act most effectively, and by working in our plot we can best promote the good of humanity as a whole, without having to make impossible calculations. But the conception of some ideally good life for mankind as a whole should be at the back of our minds, and if we see clearly that an act, previously accepted as right, will hinder this good for mankind as a whole, we should refrain from such an act.

To return to the good-will. The good-will is the will to promote a comprehensive system of values, in the enjoyment and promotion of which all are to share according to their needs and capacities. The good-will is therefore teleologically directed, and would not be good if it were not thus directed. This does not mean that it is good as a mere means, or that its goodness is proportionate to the real value of the end or ends it tries to effect, or actually achieves. To direct the will to its appropriate end as far as we know it, is in itself an intrinsic good over and above the good consequences at which it aims; for even if these purposed consequences be not good enough, or be not produced even if good enough, the goodness of the will is unaffected, so long as the will makes every effort to attain its end and to find out whether these ends are really as good as they appear to be. The good-will is therefore formal: its content may vary in kind and in value without its form, and therefore its intrinsic worth, being changed. Let me develop this point.

The good-will is the rational will or practical reason. The good man rises above the standpoint of his own preferences and the standpoint of those for whom he happens to feel affection, sympathy, or pity, and he tries to judge his proposed act from a universal, impartial, or rational standpoint, instead of from the standpoint of his own likes and dislikes. From this standpoint, his judgment is concerned with the universal or rational good. This rational good which is the appropriate object of the good-will is, as I have pointed out, a comprehensive system of values in the enjoyment and promotion of which all are to share according to their needs and capacities. It must include the good-will, which is a kind of holistic urge, a spirit of wholeness and integrity, directed towards synthesizing particular ends into one complex universal good. The good-will is, therefore, the dynamic *structural principle*, or *form*, of the good-willed. Consideration of the consequences of our acts *is*, therefore, relevant in moral issues. In what sense are they relevant?

To do our duty we must aim at the furtherance of the complete good, or of such aspects of it, and for such persons as are dictated to us by circumstances. But the complete good, or such aspects of

it as are commanded by duty, i.e. the good consequences which duty commands us to promote, need not be the main motive of our dutiful act, or even a motive at all. Often we have no direct desire for these ends, but we must will to promote them if we are to do our duty, and we *can* will to promote them, for we can have some motive for doing so other than a direct desire for these ends themselves. If we rule out interest in these ends themselves and also self-interest, our motive must be the good of acting reasonably for its own sake. To act reasonably means not only to recognize that others besides myself and my friends have a right to the good things of life and a claim upon me to help them towards these, but also a determined will to fulfil these claims even at the sacrifice of my own pleasure and the expectations of my friends. We should help others to an appreciation of knowledge and art, for example, not because, or not only because, it is good that they should enjoy these things, and because their enjoyment of these things appeals to us and is capable of rousing a desire in us, but also because it is good to act thus disinterestedly on behalf of others, whose claim to our consideration does not depend upon the presence of a fellow-feeling for them. The willingness to restrain our selfish desires, and even our kindly impulses towards others, so as to act impartially and reasonably —it is *this* that constitutes our moral goodness. It is this good which, as an ideal, makes itself felt in our consciousness as a categorical imperative.

I shall now consider the relation between "right," "duty," and "morally good." A right act is, strictly speaking, one which *will* bring about the best consequences. The plain man often uses the word in this sense. If he has genuinely tried to do his best, but finds out subsequently that he really did more harm than good, will he not say, "I did the wrong thing"? Or, say, a self-seeking prime minister decides, in opposition to public opinion, to abandon the gold-standard, because he sees that, if he does not, his country's trade will be ruined, and he will not be re-elected. Suppose he forces his policy through and prosperity results, will not people say, "He did the right thing after all," and will they not pass this judgment without bothering about his motives? This seems to show that we judge acts to be right or wrong by their consequences, and also without reference to motives. But it is seldom that we can be certain what *is* right in this sense, and then generally only after the event. So "right" usually means what will possibly, as far as we can see, produce the maximum amount of good. Right in this sense begins to have moral implications, and cannot be defined with exclusive reference to consequences. It brings in intentions, the direction a good-will must take. A right act thus comes to mean more an act directed in accordance with Practical Reason, though not necessarily

because Practical Reason so directs, than an act definable in terms of possible good consequences. Without the conception of an obligation to act reasonably, that is, without the conception of a moral good which is other than, but not opposed to, the benefits to be conferred on humanity, we should not arrive at the notion of a good which includes these benefits, and without this notion there would be no conception of a right act as one which will, as far as the agent knows, promote the best consequences. Even a selfish man who may do right from selfish motives, owes his conception of right to his rationality, or at any rate to the rationality of those from whom he has learned what is accepted as right. So that a right act means not *merely* one which is directed towards the promotion of what is possibly the best consequence; it also implies that this act is *one which is required of a reasonable, and therefore moral, being.*

But a right act is not a moral one unless done from a moral motive. This motive, or end for the sake of which a moral man does the right act, is not primarily the benefits he intends to confer. His motive is the prevalence of reasonable conduct for its own sake. It is when he acts from this motive that his right act has moral worth, because it expresses a good-will. He may have an additional motive in the good consequences intended by the right act, and it is preferable that this motive should also be present. But this latter motive is one which he cannot command at will, whereas, I believe, he can always act from a moral motive, and ought so to act. A right act done from a moral motive I should call a dutiful act, and I therefore disagree with Ross in so far as he holds that, when we are commanded to do our duty, we are not commanded to act from any particular motive, for it is not in our power to command our motives, not even a moral motive. I think even Ross would agree that it is our duty to do the right act, even if we feel impelled to do it neither by self-interest, nor by desire for the good consequences it may promote. But we cannot act without a motive, we must therefore be able to do the right act from the only motive left, namely, the right for its own sake, a moral motive which apparently *is* at our command; only I would say that the moral motive consists in doing the right act because it is through this act we express our will to do good. It may be our duty to do an act towards which we are inclined neither by self-interest nor humanitarian feelings, nor any interest in the results of the act for their own sakes. As we are still expected to do our duty, and as we cannot act without a motive, our motive must be the reasonableness of so acting for its own sake; or, alternatively, our motive must be the exercise of the good-will for its own sake. This motive is always in the background for us to fall back on when self-interest, humanitarian feelings, or interest in the consequences of our act for their

own sakes, alike fail us. A good deal of our moral spinelessness is due to our predominantly teleological practice. Unless the ends which duty requires us to promote involve our feelings (other than the thirst for righteousness) we are unable to act. Spiritual paralysis and not spiritual diabetes is our malady.

Although I hold the view that we have not done our duty unless we have acted from a moral motive, I hope I have escaped Ross's criticisms, which have force against this view when defectively expressed in the statement, "It is our duty to act from a sense of duty," or, what comes to the same thing, "we have not done our duty unless we have done so from the right motive." Ross maintains that this statement is absurd. If duty = acting from a sense of duty, we can substitute the latter for the former. "It is your duty to act from a sense of duty" would then become "It is your duty to act from a sense of acting from a sense of duty." We can substitute again and we get "It is your duty to act from a sense of acting from a sense of acting from a sense of duty," and so on *ad infinitum*. To put this point more simply. If we are to do our duty from the right motive before we can be said to have done our duty, we must first of all have the conception of an act of duty. If now we add the conception of motive to it before we call it an act of duty, we have as the subject of our proposition, duty bare, and as the predicate, duty plus motive, and we have illegitimately identified the two. And we were able to do this only because we have first of all distinguished between an act of duty, and an act of duty done from the right motive. The same criticism applies to the statement, "You have not acted rightly unless you have also acted from the right motive." We must therefore distinguish between acts which, in Kant's words, are done *as* the moral law requires, and those done *because* the moral law requires. We cannot use the words right and duty indiscriminately for both without confusion. Now, if we agree with Ross that moral motives cannot be commanded at will, we must use the word "duty" for those acts which are done *as* the moral law requires, for "it is my duty," means "I ought"; and if "I ought," I "can." For those acts which are done *because* the moral law requires we must have another word. Ross suggests "morally good."

If on the other hand we hold, as I do, that a moral motive is the one motive that we always have at our command, we may use "an act of duty," and "a morally good act" as equivalent, and apply these words to acts done because the moral law commands them. We should then have to use the word right for those acts done *as* the moral law requires. On this view, an act may be right even if done from a non-moral motive. I prefer this way out of the difficulty to adopting Ross's theory, because the phrase, "it is your duty to

act from a sense of duty," contains, I believe, a valuable truth, namely, we have not done our duty unless we have obeyed the moral law for its own sake, and not from some selfish motive, or even from kindly impulses. To obey the moral law for its own sake means, according to my theory, to act reasonably, as an end in itself. If we do this, we shall aim at the complete good, as far as we can know what this good is, that is, our reasonableness will express itself in and through a right act, i.e. an act directed towards what, to the best of our knowledge, we judge to be in harmony with the complete good. But it is this reasonableness or willingness to do good which is the motive of a moral act and the source of our sense of obligation.

The statement "It is your duty to act from a sense of duty" contains another important truth, which it expresses confusedly. It implies that the notion of obligation is involved in moral action and bound up with motive. But the concept of obligation stands in great need of clarification, for, as the statement stands, it seems to mean "you ought, i.e. you are under an obligation, to act from a sense of duty." But does a sense of duty mean a sense of obligation? If so, we have "you are under an obligation to act from a sense of obligation," and that means that the ground of our sense of obligation lies in the sense of obligation itself, which is absurd. For moral obligation to arise there must first of all be the conception of a moral ideal, the realization of which is an end in itself. This ideal is not a lifeless idol, it is dynamic, and exerts some influence on us. The experience of this influence constitutes our sense of moral obligation. We have done our duty if the recognition of the moral ideal as an end in itself, with an urgent claim to be fulfilled, determines our acts, irrespective of whatever other urges we have influencing us to act either in conformity with, or contrary to, the requirements of the moral ideal. The statement "It is our duty to act from a sense of duty" is really a confused analysis of the notion of duty, namely, "duty consists in acting from a consciousness of the moral ideal as an end-in-itself with an urgent claim upon us to realize it, the consciousness of this claim constituting our sense of obligation."

The problem of moral obligation may be raised in the form: how can we comply with the requirements of duty, when it does not promise us any satisfaction, and how can such a demand be justified? Is it possible, and is it fair, to ask a man to act contrary to every inclination and feeling? We cannot get out of the difficulty by arguing that duty always requires us to do some good, usually to somebody else, and that the promotion of their good will satisfy our social impulses. The others to whom duty requires us to do good may be just those towards whom we have no social impulses at all, and we may have to do good to them even at the expense

of those whose welfare we most strongly desire. True enough, we may hold that there is such a thing as a desire to do our duty to those who have a claim upon us, as well as a desire to help those for whom we feel some affection. But that does not help us much. Suppose that I, as an examiner, award the scholarship to Jack Jones instead of to my son, because it is my duty to do so. The situation is not accurately described by saying that my desire to do my duty was stronger than all the impulses and feelings bound up with my own son's successes and failures. Nor can the sense of obligation to do my duty be described as the experience of my desire to do my duty pulling me one way, and my desire to secure my son's success and happiness pulling me the other way. This conflict between the desire to do one's duty and competing interests, gives rise to our feelings of constraint and unwillingness, which make it so hard to do our duty. But this feeling of constraint is merely a consequence of our sense of obligation and not the sense of obligation itself, which is a recognition that the desire for duty has a *right* to supremacy, and should prevail. If our desire to do our duty can be called the strongest desire in every case in which we have done our duty in opposition to competing interests, then it has become the strongest desire through a recognition of the *right* of duty to prevail. Duty is bound up with the sense of obligation, whether we have conflicting desires or not. Butler expressed the same point when he said, "Conscience, had it power as it has authority, would rule the world." But the ideal of duty, which claims this authority, does not necessarily affect us by presenting us with an end which appeals to our sympathies.

The difficulty as seen by Prichard seems to be this: Even if every act of duty requires us to promote some particular good for somebody, it is not this good which is the ground of our sense of obligation. We either in a coldly intellectual way recognize this good as a state of affairs which is called good because it will satisfy someone's needs, and then it can provide no motive, nor give rise in us to any sense of obligation, but is merely a knowing of the specific content of a particular duty; or we recognize the good which duty requires us to promote, in an appreciative way, but then we shall desire it, and from desire no sense of obligation can arise.

Prichard draws the conclusion that we recognize certain acts as right and as obligatory, irrespective of whether or not the state of affairs these acts require us to produce *appeals* to us as good. When there is no such appeal, we still ought to do what is right, and if we ought, we can. Therefore, the recognition of an act as right, and not the appreciation of some good bound up with the right act—for, in this case, there is no such appeal—must be the moving influence in our conduct, when we have done what is right in spite

of our desire to do something else. In fact, the ends which duty requires us to promote are not presented to us *sub specie boni* at all, but simply as certain results to be effected. It is just because duty does not deign to appeal to us that its demands are felt as obligations.

Prichard's difficulty is due partly to his failure to distinguish between the psychological aspect of our sense of obligation and its ethical aspect. The feeling of unwillingness, and of being pulled contrary to our spontaneous desires, is due to our recognition of a good which has a right to prevail, impinging upon competing interests in some lesser goods. But to feel the appeal of the higher good does not destroy the sense of obligation, for we can desire the highest good without ceasing to recognize its right to prevail, and to feel the securing of this *right* as an *obligation.* I cannot see how anything can place us under an obligation, except a good recognized as such. Nor can I see eye to eye with Prichard in his argument that there is no passing from the conception of a good for humanity which "ought to be," to the conviction that I "ought to do" what I can do to promote this good. To be conscious of the good of humanity as something which ought to be, is to be conscious of its claim upon us to uphold its right to prevail. There is just as *little* and just as *much* difficulty in holding that the recognition of a highest good is bound up with a sense of obligation, as there is in holding that the consciousness of the rightness of an act is at the same time a consciousness of our obligation to do it.

I should, of course, agree that it is not the good of humanity which is the ground of our obligation, but the ground of our obligation must still be a good, for only a good can oblige us. I have already pointed out that we have an *a priori* recognition of a rational principle which claims authority over our lives. That this principle prevails in our conduct, is the good which is the ground of our sense of obligation, and the moving influence of any moral act, even if there is also a desire for the ends which this principle commands us to promote. If we are responsive to this principle, we can, and shall, aim at values that need not involve our sympathies, but which will do so in proportion to our responsiveness. It will lead us to a discovery and an appreciation of a wider good, which will exert on us a no less dynamic influence or claim, being but the full flowering of this rational principle or urge towards wholeness. Though the sense of constraint will disappear from our moral life if we become perfect, a sense of obligation, in its ethical connotation of a recognition of the *right* of the complete good to prevail, will remain.

THE MISSING LINK IN PEACE PLANS

(Address delivered by PROFESSOR J. H. MUIRHEAD *at the Eleventh Annual General Meeting of the Institute.)*

THE older of us are agreed that never before within our memory has there been a time in which men's souls have been so filled with anxiety as to the condition of the world. The Afghanistan and the Boer Wars as we look back come into our minds. But these were on the outskirts of civilization, and no one really believed that they threatened that of our own country, not to speak of Europe. The period before the Great War was one of violent conflicts, but, as contrasted with those wider and more subterranean conflicts out of which the war rose, they may be said to have been household matters, and only required a little more resolute goodwill on the part of the nation itself for their solution.

Now everything is different; the anxiety is world-wide. It comes, moreover, with the added bitterness of the sense of failure to have secured ourselves against the danger of the "downfall of the civilization of the West" which the War had suddenly revealed to us. It is now seventeen years since a great hope rose within many that by the foundation of the League of Nations Kant's vision, as set out in his Essay on Perpetual Peace, might be on the eve of being realized. The world was terror-stricken with the rising horrors of modern warfare. Here was the Ark that would save us from this appalling flood for all future time, and afford the chance of beginning anew on the basis of a new international order. Whence the shipwreck of these hopes? We have had endless letters and articles in *The Times* and elsewhere on the subject. But how few of them have touched the real root of the failure! G. K. Chesterton speaks somewhere of much of our current literature as mere "splashing about in a vocabulary." How much of our political thinking is mere splashing about in secondary causes! We shall not get the real root of the breakdown of all our peace plans and of all the mechanical means that science, physical and social, has put into our hands for bringing us closer to one another till we recognize that it has its ultimate source in the wilderness of spiritual estrangement from one another in which the nations of the earth are still wandering.

Could the issue have been any other than it was, seeing that our League was founded on no new-born love of mankind or enthusiasm for humanity, no real attempt to understand one another, but on what is a very different thing, the fear of our neighbours. Few of us were thinking of mankind, but where it wasn't of revenge it was of security for ourselves as against one another. But fear of one's neighbour, like fear of the Lord, is only the beginning of wisdom, if it is even that. Peace from war and safety within our own borders can never be ends in themselves. If peace leaves behind it the rankle of injustice, it may be itself an evil, acting merely as a plaster on a suppurating wound. Even justice and the law that supports it are incomplete and precarious, so long as they stand alone and have to rely on a continual application of force, with all the misunderstandings which that must inevitably engender when we are dealing with the complicated structure of international life. Justice is only secure when it stands on a basis of real friendship and mutual understanding. Where we have these, we may even say that law and justice may be left to take care of themselves. "Where friendship is

there is no need of justice" is one of the greatest of Aristotle's sayings. While fear may be said to be the beginning of Law, love is the chief end of it. Law, with the power that enforces it, is only there that something better may have time to grow out of it. Until international society is united by the same bond that unites families, neighbourhoods, co-operative groups of every kind and constitutes the soul of them, until we come to think of our own and other nations as we think of our private friends and acquaintances, there can be no real advance towards a fellowship among them.

What is the meaning of friendship in ordinary life? What is it that you desire for your friends? Is it not that they should live truly up to the best of their capacities, material, mental, above all spiritual? We don't say all this when we wish them all happiness. Most of us, I suppose, are thinking mainly of material things. But this is what at bottom we mean. We intend to include all mental and spiritual blessings, and the last as including all the others. Unless this kind of friendship underlies our efforts to form political leagues and peace plans for the world we labour at them in vain. Love is Lord (so far all the great religions of the world are at one) and "Except the Lord build the house they labour in vain that build it. Except the Lord keep the city the Watchman waketh but in vain." Is this an impossible ideal as between nations and races? If it is, then we are back in heathendom. The cry must be, "Each to your tents," which, translated into modern language, means "Each to your fortifications, your lines of trenches, your cruisers, your aeroplanes, and your bombs." How long shall we be before we awaken to this? How long shall we be in discovering the falsehood that underlies Hobbes's saying that "man is a wolf to man," and the essential deep-lying truth of the opposite saying of Spinoza's, "There is nothing more serviceable to man than man"?

There are immense difficulties in our way. We have recently been realizing how difficult, even impossible, it is to apply the analogy between the relations of individuals and groups within a nation to nations in their relations with one another. But this difficulty is increased tenfold in face of the reversion of so many of our neighbours to the inflamed nationalism and racialism that was the root cause of the Great War, with that terrible instrument at their disposal ("an instrument with teeth")—the concentration of power and influence over the nation's mind in the hands of a national hero. There was nothing in which the philosopher Kant showed more prophetic insight than in the emphasis which he laid upon the condition that the nations which were to form his League should be republics in the full sense of the word. It was not to him a question of President, King, or Leader, but of devotion to a *res publica* or common good; nor again merely the devotion in each to its own good as a separate nation, but to the common good of mankind. It meant to him the acceptance of his great ethical maxim that "each should treat humanity in his own person and in the person of others always as an end, and never as a means only," as applicable to nations as well as individuals. Without this he saw that we should be building our League upon sand. It might even be, as Hegel foresaw with equal insight, merely a provocation to form other perhaps more powerful leagues outside of it; and the last state of mankind might be worse than the first.

Yet against the acceptance of the maxim in this wider sense the new continental politics has raised a formidable barrier. I do not in the least underestimate it. But I wish to conclude by calling attention to some considerations that, in the general sense of failure, may be the ground of renewed hope. The first is that our own generation has seen the growth of humanitarian feeling to an astonishing degree in the treatment of individuals and classes

within civilized nations. No matter how this change has been brought about, the fact is there in the growing recognition of the rights of women and children, of workers, of the workless and the slum dweller, even of the so-called criminal class, and constitutes the best of omens for the possibility of extending it beyond the nation to the community of nations, the backward and the forward alike. At any rate, that is the task of the coming century, which it has to attempt at the peril of losing this and everything else that the past has won.

A second thing (by this time almost a commonplace) is that the imposed treaty of 1919 has been largely (if not wholly) responsible for these sinister reactions. You can't sow to the wind and not reap the whirlwind. You can't give way to passion and revenge in making peace any more than in making war and hope to escape the nemesis of your crime. Seldom has this lesson been driven home with such terrible convincingness as in the present case. Whether it be still possible to repair the blunder remains to be seen. It all depends on the amount of the humane feeling I have been speaking of that we are prepared to bring to the task. Where there is a will there is a way; and where there is a good will there is a good way.

The third thing and the most important of all is the discovery of the power which modern systems of education and propaganda, consistently directed to one supreme object, have of influencing the mind of a nation. We know how this weapon was used in pre-war Germany. We see with what fatal power it is being used in the Italy and post-war Germany of to-day. "FAS EST ET AB HOSTE DOCERI." If this tremendous instrument can be used for one purpose it can be used for another. If it may be made an instrument of evil, it may also be made an instrument of good. The "intellectual co-operation" that has been acknowledged at Geneva as a part of the League's work from the beginning is a good thing, but it is not enough. What is wanted is a *moral* co-operation directed not to the extinction of national feeling, but to the recognition of what it is that unites nations to one another, their common and precarious tenure of life upon one small planet, their common inheritance, equally precarious, if a civilization that has been won for them in some degree by the heroic efforts of all the chief races and nations of the world in their art, their literature, and the various types of excellence, intellectual and moral, that they have developed in the past, and the unlimited possibilities they hold within themselves of developing them in future in new creative ways. We are in revolt, and rightly, against the intellectualism of the older education, and are seeking to direct it far more to the cultivation of feeling than it has hitherto anywhere been. But it all depends on the kind of feeling we seek to cultivate. This must include feeling for our homes and country, our nation and race. But it must be feeling for these only as part of the greater whole from which none can be separated without irreparable loss to itself, and only as offering the opportunity of contributing to the common work of making this tiny globe a fitting home, not for heroes, but for "Every Man." "All fine things are difficult." We are aiming at the finest of all—an ENTENTE, not between two or more single nations, but between all the nations of the earth. No ENTENTE, whether of few or many, can be the real thing unless it be an ENTENTE in the full dictionary sense of the word—that of an *understanding*. And to be such an understanding it must be CORDIALE, again in the full dictionary meaning of the word—something in which, not only mind speaks to mind, but heart speaks to heart. Machinery to embody and give effect to this there must be. Mr. H. G. Wells so far has been a true prophet to his generation. But no machinery will create it, and so long as our prophets are under the delusion that it will, they prophesy a vain thing. Out of the heart are the issues of life, and no machinery can put the new heart in us.

PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY

PHILOSOPHY IN ITALY

Of late years Benedetto Croce's interpretation of the philosophy of G. B. Vico has been exposed to continual criticism from Catholic writers anxious to claim for themselves the figure of the great eighteenth-century thinker, wrested from them by Croce for inclusion in a setting of secular and immanentistic philosophy. The Catholic polemic was founded partly on a false supposition: it derived from the idea that Croce meant to deny entirely Vico's Catholicism. Instead, Croce made a distinction between Vico the man and Vico the philosopher. While he recognized that the man cherished Catholic sentiments and beliefs, he denied that the philosopher could re-enter the circle of dogmatic and confessional philosophy. To confirm the accuracy of his interpretation, Croce has now republished an interesting monograph by an eighteenth-century Catholic writer, a little later than Vico, G. F. Finetti,[1] who subjects the doctrine of Vico to a lively criticism. The motive of this exhumation is plain: "The protest of eighteenth-century Catholic criticism against the doctrines of Vico, or rather, against the doctrines of an author well known to be a blameless observant throughout his life, is of considerable importance because it is the first real acknowledgment of the revolutionary spirit, the anti-Catholic and generally anti-religious spirit, which informed his doctrines." "Finetti with fine intuition perceived that to allow the feral state as the starting-point for the development of humanity was sufficient to shake the Catholic conception to its foundation. With that historical and philosophical conception the origin of the human race could be explained by internal dialectics, without the intervention of a religious transcendent power, and outside the framework of the Bible and sacred history. He did not let himself be deluded by the distinction Vico made between profane history, or the history of the Gentiles, and sacred history, or the history of the Jews, because he saw the former and not the latter deploy in the author's mind as the sole object of his attention, and in the whole of the *Scienza Nuova* he found no trace of the action of Christianity or of the Church. Still less was he deceived by Vico's continual reference to Providence, because the Providence of Vico seemed to him very different from the Providence of the theologians. The genesis that the philosopher assigned to religion revealed itself to Finetti as Lucretian, not Christian. He was deeply preoccupied by Vico's disintegration of the personality of Homer and of other heroic characters, because this method inevitably pointed the way to the ultimate disintegration of Moses, the patriarchs and the prophets, and the stories in the Scriptures, which someone or other would not fail to carry out, indeed it was already taking place at that time—a step which was all the more natural and logical if, as it seems to me, the treatment to which Vico submitted Homer was suggested to him or facilitated by the knowledge of the treatment Spinoza had used for Moses and the prophets."

From this a further problem arises: how comes it that the Catholic Finetti, at his first reading of Vico's works, clearly perceived their anti-Catholic

[1] G. F. Finetti: *Difesa dell'autorità della Sacra Scrittura contro G. B. Vico*, con introduzione di B. Croce, Bari, Laterza. 1936. Pp. xvi, 108.

character, while contemporary Catholics who surely ought to be instructed in secular historical criticism persist in seeing in Vico a partisan of their principles? For Croce the reply is obvious: Finetti was a sincere believer who therefore was not satisfied with Vico's outward conformity to the letter of the Scriptures; the same cannot perhaps be said of the Catholic apologists of the present day.

The centenary of the death of the Italian philosopher, G. D. Romagnosi, was celebrated in Italy in 1935, occasioning many publications which, as usually happens at such anniversaries, exaggerated his historical importance not a little. An appreciation that I would like to mention is the restrictive judgment, but clear and well balanced, of Professor Giorgio del Vecchio, set out in a commemorative lecture read to the University of Parma.[1] Romagnosi was born at Salsomaggiore in 1761. He studied the physical and mathematical sciences, later philosophy, and was guided by his tutors towards the doctrines of Leibniz. Kantian critique had but a slight influence on him; rather he sympathized with the French sensist and materialistic doctrines, yet without identifying himself definitely with them. As Vecchio says: "In a word, naturalism is the sum total of the Romagnosi system, a system which certainly goes beyond the sensism of the eighteenth century, but definitely stops short of the arguments of criticism and idealism founded therein. Rather, by anticipating their fundamental traits, it links up with the positivism and the evolutionism which were to have such a great part in European thought after the first third of the nineteenth century, that is, immediately after Romagnosi had completed his days of labour."

Furthermore, del Vecchio acknowledges that theoretical philosophy is not the most original or the most elaborate part of Romagnosi's extensive activity as a writer. This activity was displayed chiefly and much more profitably in the field of public and private law, of economics and statistics. His best work, in del Vecchio's opinion, is the *Genesi del diritto penale* (Genesis of Penal Law), published in 1791. "It is not an exaggeration to say that with this work Romagnosi has given to the science of penal law a surer basis than it had ever had before. Nor does he thereby lessen the worth of those who preceded him in the study of this difficult theme, and particularly of those glorious sons of Italy, Beccaria, Filangieri, Pagano. The first of these, the second too, though indirectly, certainly contributed in preparing the thought of Romagnosi. But if these authors shared the illuministic and humanitarian intention of introducing an equal measure where before the blindest and most irrational cruelty had ruled, yet to the strongly systematic spirit of Romagnosi belonged the office of building the edifice of penal law from its foundations, resolutely abandoning the old formulas of this most unfortunate part of philosophy, without, on the other hand, trusting in the often deceptive impulses of sentiment. The principles laid down by Romagnosi about a century and a half ago have not only withstood the many agitations of doctrinal disputes in this matter, but represent therein even to-day the surest orientations."

A. Aliotta has published a thought-provoking monograph[2] into which he has compressed the more salient points of the conception of philosophy, which has been maturing in his mind for more than twenty years of study. He calls this conception radical experimentalism. "A radical experimentalism," he says, "is the one method, it seems to me, which is adapted at the present

[1] G. DEL VECCHIO: *Giandomenico Romagnosi nel primo centenario della sua morte.* Roma, Rivista internazionale di filosofia del diritto, fasc. I. 1936.

[2] A. ALIOTTA: *L'esperimento nella scienza, nella filosofia, nella religione.* Napoli, Perrella. 1936. Pp. 102.

time to Italian thought to make us leave the judgments of empty dialectics, without returning through the fog of a no less arbitrary mysticism or being numbed in the musty little formulas of the scholastic tradition." The word experimentalism suggests at first sight an analogy with traditional empiricism. Against this collocation Aliotta affirms that "experimentalism recognizes no truth or reality that may be right outside the work of man; for that reason it must not be confused with empiricism in its classical form. The old style empiricist always supposed an external nature from which sensations derived, and he made consciousness consist in the reproduction of a web of things and relations given from without. In this way all value was taken from our subjective activity, which was even considered a disturbing element." On the other hand, Aliotta's experimentalism can be differentiated from any form of rationalism, dogmatic or critical, in that it radically excludes any logical preconceived design which the intellect ought almost to read in itself according to the theory of innate ideas, or perceive intuitively outside itself according to the claims of Malebranche and Gioberti. It excludes it even in the disguised form which it assumes in Kant's philosophy, because it admits no immutable structure of categories according to which the subject is bound to think. All the categories of the mind are produced by its free activity, which never stops definitely in a given rational form, but can always generate other more complete logical structures. In this affirmation that logical structures are built by the mind, above all in placing the criterion of their truth in a concrete action which they exercise in the world of our human experience, Aliotta's experimentalism marches with pragmatism. But it differs from that too, in that it strives to free itself from the prejudice of a pure experience, that is, of an amorphous fact on which thought would act, changing its shape for practical needs: "Experimentalism thus takes from thought all character of arbitrary superposition and gives an objective value to human logic, however susceptible of infinite gradations. If he affirms that experimentalism alone is the proof of the degree of all truths, if in this he is even more radical than James, who continues to speak of truths absolute, unconditional, and eternal, yet he gives to the concept of experiment a precise meaning that frees it from a kind of vagueness which was still in the pragmatistic manner of understanding verification; above all, it frees it from that dangerous subjectivism by which truth appeared as an adaptation of fluid experience to our human needs."

In order properly to understand this philosophy (which among all the differentiations remarked upon has been only negatively characterized), we must consider that it derives from scientific experience, in which the experiment is not a reproduction or imitation of an existing order but an active modification by means of the intelligence, the creation of a higher order. Aliotta holds that the value of this intervention of the subject in the world is not limited to the physical sciences, but can be extended to any field of human activity, and he gives short examples drawn from religious experience, metaphysical experience, from logical experience itself. Thus he is drawn to recognize a foundation of truth in idealistic conceptions which seek to give a pre-eminent creative function to human subjectivity, without, however, accepting the idea of a rationality enclosed in a predetermined system of categories, which would annul all possibility of progress. If I were to indicate among the most generally known philosophies one that came nearest to Aliotta's philosophy, I think Dewey's would be the nearest approach to his inspiring mind.

A short informative note is not the place for discussing Aliotta's ideas, which provoke in the reader a double current of agreement and objection.

But the very fact that they can provoke it is a sign that they are live and suggestive ideas even in a very summarized form; all the more so that Aliotta, by his preceding works as well, is well known to English readers, who will find united and condensed in this latest monograph the mental "experiences" of the Italian thinker.

GUIDO DE RUGGIERO.

(*Translated from the Italian by Constance M. Allen.*)

NEW BOOKS

Bernard Bosanquet's Philosophy of the State. A Historical and Systematical Study. by BERTIL PFANNENSTILL. (Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup. 1936. Pp. iv + 324. Price 10 kr.)

This is a sympathetic exposition and defence of Bosanquet's philosophy of the State. It is a useful piece of work, competently and thoroughly carried out. Its usefulness lies, I think, in the fact that this co-called Idealist theory of the State is the only theory which has paid thoroughgoing attention to all the problems which must be considered by a theory of the State, and at the same time is a theory which has yet to receive a satisfactory statement. And any attempt to understand the *Philosophical Theory of the State*, which still remains (with all its defects) the most comprehensive account of this theory, is a useful preliminary to restatement. Preachers, journalists, politicians, and moralists have all had their whack at this theory, and they are satisfied that they have discredited it. But it still retains some vitality, and when, if ever, a philosopher turns his attention to it again, he will find what this book has to say both relevant and valuable.

It consists of 300 pages, and is divided into four chapters; and it is only in the last chapter, the last hundred pages, that the author comes to grips with Bosanquet's philosophy of the State itself. The earlier chapters are devoted to discussions of the object and method of political philosophy, the historical basis of Bosanquet's theory, and Bosanquet's general philosophical position. And this proportion seems to me, on the whole, to be right. It is impossible to understand this theory of the State apart from the general philosophy to which it belongs, and when that is understood the obscurities of the political philosophy are few and relatively unimportant.

Mr. Pfannenstill takes Bosanquet's theory to be an example of what he calls a "universalistic" theory, and contrasts it with what he calls an "individualistic" theory. These theories are alike in being "ethico-normative" theories; but the main difference between them lies in their different concepts of freedom. There is, however, a point of importance which he does not consider. What he speaks of as the "individualistic" theory, in all the examples of it that we have, has always been distinguished by a hedonistic ethical foundation; and the "universalistic" theories differ from it in their rejection of hedonism. And again, while Bosanquet's philosophy of the will is thoroughly and intelligently discussed, not much is said expressly about his philosophy of the self. Yet it is its thorough consideration of the self which distinguishes this theory from the so-called "individualistic" theories, which are inclined to treat the self as something too important to be examined.

Throughout the book, Bosanquet's theory of the State is taken together with that of Hegel, Green, and Bradley, and the criticisms of Hobhouse and others are considered with care. The author never attempts to go beyond Bosanquet, or to point out how the defects of Bosanquet's exposition might be remedied; indeed, he recognizes few defects. He is concerned almost entirely with removing the more obvious misunderstandings of that theory, which (though some of them are obvious enough) are sufficiently widespread to be worth while considering, and with giving a systematic exposition of

Bosanquet's thought. And, within these limits, and in spite of its rather uncritical attitude, it is as complete a guide to Bosanquet's theory of the State as one could wish.

M. Oakeshott.

In the Shadow of To-morrow: A Diagnosis of the Spiritual Distempers of Our Time. By J. Huizinga, translated from the Dutch by J. H. Huizinga. (London: William Heinemann, Ltd. 1936. Pp. ix + 218. Price 7s. 6d.)

Diagnoses of our present troubles are so many and, too frequently, so partial and hasty—if not hysterical—that it is a sign of courage in a scholar of European fame to publish yet another. It is to invite the disregard of a crisis-sated public. Yet the idlest glance at Professor Huizinga's book reveals its importance and distinction. The crisp chapter-heads alone excite an interest which carries the reader eagerly to the text and through it to the conclusion with unabated attention. The author brings to his task of diagnosis the equipment of a great philosophical historian and political philosopher; while the translator gives to his father's thought a form worthy alike of its matter and of our English tongue.

The tap-root of our spiritual distempers Professor Huizinga believes to be the "anti-noetic creed" or the disavowal of intellect and morals. "Systematic philosophical and practical anti-intellectualism such as we are witnessing," he maintains, "appears to be something truly novel in the history of human culture." In all previous reactions against intellectualism truth and knowledge in their widest sense have never been forsaken, whereas this goes the whole way to fetch up in a stinking morass of sentiment and slogan, of "blood and soil" and "nordic heroism." This "stale romanticism" with its sentimental slogans is intrinsically dangerous, but when taken as a major premiss in what purports to be science and as a principle determining forms of life and art, its influence is yet more deeply perverting and perilous to sanity and culture. It reaches those ultimate springs whence, however imperceptibly, a civilization draws its spirit, its life. Our present incipient dementia may (Professor Huizinga, in his opening sentence, fears) give way "to a frenzy which would leave our poor Europe in a state of distracted stupor, with the engines still turning and flags streaming in the breeze, but with the spirit gone."

To those who suppose him to be a pessimist the author answers shortly, "I am an optimist." Yet he is an optimist only as the greatest Christian theologians have been optimists in that they (and he) have been able to encompass in their creed a proximate pessimism darker dyed than that of even Spengler, whose factitious despair is warmed by the romantic hope of "Faustian greatness" and "healthy warlike joy." Professor Huizinga is not unfair to the "political revivalisms" of to-day. These "have caught something of the spiritual attitude necessary for the restoration of culture, but it is impure, wrapped up in excessive puerilism, overborne by the cries of the caged animal, sullied by falsehood and deception."

The healing of our distempers, he holds, awaits a new *askesis*. This, he continues, "will not be one of renunciation of the world for heavenly bliss; it will be one of self-domination and tempered appraisal of power and pleasure. The exaltation of life will have to be toned down a little. One will have to remember how Plato already described the occupation of the wise man as a preparation for death. A steady orientation of the life consciousness on death heightens the proper use of life itself." And, "The new *askesis* will

have to be a surrender, a surrender to all that can be conceived as the highest. That can no more be a nation or class than the individual existence of the self." Where, whence, and how the "indispensable purification" will set in he very wisely does not attempt to say; yet he is willing to state his conviction that it will—that in the future lies *katharsis* not destruction.

Perhaps one of the most wholesome symptoms in our disordered time is that this book is already something of a best-seller in Holland, and bids fair to become one in Great Britain. Thought (and still less reading) is not action, but, unless the noetic creed—or faith in intelligence and conscience—is utterly baseless, this remarkable essay, widely read, cannot but move men, or dispose them to be moved, in the right direction.

RALPH E. STEDMAN.

The Chinese Renaissance (The Haskell Lectures, 1933). By HU SHIH. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press; London: Cambridge University Press. 1934. Pp. viii + 110. Price 7s.)

No one is better qualified than Professor Hu Shih to interpret China, both to the West and to his own countrymen. Not only does he know America and Europe, but he has been, as far as one man can be, the parent of more than one of the intellectual movements which have contributed to make the China of to-day. In the Lectures published under the title *The Chinese Renaissance*, he compresses, with masterly skill, into a book of just over 100 pages, the experience and reflections of a life-time. The result is the best introduction to the study of China which exists in English. The belief that China is an enigma, in a sense in which other countries are not, is a cherished Western illusion. Its victims, who are numerous, will find in this unpretentious volume an effective antidote.

Professor Hu Shih begins by treating the situation of China to-day as a particular case of a general problem. Dislocation arising from a conflict of cultures is not an uncommon phenomenon. Struck by the impact of Western civilization, Japan effected a political and economic reconstruction which, whatever its remoter consequences, appears as yet to be stable. Confronted with the same alien force, China dissolved in a disorder which has lasted a quarter of a century, and which—though it is commonly exaggerated by Western writers, who are apt to forget that China is as large as Europe without Russia—is sufficiently serious. Professor Hu Shih's first chapter is devoted to a discussion of the causes of this impressive contrast. His answer to that question is given by pointing to the salient differences, when the Western impact occurred, of social organization in China and Japan. The existence in the latter of a powerful ruling class, of a strong military tradition with a caste to represent and perpetuate it, and of an imperial house which, when the moment came, could be turned into a symbol of unity and regeneration, favoured a controlled and authoritarian readjustment. In China, where authority was weak, what occurred was, not an organized reconstruction, but a "diffused assimilation" of Western influences, without the power required in order to canalize them. The words of a Chinese scholar put the situation in a nutshell: "It is easy for China to acquire the civilization of the West, but it is very difficult to master its barbarism. Yet, I suppose, we must first master this barbarism, before we can feel at home in this new civilization."

"Western civilization" includes a variety of influences, from Shakespeare and Newton to bombs and poison gas. A European can hardly read Professor Hu Shih's second chapter, in which he discusses the revision undergone by

Chinese estimates of the West since the time when China discovered that the admired Jesuit missionaries of the seventeenth century were not its most typical representatives, without a sense of humiliation. The war of 1914–18 destroyed, perhaps, as many amiable illusions in China as in Europe. By the end of it a Chinese intellectual Renaissance was under weigh, of which the author writes with the authority of its pioneer. In essence it was a return to the popular tradition represented by the *pei-hua*, the vulgar tongue of the great majority of the population. The movement was aided, no doubt, by the indignant nationalist feeling which woke when China learned that the Peace Conference proposed to hand over to Japan the former German possessions in Shantung. But its roots lay deeper. China had discovered herself by discovering, at first with extreme reluctance, the character of a culture alien to her own. That the Intellectual Renaissance was overdue was shown by the rapidity with which, once launched, it triumphed.

The cultural tradition on which it worked was profoundly different from that of the West, and Professor Hu Shih devotes some illuminating pages to the causes of the contrast. The predominantly literary and philosophical culture of China has not, however, prevented the emergence of natural scientists, who, like the late Dr. V. K. Ting, the founder of the geological survey, Dr. W. H. Wong, and Dr. J. S. Lee, have done admirable work in their own field. The contrast between the attitudes of China and the West to religion, is, perhaps, more fundamental. The subject is one on which verdicts based on the temper of a single generation, or even century, are notoriously misleading. Religious fanaticism, though it seems to-day peculiarly alien to the Chinese outlook on life, is by no means an unknown phenomenon in Chinese history. On the whole, however, a rationalist mentality has been, Dr. Hu Shin thinks, more characteristic of China than of Europe, and the slowly advancing Westernization of Chinese economic life is on its side. To that immense movement and its social repercussions Dr. Shih devotes a concluding chapter of the highest interest. Altogether this book is a *tour de force* of lucidity and compression. It may be added that it is written in an English which many Englishmen might envy.

R. H. Tawney.

The Revival of Pascal: A Study of his Relation to Modern French Thought. By Dorothy Margaret Eastwood. (Oxford Studies in Modern Languages and Literature. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press. London: Humphrey Milford. 1936. Pp. xii + 212. Price 12s. 6d. net.)

The revival of Pascal, or perhaps it might rather be said the first attempt to find a positive value in his writings, belongs to the last decades of the nineteenth century. It is not the Pascal of Jansenist controversy, though that subject is not absent, but the author of the *Pensées*, the thoughts that have compelled a number of French thinkers to ask what are the fundamental truths implied in their attitude towards reality. The present work is in the first place a brilliant exposition and analysis of several strands of recent French thought, but it is also a valuable contribution to the understanding of Pascal.

However diverse these writers may be, we find them all adopting Pascal's attitude and breaking away from the complacent rationalism of the nineteenth century. Bergson and the mathematician Henri Poincaré appear to have dealt the first blow. But how much have they in common with Pascal? Poincaré's scepticism towards scientific concepts remained scepticism, but Pascal, in spite of his sceptical method, cleared the ground for "une idée

de la vérité, invincible à tout le pyrrhonisme"; while Bergson's doctrine, which, we are told, leaves the whole domain of morality untouched, does not lead to any truth of value to Pascal. Nevertheless, the author gives a long and important chapter on the conflict between scientific dogmatism and the new intuitionism. It is needless to discuss it, for every reader will have his own point of view, but no one can doubt that it is an illuminating account of this revolution in French thought.

But there is another type of thought, that of Catholic France, which takes us into another world. Here we find not only the pragmatists but Brunetière discussing the famous Wager, Blondel with a new philosophy of action, and Father Laberthonnière writing an apology, and finding that the Thomist position and his own are fundamentally irreconcilable. Finally, the question of Pascal's Jansenism intrudes. Did he die in a state of complete submission to the Church? This question is discussed, but surely the only thing that matters is whether he held a Jansenist position when he wrote the *Pensées*. This chapter is somewhat inconclusive, as the author disclaims any attempt to define the teaching of Port-Royal, and thinks that two directly opposite views may be maintained with equal emphasis. But at least we have the unbiased attempt of one writing "without any confessional bias" to arrive at the truth; and the final conclusion appears to be sound, that the basis of the *Pensées* is not any Jansenist dogma but the mind of Pascal. The chapter on the new interest in Pascal as a mystic at first appears to land us in the deepest problems of religion, but really "the conceptions of mystical theology" are assumed, and what we have is a discussion of the new attitude of twentieth-century thought to the mystical aspect of Pascal. Naturally there will be some who will shrink from seeing him discussed in the light of William James and the new psychology, but granted the point of view the chapter is an essential part of Pascal's relations to modern French thought. Throughout the book there are odd turns of expression, which arouse not criticism but the deepest sympathy for one who through ill health had largely to depend on her own energies, and who yet succeeded in portraying a complex and important chapter of French thought and throwing new light on the character of a great man. The care and devotion of her friends who have revised and edited the work has been well spent.

E. J. Thomas.

Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century. By George H. Mead. Edited by Merritt H. Moore. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. London: Cambridge University Press. 1936. Pp. xxxix + 518. Price 22s. 6d. net.)

The most striking thing about the thought of the nineteenth century is perhaps its lack of originality. The doctrine of evolution which fills so much of the literature of the time results from the adaptation to empirical science of the historical method discovered in the century preceding. Pre-Raphaelitism in art and the Catholic revival in religion are regressions to medieval ideas strong enough in this country to cast a spell even over a man like Carlyle. The aridity of nineteenth-century philosophy is a commonplace amongst those who have to teach the history of philosophy from Descartes to the present day; just as the technologists of the period confined themselves to the unoriginal task of building bigger and bigger steam engines, so the philosophers failed to improve on the ideas of their eighteenth-century predecessors, Hume, or Kant, or Hegel (whose system was more or less complete in his mind by 1810 at the latest). The century was perhaps too intent upon

and successful in material progress to have time or inclination for original thought.

Into that question, however, this book does not enter. It consists of a verbatim report, taken down by a stenographer, of lectures delivered by Professor Mead, who died in 1931, and it is concerned not with the history of nineteenth-century thought as a whole, nor with its origins or development, but with showing the interconnection of historical events, or economic conditions with scientific discovery, and of both of these with philosophy. The French Revolution, the Industrial Revolution, and the development of the technique of empirical science have as important a place in the book as the exposition of philosophic ideas. Idealism failed, in Professor Mead's view, because it could not take account of the novelty of scientific discovery and the method of "research science"; his lectures began, therefore, with an account of the "revolutionary" or "romantic" philosophers from Kant to Hegel, went on to give an account of the scientific advance which made them obsolete, and concluded by giving some account of those philosophers who had learned the lessons of science, namely, Bergson, the pragmatists, Russell and Whitehead.

The strength of the book is its concreteness, its insistence on relating philosophical ideas to contemporary life as a whole, and this makes it useful for reference to, for instance, candidates for the Honour School of Philosophy, Politics, and Economics at Oxford. But it lacks the brilliance and the incisiveness of Ruggiero (whose work was surely more worthy of mention than those referred to by Professor Moore in his Introduction), and the omission of any comment on the use in the nineteenth century of historical as distinct from scientific modes of thought is extremely curious. It must also be added that, owing to the retention of the lecture form and the consequent repetitions, the book is very tedious to read. It is surely no kindness to the memory of a scholar to publish *in extenso* a verbatim report of lectures delivered extempore from notes, and this volume would have gained greatly in attractiveness had half its bulk been pruned away by a sympathetic pupil of its author.

T. M. Knox.

The Hebrew Philosophical Genius. A Vindication. By Duncan Black Macdonald, M.A., D.D. (Princeton: Princeton University Press; London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1936. Pp. xi + 155. Price 11s. 6d. net.)

Philosophy and Faith. By Dorothy M. Emmet. (London: S.C.M. Press. 1936. Pp. 164. Price 4s. 6d. net.)

Dr. Macdonald seeks to show that the Hebrews had a fundamental philosophy of their own, not simply one adapted from Greece. Whether or no it be regarded as a strong case, it cannot be regarded as a long one, since apart from much said in these 150 pages about the Greeks, there is much space given to translations. For example, the whole of Ecclesiastes is translated—one may add very well translated. But had the material for proving Dr. Macdonald's case been ampler, he could not have spared so much space for extracts. What Dr. Macdonald does succeed in showing is that there is a philosophical background to the Old Testament, but that does not prove that the Hebrew race had philosophical genius. All races have a racial philosophy, just as they have a racial psychology. But it is *phronesis*, not *sophia*. The Hebrew was not a philosopher in the sense that the Greek was. Dr. Macdonald makes much of the concept of Reason as found in the Book

of Proverbs. Yet even there Reason is much more manifestly extolled as an attribute of God than as the glory of man. The Hebrew race has produced its great philosophers, though, as with the greatest of them, Spinoza, the espousal of philosophy has often meant divorce from the synagogue. Dr. Macdonald has written a most interesting book, and demonstrated the existence of philosophical conceptions in the Old Testament, but it is still open to doubt that it is correct, at least in the technical sense of the term philosophy, to speak of the Hebrews as a philosophical race.

The religious man and the philosopher have often met on some field of quest. "What are you doing here?" inquires the philosopher. "Seeking God," is the reply, "and look, here is a token of Him." "That," says the philosopher, "is merely an aspect of the Absolute." Miss Emmet wants to introduce these fellow seekers to each other. She admits, "The philosopher may even make his contribution to the Church by keeping a certain detachment from it." But she adds, "It must be no attitude of mere indifferent detachment." In those sentences lie the gist of the book. Miss Emmet writes in detachment as a philosopher, not a theologian, but hers is a very understanding and sympathetic detachment. She sees that philosophy and religion cannot conduct separate quests, yet each is suspicious of the other. It is to remove some of that suspicion by showing what is common to the work of each that she sets herself. If we could be delivered from materialist philosophies and dogmatic theologies, from agnostics who make a philosophy of what they don't know and mystics who make a theology of what nobody knows, we might find that religion and philosophy were much closer kin than we think. Miss Emmet's book is admirable in contention, tone, and temper, and should do something, especially among the student class, for which it is particularly suited, to remove the foolish separation between two seekers, each of whom will come back unsatisfied without the knowledge gained by the other. *Philosophy and Faith* is a book that was well worth writing and is well worth reading.

E. S. Waterhouse.

The Unlimited Community: A Study of the possibility of Social Science. By Julius W. Friend and James Feibleman. (London: Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1936. Pp. 383. Price 15s. net.)

As its sub-title suggests, this book is not so much a contribution to social theory as a consideration of the conditions under which there could be such a thing. Indeed, it is primarily a contribution to metaphysics. According to the authors, the chief defect of modern thought is what they call nominalism, using the word in its medieval sense of the denial of reality to universals; in fact, though they see some signs of grace in Spinoza and Whitehead, the only modern philosopher whom they seem willing to exempt from their strictures is C. S. Peirce, from a remark by whom the main title of the book is taken. And their main aim is to advocate instead a Platonic-Aristotelian realism, in which the objective existence of universals is explicitly upheld. To describe in detail the way in which they develop this thesis would occupy too much space; and it is sufficient to say that they conceive that their task should be carried out in the spirit of modern physical science, of which they regard the procedure, though not of course the explicit metaphysics, as thoroughly realistic in their sense of the word. When this is satisfactorily done, they maintain, it will be seen that values are an essential part of the objective structure of the universe; and it will be the proper duty of the social theorist to consider them mathematically.

A thesis of this ambitious nature is hardly likely to escape criticism. The social theorist, unless he should chance to be also a metaphysician, is likely to regard it as very remote from his actual studies, and as likely to remain so in any conceivable future. The metaphysician, too, in addition to deploring the indifference to concrete detail of all kinds, is likely to regret the absence, and indeed the impossibility, of any satisfactory conception of individuality; how, on such a theory, could there be individual things, and especially individual minds, at all, and how can we account for our stubborn tendency to associate values with such minds and their experiences? Our authors are not, however, altogether unaware of such criticism, or at least of its possibility. They make no claim that the mathematical treatment of value is now possible, or soon likely to be; and they have much that is valuable, though of a negative kind, to say in the "Criticism of Present-Day Social Theory" which they offer in the second chapter: in particular their attempt to exhibit the corruption of social theory by nominalism is an interesting and effective application of their main thesis. They also attempt to deal with the more metaphysical difficulties by devoting a whole chapter to what they call the "Historical Order," as distinguished from the "Logical Order" of which they suppose objective reality to consist; and in their chapter on the "Epistemological Hypothesis" and elsewhere they have much to say about the place and function of minds in the scheme of things. But they do not explicitly consider either of these objections, or indeed any objections of the kind, preferring to develop their argument dogmatically rather than dialectically; and the remarks which they do make on such topics are not likely to convince or enlighten the critics who do not share their general assumptions and outlook. At the same time, their thesis is well worth maintaining; and they have argued it with considerable skill and force.

O. DE SELINCOURT.

Political Philosophies of Plato and Hegel. By M. B. FOSTER. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, Humphrey Milford. 1935. Pp. xii + 207. Price 7s. 6d.)

This is an important book. Mr. Foster summons Plato from off his pedestal and argues with him as one philosopher should argue with another, with the result that I have learnt more from his three short chapters on Plato than from many volumes of Platonic exegesis.

But there are dangers in Mr. Foster's method. In the first place, he has not been able to resist the temptation of fitting Plato and Hegel into a neat pattern, in which the one-sidedness and ambiguities of the former are corrected by the latter, and the historical relation of the two is given a purely logical form. Perhaps this fault is inevitable in a Hegelian looking back at the history of philosophy, but it undoubtedly results in an over-simplification of Plato's argument. Partly because he was not so rigidly consistent, Plato was not as pellucidly wrong as Mr. Foster suggests. He did not[1] deny all Reason to his lowest class, and for this reason it seems possible to connect the tripartite divisions of soul and State without violation of the τεχνη principle. Each class has a function and a *dominant* interest which is realized in the State by the sacrifice of the *full* realization of its other two interests. But each soul has the three parts, and it is only because Reason is weak in those of the lowest class that it must be aided and guided by the Reason of the ruler.

In effect, Mr. Foster interprets the *Republic* as though it ended at Book IV, and leaves it to Hegel to take the problem a stage further and consider how

[1] See *Republic*, 590 ff.

the τεχνη of ruling can become the free functioning of Reason. But this is precisely the question discussed by Plato himself in Books V to VII, where it is clearly seen that the Guardians are not only δημιουργοι της ελευθερεως της πολεως, but rational souls aware of the principles of unity which permeate the universe; and where διανοητικη ἀρετη takes up into itself and transforms the ἠθικη ἀρετη of Books II to IV.

Thus we reach the strange conclusion that in fact Hegel did not carry the thought of Plato much further than Plato himself. For in Mr. Foster's excellent account of Hegel's political philosophy it is clearly admitted that Hegel too found himself unable to grant to the mass of the people genuine freedom. Hegel and Plato are parallel philosophers of different ages, not stages in the evolution of Philosophy.

But no criticism should leave the impression that this is not a noteworthy book. It is clearly and simply written, and is obviously the work of a philosopher: as such it cannot but stimulate others to a better understanding and a careful re-reading of the texts which it analyses.

R. H. S. Crossman.

An Introduction to Theory and Practice of Psychology. By Ll. Wynn Jones, M.A., Ph.D. (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. 1934. Pp. x + 308. Price 12s. 6d. net.)

This is a valuable addition to the available textbooks of Experimental Psychology. The title is too wide, since the book makes hardly any reference to affection, instinct, or the higher conative processes, omissions not justified by the writer's strict adherence to experimental treatment. But in compensation he has made available to students such topics as Factorial Analysis and Perseveration, which would otherwise have to be studied in the original papers. Within its chosen limits the book is up to date and good, though those who are not fervent believers in the doctrines of Noegenesis may find it inconvenient in use. But this would be true of a textbook written from any definite and consistently maintained point of view, and it is to the author's credit that he has sought to present one consistent theory.

Most of the twenty-four chapters start with instructions for experiments, followed by discussion of typical results and a wider discussion of the general topic. Questions are appended to stimulate the curiosity of the reader. Dr. Wynn Jones has earned the gratitude of teachers of the subject by presenting such an unusual wealth of useful, and often novel, exercises. The instructions are nearly always perfectly adequate, and the discussions good, though necessarily brief. The statistical chapters also deserve praise, and an important feature of the book is the adequacy of the running references and the chapter bibliographies. Throughout the book psychology is presented as a very living field of experimental study, and though it will require supplementation in the important departments omitted, it is well designed to lead students to an appreciation of scientific method and to more extensive study. It is clearly the work of an experienced teacher addressing himself to students.

A. W. Wolters.

Early Buddhist Scriptures. A Selection translated and edited by Edward J. Thomas, M.A., D.Litt. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1935. Pp. xxv + 232. Price 10s. 6d.)

This is a practical little book containing a good selection of carefully translated ancient Buddhist texts. Most of these have been long available in com-

plete translations, but the reader will thank Dr. Thomas for his pleasant introduction to the vast subject. The standpoint taken by the translator is that of the compilators of the Pali Scripture, which means that he declines Mrs. Rhys Davids's view of a falsified and mutilated scripture. This opposition to such a great authority whose numerous works have a larger circle of readers than those of any writer on Buddhism should, in our opinion, even in a work for beginners like the one before us not have been merely hinted at in a solitary footnote (p. xii).

F. O. SCHRADER.

Kamala Lectures: *Evolution of Hindu Moral Ideals.* By Sir P. S. SIVASWAMY AIYER, K.C.S.I., C.I.E., LL.D. (Calcutta University. 1935. Pp. xix+242. Price 4s. 6d. Rs.2.8.)

The task the author has set to himself in these lectures is to examine the ethical principles of Hinduism with special regard to that defensive movement of Hindu orthodoxy which is represented in the legislature by the so-called Sanātanist group, and in journalism by such papers as the *Indian Mirror* of Bombay. He shows that the assumption underlying this position, viz. that the ethical rules and principles laid down in the ancient "Law Books" (Dharma Śāstras) are *sanātana*, i.e. eternal and immutable, is contradicted by the history of that very literature. But he is not, for that, prepared to assent to all attacks made on Hinduism. There is a good deal in its principles which is sound in his opinion. Thus he thinks that, while the social institution of caste is bound to disappear, the doctrine of Karma deserves to remain the backbone of Hindu ethics.

There is too much detail in some parts of the book, while others are too sketchy. E.g. we need not know all the absurdities Manu has got to say on sins and corresponding penances, while a sentence of three lines telling us nothing but that sea-voyages cause loss of caste is surely too meagre an information on a most extraordinary prohibition which is still in force with the majority of the orthodox. But the book is based on accurate information, and well worth reading. It should be specially welcome to those who, having read Prof. Washburn Hopkins's *Ethics of India* (New Haven, 1924), wish to know how an enlightened and patriotic Indian deals with the same subject.

F. O. SCHRADER.

Pareto's General Sociology: a Physiologist's Interpretation. By LAWRENCE J. HENDERSON. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. London: Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press. 1935. Pp. vii + 119. Price $1.25, or 5s. 6d. net.)

This book consists of eight short chapters and of thirteen long notes covering an approximately equal number of pages; it has a Preface but no index. The author entertains a great admiration for Pareto's *Treatise on General Sociology*, which he feels is not likely to be appreciated as it deserves, partly owing to its inordinate length and partly owing to the natural difficulty presented by much of it to those who have had little acquaintance with natural science; and he offers his book as a modest contribution to the overcoming of these difficulties. Since it is probably the most elaborate attempt in existence at a purely objective treatment of sociological questions, the importance of the *Treatise* is not likely to be questioned; and a discussion of it is especially welcome just now in view of the recent publication of the English translation.

Nor can it be questioned that Dr. Henderson has had some success in making clear some of its fundamental ideas. Considerable portions of his book, however, are devoted to chemical formulae, and to other topics which will hardly be intelligible to anybody unacquainted with scientific procedure. Moreover, even the portions of it that are of general interest are mainly discussions of scientific method in general; and he has not really attempted to determine how far the methods appropriate in other sciences can be profitably followed in sociology. It is indeed arguable that his aims could be more effectively achieved by somebody who, while sharing his admiration for Pareto, was more interested in society and less interested in science.

O. DE SELINCOURT.

A History of Embryology. By JOSEPH NEEDHAM, Sc.D. (Cambridge: At the University Press. 1934. Pp. xviii + 274. Price 15s. net.)

In his very comprehensive three-volume work on *Chemical Embryology*, which Dr. Needham published in 1931, a section was devoted to the history of the subject. This historical section is here reprinted as a separate work, the period covered extending from Indian and Egyptian Antiquity to the beginning of the nineteenth century. It is a very readable book, very thorough and scholarly, with enough detail and explanation by the author to make a connected story, but not too much to obscure what is of interest to modern embryology. These qualities make this book the best history of embryology in the English language.

Dr. Needham freely distributes praise and blame among the authors whose works are commemorated in his history. But it is difficult to see what such judgments express beyond the personal predilections of the author, because in different histories one finds the praise and blame differently distributed. Dr. Needham is also fond of seeking for anticipations of modern theories in the works of early embryologists who wrote at a time when the whole outlook was so different from our own that such comparisons must be very hazardous. To the reviewer at least some of the alleged connections between ancient and modern theories seem rather far-fetched.

Dr. Needham concludes his book with ten pages of very pertinent reflections on the lessons of history for modern biology. Among other points he shows how the earlier workers were hampered by the poverty of their language and how this was in part responsible for diverting them from the work of observation to endless discussions of pseudo-problems. Perhaps the most interesting topic in the history of embryology from the philosophical point of view is the lengthy controversy about "preformation" and "epigenesis." Any reader who is interested in this subject (which illustrates so well the evil influence of rationalism in natural science) should compare Dr. Needham's account of it with that of Professor Cole in his *Early Theories of Sexual Generation* which appeared in 1930.

J. H. WOODGER.

Neoplatonism of the Italian Renaissance. By NESCA A. ROBB, D.Phil. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1935. Pp. 315. Price 12s. 6d.)

There is room for a book on the philosophy of the Italian Renaissance in relation to the sources, mainly Plato and the Neoplatonic School, in which it found its inspiration. This, however, is not the subject of Miss Robb's book, though the title might lead us to expect it. In the fifteen closely printed pages

of bibliography one subject is conspicuous by its absence—Neoplatonism. We look in vain for the names of Plato and Plotinus, and for references to the modern philosophers and historians of philosophy who have written about them. There is nothing in the body of the work to suggest that this omission is accidental. Miss Robb is a learned medievalist and an accomplished Italian scholar. Her book will be full of interest to students of one of the most fascinating periods of European history. But since it does not profess to be a contribution to philosophy, a very brief notice in this journal may suffice.

W. R. Inge.

Outline of Clinical Psycho-analysis. By Otto Fenichel, M.D. Translated by Bertram D. Lewin, M.D., and Gregory Tilboorg, M.D. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd. 1934. Pp. 492. Price 18s.)

We learn from the translators' preface that the volume under review was published serially in the *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, before appearing in book form. It is easy to understand the choice. Dr. Fenichel's book is a monument of laborious systematization. The very index gives proof of this, running as it does to fourteen closely printed pages. But this same index provides a forecast of the almost slavish orthodoxy which one recognizes on perusing the text. Indeed, one could read through this volume and be left with the impression that Psycho-analysis marches forward with a united front rolling up the forces of blind ignorance opposed to it and untroubled by dissensions, mutinies, or revolts. The whole tone of the book assumes that the spirit of man can be interpreted completely and exclusively by Freudian theory. To those who accept this assumption the book can be recommended unreservedly. On the other hand, those who have a wider outlook on psychology, philosophy, and indeed physiology, are likely to find it cramped in treatment and narrow in outlook. As examples of the author's loyal objection to physiological aetiology we may take his whole section on addictions (pp. 294 to 312). and his introduction to the chapter on manic-depression (p. 362). Here we see the typical Freudian determined to read Freudian Psychopathology into a syndrome that is being recognized, more and more generally, as of endocrine origin. And, as far as philosophy is concerned, the writer has written 478 pages without reference to the subject of values. This might be permissible in a textbook of pure psychology, but not in one that professes to deal with characterology. It is noteworthy that the book contains two references apiece to Kretchmer and Jung, one to Groddeck, and none to McDougall, Adler, or Prinzhorn.

In short, the book is first rate of its kind, but makes no contribution to that synthesis of Freudian theory and the general structure of philosophy.

H. Crichton-Miller.

General Experimental Psychology. By A. G. Bills. (London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1934. Pp. x + 620. Price 16s.)

This book must be regarded as a textbook in general psychology, but written from the experimental standpoint. It is arranged in six parts. Part 1 deals with the nature of the sensory process, Part 2 with the perceptual process—space perception principally, Part 3 with learning and memory, Part 4 with association and thought, Part 5 with work and fatigue, and

Part 6 with emotional and affective processes. There are, in addition, two appendices, in one of which is given a brief account of the essential statistical methods in experimental psychology, and in the other the psycho-physical methods are discussed. At the end of each chapter throughout the book appears a very full list of references.

The book is very comprehensive and covers the ground well. Much attention is paid to Parts 3 and 5, and very adequate discussions on learning and memory and work and fatigue are contained therein. The other sections are shorter, and the tendency in some chapters is to give merely a summary of results obtained or of theories expounded. This is apt to make certain parts of the book a little scrappy. The book, however, may be recommended as a useful reference book for students, though not quite for beginners, as well as being of use to those in charge of experimental courses. It could also be used as a general textbook in psychology. It is a pity that no references are given to any articles or books published in this country, for these surely are not so inaccessible as the author indicates in his preface.

MARY COLLINS.

Manu: A Study in Hindu Social Theory. By KEWAL MOTWANI, A.M., Ph.D. (Madras: Ganesh & Co., 1934. Pp. xxvii + 261. Price Rs. 3.)

This is an effort, written in lucid and agreeable style, to present to American instructors in Sociology the bulky contents of the work known as the Laws of Manu as a "social theory in the scientific terminology of to-day. The spirit is ancient . . . and oriental; the garb is modern and occidental." Well, I have tried to some extent to do that in psychology—"myself when young"—I don't do it now. Art warns us; she once tried pictures of people of A.D. 30 or thereabouts, in clothing of the Renaissance. They make to us now no appeal. "Manu's" theory, "Manu's" language belong to the ancient Orient: let the writer seek to quicken our reconstructive imagination and take us back to it. Do not let him ask us to understand, by *brahmacharya*, education, by *artha*, power, by *mŏksha*, wisdom, or by *dharma*, intellect. Everyone of these is a misfit. Nevertheless, when Mr. Motwani is not trying adjustments, and discusses the history of the many Manus and expounds the aggregate of codes, his book is both informative and interesting.

C. A. F. RHYS DAVIDS.

Human Personality and the Environment. By Professor C. MACFIE CAMPBELL (London and New York: The Macmillan Co. 1934. Pp. x + 252. Price 12s. 6d.)

The theme of this book is no new one, but Professor Macfie Campbell's treatment of his subject is delightfully fresh. He has the necessary qualifications for the task—an extensive knowledge of human personality both adjusted and maladjusted, a practised and discerning eye for human behaviour and its motivation, a breadth of erudition possessed by few in his profession, and, above all, a sense of proportion that never fails him.

In this most readable volume we are first given a simple exposition of anatomy and physiology in so far as they constitute significant factors in the environment of the personality. In this connection the author sketches in an intriguing way the modern views of cortical and thalamic influences on behaviour. In the third chapter we have a description of personal development, which necessarily introduces most of the broader concepts of psychoanalysis.

The second half of the book is devoted to the integration of the personality in relation to society and the universe. In these chapters the author draws upon his wide literary and historical knowledge, and provides examples from all ages and countries, from Loyola to Captain Scott, from Robespierre to Roosevelt, from Shelley to Santa Teresa. This material is handled in a way that can justly be described as fascinating. With an insight that is always tolerant and generally humorous, the unconscious motivation of conduct is laid bare, and we see our saints and heroes, our geniuses and reformers dissected, explained, and demonstrated with no more iconoclasm than is demanded in the interests of accuracy.

No one who reads this book will lay it down without wanting to know more about human personality and wanting to read more of Professor Macfie Campbell's writings.

H. CRICHTON-MILLER.

Eros and Psyche: an Essay on the Constitution and Destiny of Man. By BENCHARA BRANFORD. (London: University of London Press. 1934. Pp. ix + 378. Price 12s. 6d.)

This book has proved difficult to read, and seems almost impossible to review, not because of its profundity or originality, but because of the arrangement and the style. Were it not for the intense enthusiasm and transparent sincerity of the author, one would be tempted to pronounce it a pretentious production with a parade of learning, which disappointed the promise that it held out. I have allowed patience to have "its perfect work," and have been rewarded, not with entire satisfaction but with a qualification of the unfavourable impression which at first the book made upon me. It is good enough to deserve a review, but not good enough to secure an uncritical appreciation.

The argument lacks continuity; there are many irrelevancies; the author is too easily tempted to turn aside into bypaths, and so mislead the unwary reader as to the direction of his journey. While there is an index of names only, the Table of Contents is altogether inadequate, as no chapter headings are given but only the titles, some of them misleading, of the seven books, each of which is divided into a number of short chapters. The use of Greek words where plain English would serve the purpose just as well seems to me an affectation. The definition of love in the last book would lead one to expect *Agape* and not *Eros* as its title. The first chapter of Book V, *The Mission of Genius*, raises six questions about man, and one would expect that the succeeding chapters would answer these questions; but not so. A good deal of historical and autobiographical material is introduced which is really not necessary for the exposition of the subject. It is no advantage to the author that he has, as it were, gone to school to Sir Patrick Geddes, whose methods of exposition always seemed to me too artificial, however great his merits as a pioneer thinker may have been. The diagrams which, following his example the author uses freely, I find no help whatever. There are also arbitrary analogies and artificial correspondences, which show ingenuity rather than insight. For brevity let me tabulate a series:

LAWS	MYTHS	RELIGIONS
Mechanical	Fetishism	Islamism
Biological	Totemism	Confucianism
Sociological	Tabuism	Judaism

I find this simplification of complex problems quite unconvincing. The

psychology is also arbitrary and its terminology confusing. Again let me illustrate:

Man as Natural Creature		Man as Creator		
Form		Spirit		
Mechanism	Sense	Super-mechanism	Imagination	Artist
Organism	Intellect	Super-organism	Ideation	Thinker
Humanism	Feeling	Super-humanism	Idealization	Ethicist

How does this system relate itself to recognized science and current speech? The author is apologetic about his neologisms; but he is far too fond of them and indulges in them needlessly. Would not the word *lover*, parallel to Artist and Hunter, convey more meaning than Ethicist does? Sometimes the writing is eloquent but sometimes only rhetorical. I have offered these criticisms as a protest against a tendency to make philosophy an esoteric doctrine, intelligible only to initiates, instead of making it accessible to all persons of general culture. The sciences need their own precise terminology, and to that no objection can be taken; but in a work like this under review all this "jargon" and artifice is without any justification, and my appreciation of what is good in the book makes me regret that the author seems to have gone out of his way not "to get it over."

As I have indicated, the argument is not consistently sustained, and only a general indication can be given. Book I is an *Overture* of undue length, autobiographical and historical, and one wishes before reaching page 78 that the play would begin. Book II elaborates a distinction between *Fact* and *Myth*, which in varying forms runs through the whole book, reappearing as Form and Spirit, Science and Philosophy, or Religion, Man as Creature and as Creator. Book III, under the fanciful name *Pan*, discusses nature generally; and Book III, also with a fanciful name, *Psyche*, deals with man as natural creature. Book V, entitled the *Mission of Genius*, seems an intrusion; but one discovers that the discussion of eminent thinkers is intended to justify the transition from Fact to Myth, from man as natural to man as spiritual. This is the completion of the argument in Book VI, named *Eros*.

Some of the conclusions advanced may be briefly mentioned. Although the subject is the Constitution and Destiny of Man, the writer is no humanist, but a theist. He closes a sentence dealing with the progressive order in nature and man with this statement: "an order created and sustained by Deity, All-holy Spirit; as Personal, immanent in man spiritual and in nature spiritual, with divine spontaneity suffering with all selves and joyful with all selves: as Absolute, Super-personal, transcending man and nature, beyond good and evil" (p. 269). If the last words mean that for God as Absolute moral distinctions cease, I must register my emphatic dissent. This belief is not "a sentiency of Duty," which accompanies "a sentiency of all nature within man" (p. 171). Religion has significance and value for him (p. 283). His main concern is with man. Man is both natural creature and spiritual creator; he is ever creating himself; it is his imagination which brings his body into being in the mother's womb; for the author whole-heartedly accepts the Eastern doctrine of reincarnation. As eternal spirit man creates not himself alone but his environment, including his fellow-man; for there is an inter-volvedness of God, man, and nature in the continuous creative process. Man is the microcosm and nature the macrocosm: for the latter is fully reproduced in the former, even as regards the chemical elements. A sentence is worth quoting to show the confidence the author has in his own speculations. "Though scarcely one-third of the chemical

elements have so far been discovered in the body of man, the history of this branch of bio-chemistry supports the conjecture, latent in our fundamental postulates, that ultimately all the elements will be found therein" (p. 240). His outlook is optimistic: "A vital consequence," he writes, "of this transcendental order, this ingenerate bias from irregularity to regularity, is the inherent stability of goodness, truth, and beauty, the cardinal elements of order, with the bliss that is their emotional value and function; and conversely the inherent instability of evil, error, and ugliness, the cardinal elements of disorder, with the bale that is their emotional value and function" (p. 272). While disagreeing profoundly from much of this speculation, which, like the curate's egg, is good only in parts, and distrusting this eclecticism, which draws all fish, good and bad, into its hospitable net, I gladly recognize that the author is on the side of the angels in his estimate of man's constitution and destiny. In his *Envoy* (p. 372) he expresses the hope that his readers will share his happiness in his explorations. Will he make their happiness easier and surer in giving some heed to the criticisms which I have offered in all good will?

A. E. Garvie.

Inquiry into the Unknown. Edited by Theodore Besterman. (London: Methuen & Co. 1934. Pp. 142. Price 3s. 6d. net.)

This symposium issues in book form ten B.B.C. broadcast talks on the subject of psychical research, which were given by practical investigators of the subject between January and March 1934. It is a subject which the general public approaches with a considerable amount of bias, and the task of presenting it fairly in so brief a space cannot have been an easy one. Nevertheless, some interesting points of view are raised and discussed, including the charge brought against psychical research of lying outside the realm of science because the phenomena with which it deals are mainly spontaneous. History, it is pointed out in reply, and a large part of astronomy, are also spontaneous or non-experimental, yet not therefore unscientific.

But psychical research has also its experimental side, as is shown by Osty's (and other's) use of the infra-red beam, in conjunction with automatic recording apparatus, to detect the alleged forces of physical mediumship; and the experimental methods now in use for the testing of telepathy and clairvoyance.

The anthropological side of the subject, which includes a discussion of the practices of savage tribes and Eastern cults, with special reference to the "fire-walk," seems to have been accorded an undue importance in the series.

Sir Oliver Lodge refers to the "cross-correspondences" as affording strong evidence for survival. These interesting examples of multiple automatism in which two or more automatic writers have simultaneously produced matter which fits together like the pieces of a mosaic to form a single, intelligible whole are too little known to the public.

Dame Edith Lyttelton gives some clear-cut examples of precognition from her own experience, as when, on February 10, 1914, she wrote automatically the words: "*Lusitania* fire and foam"—and thereafter watched for disaster to the ship, which occurred in May 1915.

The philosophical aspect of the subject is dealt with by Professor C. D. Broad in his lucid summing-up. Although the facts which psychical research alleges "are directly relevant to the very problems which it is their main business to discuss," yet the whole subject, he says, has been ignored by

nearly all professional philosophers. "You might, perhaps, think," he goes on to say, "that philosophers ignore the whole subject of psychical research in their writings because they have carefully looked into the alleged facts for themselves and have one and all found that there is nothing there but fraud and delusion. If this were so, it would, of course, be highly significant and important. But I can assure you that it is not so. Most philosophers have never taken the trouble even to read the best of the relevant literature, much less to do any investigation for themselves." And point is given to this dictum by a report to which Professor Broad refers, which was published by Mr. H. F. Saltmarsh in the *Proceedings* of the Society for Psychical Research for February 1934. This report contains 281 cases of apparent precognition, the evidence for each of which has been sifted. No attempt has been made by any philosopher to deal with the tremendously important issue here raised or to rebut the evidence. Yet it is the business of the philosopher "to make a resolute attempt to see the world steadily and to see it whole." And it is, moreover, "the odd, exceptional, inexplicable facts, however trivial in themselves (which) are always the points from which the next great and fundamental advance in human knowledge may be made."

G. N. M. Tyrrell.

The Nature of History. By Sir Henry Lambert, K.C.M.G., C.B., F.S.A., F.R.Hist.S. (London: Oxford University Press: Humphrey Milford. 1933. Pp. viii + 94. Price 5s. net.)

The aim of this little book is to demonstrate the independence of history from the scientific method and ideal, and to assert its practical and philosophical value as an independent study. In a modest preface Sir Henry Lambert states that his book makes no claim to originality, that it is not a book of metaphysics, but "merely an attempt to give a clear account and definite answers to questions in a matter in which there is a good deal of confusion." I think Sir Henry hardly realizes how profound that confusion is, and that an essay with no pretension to philosophical originality is not likely to achieve a solution of it. But still, within the limits indicated, he has written a quite admirable little book, lucid, judicious, and humane: the trip he takes one is none the less agreeable for not venturing too far to sea. There is just one protest I must make, against his assumption (for which a precedent is to be found, curiously enough, in the opinion of the poet Southey) that the play of *Hamlet* has less interest for us because it is not historically "true."

Adrian Coates.

The Idea of Salvation in the World's Religions. By J. W. Parker, M.A., B.D. (London: Macmillan & Co. 1935. Pp. viii + 259. Price 6s. net.)

This "Essay in the Comparative Study of Religions" deals with salvation in the widest sense—all that man desires to escape or to secure by his relation to spirits, gods, or God. He seeks "relief from present material wants"; he tries to overcome "the dread of evil powers"; he strives for "release" from life as evil; and for "freedom from sin." He craves guidance in "the Way of Life." What other religions only partially supply is perfectly provided for man in "the incarnate God." The words in inverted commas give the titles of the chapters and indicate the nature and the arrangement of the contents. The author admits that what he gives is at second hand from books dealing

with the religions. On critical, dogmatic, and ecclesiastical questions he is a conservative Anglo-Catholic; and shows no marked originality of thought. As regards the significance of the Cross of Christ, he does not sound the depths of its significance as presented in Evangelical Protestant theology.

His arrangement seems in some respects defective. The first chapter deals not only with material goods, but also with the social order. The dread of evil powers scarcely can claim a chapter to itself. The trust in good powers and the dread of evil powers should have been combined in the first chapter as dealing with natural weal or woe. The teaching on social order might claim a chapter to itself. The description of religions is peculiar, and in my judgment mistaken. I should not describe Hinduism or Zoroastrianism as *universal* religions, but as *national*; and confine the term *universal* to Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity, and Buddhism should not be described as a heresy of Hinduism along with Jainism.

The attitude to other religions is appreciative, although in each chapter the superiority of Christianity is insisted on. The book will serve a useful purpose, not only in showing the solidarity of mankind in regard to the needs religion meets, but in displaying the variety in which the satisfaction is offered. The depreciation of religion as a necessary element of human personality and the substitution for it of an emotional reaction to the Universe without any reference to any divine reality, or of a philosophy which answers the intellectual inquiry, but does not meet the practical needs of mankind, find here a welcome challenge of their adequacy. Could a delusion have spread so wide throughout all mankind, or have endured so long in man's history?

ALFRED E. GARVIE.

Religious Thought in the Eighteenth Century. Illustrated from Writers of the Period. By J. M. CREED, D.D., and J. S. BOYS SMITH, M.A. (Cambridge: at the University Press. 1934. Pp. xl + 301. Price 10s. 6d. net.)

There was a common tendency in the nineteenth century to depreciate the eighteenth; yet, despite its defects and limitations, it made a valuable contribution to life and thought, in philosophy and theology as in science. What we owe to it in religious thought is clearly and briefly presented to us in this useful volume. The quotations from a number of representative thinkers are prefixed by a short biographical note, and besides the well-known names, names now forgotten occur because of some distinctive merit in the eyes of the editors. The main interest in religious thought during this century was the controversy between the Deists advocating natural religion and the Orthodox divines defending a supernatural revelation. What was common to both sides was belief in reason, the adequacy of reason without revelation on the one hand, the argument from reason for the reality of revelation on the other. Accordingly, the first three sections deal with Natural Religion and Revelation, the Credentials of Revelation, the Grounds and Sufficiency of Natural Religion Considered. A fresh phase of thought and life is described in the fourth section, the Passing of the Age of Reason. It begins with the Evangelical Revival under John Wesley and ends in Kant's *Critiques*. The controversy between the Deists and the Orthodox led to the study of the Bible, with which the fifth section deals: not a few of the conclusions of nineteenth-century biblical scholarship were here anticipated. These varied movements, in which there was much activity of mind as well as experience of religion, brought to the forefront the question of the Church in its relation to the State, and this is the subject illustrated

in the sixth section. The Reformation did not secure religious liberty; it was in this eighteenth century that the principle of toleration was advocated and accepted. It is quite impossible to discuss the contents in detail; this general indication must suffice, with a cordial commendation of the editors' plan and performance, for which all students of theology and philosophy should be grateful.

A. E. GARVIE.

The Theory of Education in Plato's Republic. By R. L. NETTLESHIP. (London and Oxford: Clarendon Press; Humphrey Milford, 1935. Pp. viii + 155. Price 2s. 6d.)

It was an excellent idea to reprint this essay of Nettleship's, since the volume in which it appeared, Abbott's *Hellenica* (1880), has long been out of print, and is in any case less convenient to read than this slim book. Although much progress has been made in Platonic studies since it was written (and in particular Dr. James Adam's exposition, in his edition of the *Republic*, and in *The Religious Teachers of Greece*, should be consulted), yet it remains the best introduction to Plato's theory of education. The Essay is, moreover, as Mr. Spencer Leeson remarks in his brief introduction, "not simply an analysis, but in itself a living whole."

The Trustees of the Jowett Copyright Fund have contributed to the expense of this reprint. Section headings and marginal notes have been added; but the value of the book is very greatly diminished by the omission of references to the text. The Essay should be read in close connexion with the *Republic*, and without references a student will have difficulty in finding the place.

F. A. CAVENAGH.

Manual Skill: Its Organization and Development. By J. W. Cox, D.Sc. (London: Cambridge University Press. 1934. Pp. xx + 247. Price 16s.)

The scientific interest in human skill, though a recent development, has already travelled far from the issues raised by the pioneers, F. W. Taylor and F. B. Gilbreth. Their simple "motion study" has been supplemented by specifically psychological approaches, and Dr. Cox's book is welcome, as exemplifying this tendency. He lays stress on the fact that the present volume is concerned with the organization and development of manual skills *after* normal control of the hand has been developed. Yet the treatment in the book, excellent in many ways, does not fulfil the expectations aroused by its title.

The author investigated the conditions in which certain manual operations, which involved the manipulation and adjustment of objects to one another, could be employed as tests, and how reliable measures of individual ability could be secured from them. These initial abilities, for reasons unconvincing to the present reviewer, he calls "static" functions. The investigation of their interrelation raises one's first doubt. Dr. Cox states his aim of resolving the psychological activity in muscular skill into "*ultimate unitary* mental processes." To read this may raise the eyebrows of psychologists who are not necessarily wedded to the extremer forms of the *Gestalt* school, and when Dr. Cox says "such usage conforms appropriately with that of mathematics" (p. 18), is it not possible that he is putting the cart before the horse,

or even kissing the rod? Mathematics apart, one would have thought that the word "static" had fallen out of the psychologist's vocabulary long ago. To assume that a person's capacities for doing a particular performance, capacities which depend upon the fluctuations of bodily conditions, are actually static seems unwise.

A very interesting part of the book examines the nature of the changes in abilities which are brought about, first by more or less mechanical practice, and secondly by a special course of training. Such changes are called, with reason, dynamic functions. Dr. Cox then attempts to describe the mental processes involved in improvement in manual operations, and valuably indicates that in the acquisition of manual skill mental processes play a larger part than is commonly supposed.

This allows him to state the problem of the transfer of skill in a relatively new form, for this problem has usually been investigated only under conditions of routine practice and with simple tests, whereas Dr. Cox valuably extends his inquiry to more complex manual operations of the assembling-room.

It seems a pity that the writer uses phrases like "previous researches have already disclosed" where others would say "have shown some evidence," and that such a long book gives so few references. The advanced student, for whom the book is intended, expects them. If there is a second edition—and I sincerely hope there will be—workers in several countries outside England would gladly help to supply a bibliography.

T. H. Pear.

Morality and Reality: An Essay on the Law of Life. By E. Graham Howe, M.B., B.S., D.P.M. (London: Gerald Howe, Ltd. 1934. Pp. 136. Price 6s.)

This book deserves special consideration on two separate counts. In the first place the five lectures of which it is composed were apparently delivered to an audience of nursery governesses, and anyone who attempts to distil philosophic truth to nursery governesses commands admiration and sympathetic criticism. In the second place, the author is himself innocent of philosophic training and erudition, and thus approaches his task with an independence of thought and outlook that has both advantages and disadvantages. It is certainly true that he has chosen a title which is intriguing, and which might well adorn a volume more bulky, more profound, and less original. Indeed, if this book is not original it is nothing. But Dr. Graham Howe has brought his fresh and versatile mind to extract from his psychotherapeutic experience certain views of character development which are sure to be helpful to some if not to many. The general theme is a reinterpretation of the familiar Freudian presentation of the Id, the Ego, and the Super-ego. There are those who will think that he has improved on that presentation; others who will consider that he has elaborated it without advantage. Certainly the orthodox philosopher will be apt to cavil at the definition of Reality on p. 18: "That which is now, which is not, as a whole, what I want." Clearly this is a definition which implies an assumption. Again, "A good morality is one which accepts what is true" (p. 21) seems rather an inadequate platitude. One wonders sometimes whether the author does indeed mean morality and reality when he uses these terms, or whether he has not been hypnotized by his own caption and adjusted the connotation of the words to suit his thesis. There are other indications that the author is apt to be carried away by his remarkable facility for contriving arresting headlines, for example, "wholeness and holiness" (p. 123), "Heaven and

Haven," "Fake Facts or Face Facts," "Convenience and Convention," "Responsibility—Responsiveness—Irresponsibility." This last example is taken out of the arresting list of "whole words" and "part words" on p. 29. In that list we find that True is the "whole word" which corresponds to the two "part words" Good and Bad. It is difficult to see how any sort of juggling can make sense out of this juxtaposition of different categories.

On the other hand, the book contains many pithy and admirable aphorisms: "I am, then, to predigest reality so that the child may grow by assimilating it in its own way," "We all want the best seats and someone else has them," "This child is not what I want. What am I going to do about it? Do I 'let,' or do I 'try'?" On child psychology the author is always stimulating and generally illuminating. The passage about David and Goliath (pp. 59–64) and that on weaning (p. 30) are particularly good. But when relativity is introduced the present reviewer must admit himself somewhat bewildered. Take, for example, Fig. 3 on p. 44. It is difficult to believe that nursery governesses will be more efficient by reason of the diagram of a spiral with a line through the middle of it to represent a fourth dimension in character growth. The book as a whole is readable, suggestive, and often inspiring, and for these reasons will live down such blemishes as catch the critic's eye.

H. Crichton-Miller.

Conscious and Unconscious Sin: A Study in Practical Christianity. By Robert E. D. Clark, M.A., Ph.D. (London: Williams & Norgate. 1934. Pp. ix + 186. Price 4s. 6d.)

This is an unpretentious but useful work, and while it deals explicitly with Christian character and experience, it implicitly raises psychological and ethical questions of more general interest for the readers of *Philosophy*. While it does not call for a long review, it deserves a brief mention. The style is simple, the argument sound, and the arrangement orderly; and it has what every book should have—a good index. The purpose of the author is to raise the whole moral life to full self-consciousness; and thus to secure a consistent moral character in a fully developed personality. Not only should "provoked" sins, that is, sins of which there is full consciousness, be combated; but "unprovoked" sins, faults, and failings which are subconscious should by reflection be brought out of their obscurity to be dealt with; for his judgment defeats on a wider field of battle may in the long run be better than victories on a narrower. Self-satisfaction with such victories may often go with ignorance or neglect of even more serious defects of character. An educated sensitive conscience and a disciplined intelligence are the conditions of the worthiest type of personality. Even his paradoxes, e.g. that it is better to confess inability to conquer a bad habit with repentance for such failure than to get rid of the struggle with it by rationalization, prove on reflection sound. This book proves that there is a necessary and legitimate casuistry in the education of conscience and the formation of character. I can commend the book confidently.

Alfred E. Garvie.

Principles of Gestalt Psychology. By K. Koffka. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd. 1935. Pp. xi + 720. Price 25s.)

This book will influence the progress of psychology for many years. Pro-

fessor Koffka has set himself the task of writing a treatise on psychology at large from the standpoint of the gestalt[1] school. The adequacy with which the several sections are treated varies (and the author is very candid regarding his limitations), but most of the subjects are discussed with very great fulness of detail and close argumentation. The appeal to the experimental work of the school is so extensive as to make the book valuable as a work of reference, the extensive bibliography and index adding to its general usefulness. In view of the range covered and the meticulous care in the treatment we must not complain that the book is a very long one, though we may hope that at some future time the writer may feel himself able to take more for granted and provide a more compact statement of his principles. The book is necessarily intricate in its array of facts and arguments, but at the same time is remarkably clear in arrangement and expression. In his preface Koffka ascribes much of the merit of the book's style to Miss Harrower. The reader can only express gratitude impartially to both for the lucidity of statement which distinguishes this work. Unfortunately, the printer has in several cases frustrated their efforts by a disastrous transposition of lines.

It is implicitly claimed that gestalt principles "can lay the foundations of a system of knowledge that will contain the behaviour of a single atom as well as that of an amoeba, a white rat, a chimpanzee, and a human being, with all the latter's curious activities which we call social conduct, music and art, literature and drama" (p. 23). Further, it will retain for science the values of truth and beauty. In attempting to carry out this programme, it is inevitable that the author should at times appear to be achieving a *tour de force*, and in particular the section on Social Psychology appears to be premature. But even this is stimulating, and leads us to hope for a fuller special treatment of the subject.

The foundations of the presentation are the field concept and the principle of isomorphism. The former is taken to mean "a system of stresses and strains" which "determine real behaviour" (p. 42), and this is definitely claimed to be more than an analogical statement. The result is that the boundaries of psychology and of physical science are largely obliterated, and explanations of mental phenomena pushed into the physical sphere. There is one universe of fact with common principles of structure throughout it, so that behaviour can be deduced from the constitution of the field in which the organism is present at a given moment, the organism itself being part of the field. By isomorphism is meant that the structural principles of consciousness are the same as those of the physiological process which accompany it, so that there is no gap between material, physiological, and conscious events and processes. This is worked out most fully in connection with visual perception, along lines which are now familiar. But in spite of the careful treatment the question may still be raised whether we are entitled to use the *physical* conception of a field as more than an analogy, and whether psychological fields must not be treated independently. Further, the writer's claim that we can validly argue from the "behavioural" phenomena to the physiological is too reminiscent of earlier and unfortunate attempts to determine the nature of facts by deduction. To say that if the principle of isomorphism is valid the neural facts must correspond in quality with the conscious facts is only tautology, and the principle can only be established by appeal to the physiological data. Until that line of investigation becomes possible isomorphism can only rank as an attractive and plausible hypothesis, and all that is built upon it will be infected with the same characters. Perhaps, too, its plausibility is largely due to Koffka's persuasiveness, for on reflection it

[1] I follow Koffka's example in abandoning the initial capital.

must surely appear that the identities of structure which he claims are so very general as to be insufficient to serve as explanatory principles. Nor is the case greatly helped by the play made with terms like force, stress, and tension. In spite of the arguments adduced they seem to be only picturesque descriptions insusceptible of close definition. Even in physical science these terms seem at times to be makeshifts, or unnecessary relics of an earlier stage of scientific thinking, and in the reviewer's opinion gestalt theory would be stronger if it were stated only in terms of descriptive laws based upon the field concept. For this last, when confined to psychology, is indubitably of the first importance, and though it may be claimed that writers in other schools of thought have also realized this, yet none have clarified and emphasized it so thoroughly. For the most part the existence of "field properties" has been accepted in a very general, almost light-hearted fashion; henceforth they provide an endless field for detailed research. No praise can be too high for this achievement. Our complaint is that the talk of forces and tensions adds nothing to knowledge, but only restates the facts in a manner so pretentious as to obscure the real advances made. Is the statement that action results from tension within the Ego better than Locke's, that the mind in willing is moved by a present uneasiness?

While the book is firmly scientific in content and outlook, such broad and bold hypotheses are bound to stir up other interests, and philosophers will find plentiful material for reflection in it, and wonder how the author will steer his way between two perils. For in the earlier sections it appears possible that by his insistence upon the reality of the field he will end by dissolving the psychological data into the homogeneous field of physics; or, if he can stop short of that, that he will reduce psychology to the status of an appendix to physiology. He may claim to have avoided the former risk by his very careful treatment of the Ego, but many will think that he has done so by succumbing to the latter. His theory of the Ego is the most difficult part of the book to understand, but it is quite clear that it rests upon a definitely physiological theory of traces. His hypothesis of traces is the most ingenious and satisfying that we have met, but it is pure deduction from first principles. At all times Professor Koffka is alive to the risk of circular argument, but throughout the relation of physiology to psychology (if he can be said to distinguish them) is dangerously near the circular.

Professor Koffka leaves to the future the decision whether his principles are valid or not. In any case psychologists of all opinions must be grateful to him for this book, which enriches our literature by showing how a systematic empirical science must be built. Those who still feel that biology affords a more promising hunting ground than physics when we need guiding principles, can nevertheless learn much from gestalt.

A. W. W.

Books received also:—

B. H. Streeter. *The God Who Speaks* (Warburton Lectures, 1933–35). London: Macmillan & Co. 1936. Pp. 224. 5s.

O. C. J. G. L. Overbeck, F.C.S. *The New Light.* London: Metchim & Son. 1936. Pp. x + 229. 5s.

J. Wild. *George Berkeley: A Study of his Life and Philosophy.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1936. Pp. xi + 552. $6. 25s.

W. L. George, M.Sc., Ph.D. *The Scientist in Action. A Scientific Study of his Methods.* London: Williams & Norgate, Ltd. 1936. Pp. 355. 10s. 6d.

J. H. Wicksteed, M.A. *The Challenge of Childhood. An Essay on Nature and Education.* London: Chapman & Hall, Ltd. 1936. Pp. 336. 10s. 6d.

A. Eagle. *The Philosophy of Religion versus the Philosophy of Science.* London and Manchester: Simpkin Marshall, Ltd. 1936. Pp. 352. 5s.

J. Lindworsky, S.J. *The Psychology of Asceticism* (Tr. by E. A. Heiring). London: H. W. Edwards. 1936. Pp. 95. 5s.

J. H. Muirhead. *John Stuart Mackenzie,* 1860–1935. (From the Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol. XXI.) London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1936. Pp. 18. 1s. 6d.

Various. *What Can Philosophy Determine?* (Aristotelian Society Supplementary, Vol. XV). London: Harrison & Sons, Ltd. 1936. Pp. 235. 15s.

D. Carneades. *Matter, Spirit and Living Intellect* (English edition). London: Simpkin Marshall, Ltd. 1936. Pp. xvii + 424. 15s.

Various. *The Social Sciences: Their Relations in Theory and in Teaching.* London: Le Play House Press. 1936. Pp. 222. 5s.

F. P. Keppel. *Philanthropy and Learning. With other Papers.* New York: Columbia University Press; London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1936. Pp. 175. 9s.

G. Hort, Ph.D. *Sense and Thought. A Study in Mysticism.* London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1936. Pp. 262. 8s. 6d.

A. K. Coomaraswamy and A. G. Carey. *Patron and Artist: Pre-Renaissance and Modern.* Norton, Mass: Wheaton College Press. 1936. Pp. 69. $1.

I. Hedenius. *Sensationalism and Theology in Berkeley's Philosophy* (Inaugural Dissertation). Uppsala, Sweden: Almqvist & Wiksells Boktryckeri A.B.; Oxford: B. H. Blackwell, Ltd. 1936. Pp. 238. 10s.

A. O. Lovejoy. *The Great Chain of Being. A Study of the History of an Idea* (William James Lectures, 1933). Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1936. Pp. xi + 382. $4. 17s.

J. J. Cohen. *Psychotherapy.* London: J. Bale, Sons & Danielsson, Ltd. 1936. Pp. v + 149. 5s.

B. Farrington. *Science in Antiquity.* London: T. Butterworth, Ltd. 1936. Pp. 257. 2s. 6d.

H. J. Paton, D.Litt. *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience; a commentary on the first half of the "Kritik der Reinen Vernunft."* London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1936. Pp. Vol. I, 585; Vol. II, 510. 30s. the two volumes.

Lord Raglan. *The Hero. A Study in Tradition, Myth and Drama.* London: Methuen & Co. 1936. Pp. xi + 311. 10s. 6d.

The Testament of Man. An Anthology of the Spirit. Ed. by A. Stanley. London: V. Gollancz. 1936. Pp. ix + 662. 7s. 6d.

G. Santayana. *Obiter Scripta. Lectures, Essays and Reviews.* Ed. by J. Buchler and B. Schwartz. London: Constable & Co. 1936. Pp. ix + 238. 10s.

R. Gray-Smith. *God in the Philosophy of Schelling* (A Dissertation), Philadelphia, U.S.A.: University of Pennsylvania. 1933. Pp. 120.

G. Dawes Hicks, Ph.D., Litt.D. *Thought and Real Existence* (Hobhouse Memorial Trust Lecture, 1936). London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1936. Pp. 30. 2s.

M. Taube, Ph.D. *Causation, Freedom and Determinism. An Attempt to Solve the Causal Problem through a Study of its Origins in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy.* London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1936. Pp. 262. 10s.

E. Meyerson. *Essais* (Préface de L. de Broglie. Avertissement de L. Lévy-Bruhl). Paris: J. Vrin. 1936. Pp. xvi+ 273. Fr. 32.

H. Gouhier. *La Jeunesse d'Auguste Comte et la Formation du Positivisme. II. Saint-Simon jusqu'a la Restauration.* Paris. J. Vrin. 1936. Pp. 388. Fr. 36.

P. Rousselot. *L'Intellectualisme de Saint Thomas.* Précedée d'une notice sur l'auteur et d'une bibliographie par le Père L. de Grandmaison, S.J. Troisième edition. Bibliothèque des Archives de Philosophie. Paris: Beauchesne. 1936. Pp. lxiv + 264. Fr. 30.

J. Souilhé, R. Hönigswald, C. von Brockdorf, S. Holm, J. Lairel, F. Tönnies, F. Thompson. *La Pensée et l'Influence de Th. Hobbes.* Archives de Philosophie. Paris: Beauchesne. 1936. Vol. XII, cahier ii. Pp. 106. Fr. 24.

M. Wahl. *Le Mouvement dans la Peinture.* Paris: F. Alcan. 1936. Pp. viii + 117. Fr. 15.

É. Fiszer. *Unité et Intelligibilité.* Paris: J. Vrin. 1936. Pp. 245.

A. Jakubisiak. *La Pensée et le Libre Arbitre.* Paris: J. Vrin. 1936. Pp. 344. Fr. 35.

A.-H. Foroughi. *Civilisation et Synthèse.* Paris: F. Alcan. 1936. Pp. vii + 89. Fr. 10.

J.-J. Vallory. *Poussières de Physique. Glanes dans le Champ du Sauvage Subtil.* Tome 1. Paris: Rieder. 1936. Pp. xvi + 389. Fr. 50.

Ét. Gilson. *Christianisme et Philosophie.* Paris: J. Vrin. 1936. Pp. 168. Fr. 15.

G. Bénézé D'ès-L. *Valeur (Essai d'une Théorie Générale).* Paris: J. Vrin. 1936. Pp. 64. Fr. 10.

G. Bénézé D'ès-L. *Allure du Transcendental.* Paris: J. Vrin. 1936. Pp. xxvii + 274. Fr. 40.

Variés. *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age* (Dirigées par Ét. Gilson et G. Théry, O.P.). Paris: J. Vrin. 1936. Pp. 417. Fr. 40.

J.-P. Sartre. *L'Imagination.* Paris: F. Alcan. 1936. Pp. 162. Fr. 10.

P. Quercy. *Les Hallucinations.* Paris: F. Alcan. 1936. Pp. 178. Fr. 10.

E. Minkowski. *Vers une Cosmologie, Fragments Philosophiques.* Paris: F. Aubier. 1936. Pp. 263. Fr. 15.

A. Heschel. *Die Prophetie.* Krakow: Nakladem Polskiej Akademji Umiejetnosci. Berlin: E. Reiss. 1936. Pp. vi + 192.

S. von Dunin Borkowski, S.J. *Spinoza.* Band III (Aus den Tagen Spinozas; Geschehnisse, Gestalten, Gedankenwelt. II. Teil: Das neue Leben. Münster i.W.: Aschendorffschen Verlagsbuchhandlung. 1935. Pp. 444. RM. 18.70 geheftet; 20.40 gebunden.

K. S. Laurila. *Aesthetische Streitfragen.* Helsingfors: Akademische Buchhandlung. 1934. Pp. 424.

C. G. Hempel und P. Oppemheim. *Der Typusbegriff im Liche der neuen Logik.* Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff's Uitgeversmij. N.V. 1936. Pp. vii + 130. Geheftet holl. fl. 2.25; gebunden holl. fl. 3.25.

C. Ottaviano. *Critica dell'Idealismo.* Napoli: Rondinella Alfredo. 1936. Pp. 194. L. 12.

CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor of *Philosophy*

SPINOZANA

Sir,

I am loth to trespass once again on your valuable space, but certain statements connected with Spinoza in your July issue seem to me to call for comment:

(1) In his short popular exposition of the philosophy of Spinoza, and again in his notice of Sir Frederick Pollock's recent biography of the philosopher, Mr W. G. de Burgh makes emphatic reference to the commonly alleged contradiction between Spinoza's deterministic metaphysics and his doctrine of salvation. I confess that I do not understand how it is rationally possible to believe both that a man is capable of falling into so naïve a blunder, and also that he is the great philosopher that Mr de Burgh evidently admits him to be. It is like catching Euclid in the act of assuming a simple converse without geometrical proof, or Newton substituting a plus for a minus sign in a fundamental equation. Contradictions there may be, and probably are, in the philosophy of Spinoza, but they are not of the childish kind supposed by Mr de Burgh and the scores of psittacine commentators that were before him. And now in fullness of time Signor Guzzo has even discovered the very "*potest*" at which the contradiction was "unwittingly" introduced. This is criticism indeed! I hope that it will not be supposed that I am unduly impressed by mere authority, even that of Spinoza, when I say that the discovery of a blatant antinomy in the system of a thinker of his integrity and calibre should lead any acute critic to look for a profounder basis of exposition through which the seeming contradiction is resolved. Such a basis is discoverable by a more precise examination of Spinoza's determinism, which is not the mechanism that Mr de Burgh seems to suppose. This is not the place for a detailed analysis: perhaps the simplest way of indicating the source of the misunderstanding is by recalling that the determinism that conflicts with freedom is that which holds that every event is precisely determined in character and occurrence by temporally prior events, so that with sufficient knowledge of these its nature and epoch are calculable. If every event is wholly determined by events occurring before it, and so to infinity, if determination is essentially *a praeterito*, there is, of course, no sense in talking of human freedom. Mr de Burgh knows well enough that such a doctrine of causation collapses before the slightest inspection: if it remains stubbornly temporal it stands self-refuted in the philosophy of Hume; if it seeks mitigation it is caught in a process that eliminates time and identifies the cause with its own effect. What he does not appear even to suspect is that *Spinoza neither advanced nor accepted any such view of causation*: this was no more than the "common order of nature" that in philosophy is subordinated to the "order of the intellect" for which real causation is not transeunt but immanent, not sematic but genetic, not serial but creative, not temporal but eternal. This is, perhaps, what critics mean when they falsely assert that for Spinoza "cause" means "reason" or "logical ground". Doubtless, real causation finds its amplest and purest expression in the eternal creative process that unites *Natura naturans* with *Natura naturata*, but although man by reason of his essential finitude is necessarily to some extent involved in time and the common order of nature, yet even for him the essential form of causation remains unchanged, and in *his own* actions he is free as an eternal self-determinant.

Man's self-determination is thus not merely the inclusion of a set of serial causes within the contours of a relative individuality (for so a self-fuelling engine would be free), but the self-legislating individual operating in accordance with its own inherent principles as a draught of *Natura*. Every intelligent action is free, and every action is intelligible: but not every action that falls within the contours of the finite

individual is intelligent, i.e. *to him* intelligible. Doubtless it is intelligent in relation to some higher individual within which the finite being is an element: in any case it is at furthest the free action of *Natura* or some part of its free action; it becomes *the man's* free action when he understands it, that is when its genetic causes lie within his finite eternal individuality. And there is nothing in Spinozistic determinism to make this variation of contour and integration impossible; the "emendation of the intellect" is no miracle thrust upon a resisting natural order: it *is* the natural order, though not the "common order of nature". Nor is there in fact anything in Spinozistic determinism to make even temporal choice impossible, for no action is completely determined *a praeterito*, though it is futile to argue endlessly whether the rejected alternative was really possible or not. It was a sure ethical instinct with Spinoza to identify morals not with acts of choice but with aspiration, and to refer freedom to intellectual love and its eternity rather than to fragmentary actions and their temporality, If this variation of ethical climate is really what Mr de Burgh deplores, it was a superfluous refinement to give his predilections an air of scholarly precision by tacitly ignoring the doctrine of *Ethics*, III. xxx, and omitting the ruling phrase of *Ethics*, III. xl: "Qui . . . imaginatur", thus implying that "Hatred is increased by reciprocated hatred" represents "the mechanism", while "Hatred can be destroyed by love" represents "the miracle". If the one is "mechanism", so also is the other; if the one is "miracle", so also is the other. But in fact, as there is no "mechanism" there is no need to make freedom a miracle. That human freedom is limited, not only by man's essential finiteness as an eternal part of *Natura*, but also by his consequent partial pulverization by time, I have elsewhere not spared pains to emphasize; and if the former limitation is the sphere of religion, the latter is the sphere of moral endeavour. The moral life is no more and no less than the aspiration of the temporal individual after his full eternal finite stature. That aspiration, where it exists, is essentially free, for it is the very nisus of reality. It is strange criticism that makes the admission of the limitation of freedom into an assertion of its impossibility.

(2) My second comment, happily, can be much briefer: it refers to Sir Herbert Samuel's notes on *Spinoza Memorials in Holland*, in which he implies that it was wholly "friends of philosophy in Holland" who rescued the house at The Hague from destruction or oblivion. I think, Sir, that no account of the Spinoza House, however brief, can be satisfactory that makes no reference to the inspiration, labour, enthusiasm, and unsparing energy and generosity of that true lover of Spinoza, and learned editor of his works, the late Dr Carl Gebhardt of Frankfurt. It would not, I suppose, be far from the truth to speak of Gebhardt as the "onlie begetter" of the *Domus Spinozana* and the *Societas Spinozana*, and it is an act of piety to recall to the minds of some at least of your readers the personality of that most urbane of Germans, that most human of scholars, unhappily cut off by painful disease in a time of national and personal anxiety, and without the assurance of the completion and permanence of the work he had most closely at heart.

I am, Sir, yours, etc.,

H. F. Hallett.

King's College, London,
August 21, 1936.

INSTITUTE NOTES

THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

(Incorporated under the Companies Acts 1908–1917 as a Company not for Profit but limited by Guarantee.)

President:
THE RT. HON. SIR HERBERT SAMUEL, G.C.B., G.B.E., M.A., D.C.L.

Chairman of the Council:
J. H. MUIRHEAD, M.A., LL.D., F.B.A.

Deputy Chairman of the Council:
A. D. LINDSAY, C.B.E., M.A., LL.D.

Hon. Treasurer:
THE RT. HON. LORD TWEEDSMUIR, C.H., G.C.M.G., D.C.L.

Director of Studies:
SYDNEY E. HOOPER, M.A.

Hon. Secretary:
P. M. ROSSDALE, LL.M.

INSTITUTE NOTES

LECTURE Courses for the Michaelmas Term, Session 1936–37:—

"SCIENCE AND METAPHYSICS," a course of six weekly lectures by O. S. Franks, M.A. (of the Queen's College, Oxford), on Mondays, at 5.45 p.m., at University Hall, 14, Gordon Square, W.C.1., beginning October 19th. Fee for the course, 12s. 6d. Members free.

"OUTLINES OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY," a class by the Director of Studies, on Wednesdays, at 5.45 p.m., at University Hall, 14, Gordon Square, W.C.1., in the Michaelmas and Lent Terms, beginning Michaelmas Term, October 21st; Lent Term, January 20th. Fee for the Session, £1 1s., Terminal, 12s. 6d. Members free.

The EVENING MEETINGS for the Michaelmas Term of the Session will be held at University College, Gower Street, W.C.1., at 8 p.m., on the following dates:—

Tuesday, October 13th: "On Being a Philosopher." Professor H. F. Hallett.

Tuesday, November 17th: Presidential Address. The Rt. Hon. Sir Herbert Samuel, G.C.B., G.B.E., D.C.L.

Tuesday, December 15th: "Culture, Philosophy and Faith." The Rt. Hon. Lord Eustace Percy, P.C.

PHILOSOPHY

OBJECTS OF THE INSTITUTE

The British Institute of Philosophy exists to bring leading exponents of various branches of Philosophy into direct contact with the general public, with the purpose of satisfying a need felt by many men and women in every walk of life for greater clearness and comprehensiveness of vision in human affairs.

With this broad educational purpose in view, the Institute—

(1) Provides at suitable times in the day and evening courses of lectures by leading exponents in the more important subjects coming within the scope of Philosophy. All branches of Philosophy are represented—Ethics and Social Philosophy, the Philosophy of Law and of the Sciences, of the Fine Arts and of Religion, as well as Logic and Metaphysics and Psychology.
These lectures are free to members.
(2) Issues a quarterly philosophical journal (free to members).
(3) Proposes to form a philosophical Library.
(4) Gives guidance and assistance to individuals in their philosophical reading.
(5) Encourages research in Philosophy.
(6) There are Local Centres of the Institute at Bangor, Cardiff, Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle and Durham, and Sheffield.

Further information and forms of application for membership may be had on application to the Director of Studies, University Hall, 14 Gordon Square, London, W.C. 1.

[Suggested]

FORM OF BEQUEST

I bequeath to THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY the sum of ..... free of duty, to be applied to the purposes of that Institute, and I declare that the receipt of the Honorary Secretary or other proper officer for the time being of that Institute, shall be sufficient discharge for the same.

BIBL.
LONDIN.
UNIV.

Sense and Thought

A Study in Mysticism

By GRETA HORT

"A fresh and illuminating analysis of the mental development of a mystic."—*Time and Tide*

"Dr. Hort's book is a careful, detailed, and scholarly study, and everyone who is interested in mysticism ought to read it."—*Methodist Recorder.*

8*s.* 6*d.*

Kant's Metaphysic of Experience

By H. J. PATON

A detailed commentary on the first half of the *Critique of Pure Reason.* It deals with Kant's positive metaphysics, his account of what we know about the universal and necessary characteristics of the world experienced by us as human beings.

Library of Philosophy. 2 *vols.* 30*s. the set*

George Allen & Unwin Ltd.

MANCHESTER COLLEGE, OXFORD

(Founded in Manchester 1786)

SENIOR THEOLOGICAL STUDENTSHIPS.

The Governing Body of Manchester College proposes to elect One or Two Theological Research Students if suitable Candidates present themselves.

The Studentships will be of the annual value of £300. They will be tenable for two years but may be renewed for a third year at the discretion of the College. Candidates must be graduates of an approved University, and must provide evidence

(*a*) of their academical qualifications, and
(*b*) of their ability to undertake original research in Theology.

The Studentships are open to men or women of any sect, creed, race, or colour.

Applications to be sent to the Principal, Manchester College, Oxford; from whom copies of the Prospectus of the College may be obtained.

SCIENTIFIC BOOKS

Works in all branches of Science, English and Foreign, including PHILOSOPHY, supplied from stock, or obtained promptly to order. Catalogues of new books of all publishers post free on request.

H. K. LEWIS & Co. Ltd.

136 Gower Street *Tel.* EUSTON 4282 **London, W.C.1**

Objective Evolution

By C. PLEYDELL-BOUVERIE
Author of "The Cosmic Awakening"

The latest indications of science are combined to form a synthesis illustrative of the evolution of creative consciousness and its effects as manifested in the development of civilisation.

7/6 net

Williams & Norgate Ltd.
Gt. Russell Street, London

Modern Culture Institute

Dr. HAR DAYAL, M.A., Ph.D., will give the following lectures at Caxton Hall at 8 p.m. Admission free

OCTOBER 23
"After Christianity, *What?*"

NOVEMBER 20
"The World State, *Why?*"

DECEMBER 11
"Develop your Personality, *How?*"

Read Dr. Dayal's book "*Hints for Self-Culture*" (Watts 5/-)

Sociological Review

Editorial Board:
A. M. Carr-Saunders, Alexander Farquharson
Morris Ginsberg

CONTENTS — JULY 1936

The Sociology of Pareto	*Morris Ginsberg*
The Recruitment of the Nation's Leaders	*E. L. Clarke*
Further Historical Evidence for the Growth of the Chinese Population	*C. P. Fitzgerald*
Social Surveys and Sociology	*A. F. Wells*
The Factory Worker's Philosophy	*M. G. Dickson*
Ferdinand Tönnies	*Karl Mannheim*

THE LePLAY HOUSE PRESS, 35 Gordon Square, London, W.C.I.
ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTION, £1 1s. 0d., post free. Single copies 5s.

VOL. XI. No. 44. OCTOBER 193

PHILOSOPHY

THE JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

Edited by

SYDNEY E. HOOPER

with the assistance of

S. ALEXANDER C. D. BROAD WILLIAM BROWN
M. GINSBERG G. DAWES HICKS JULIAN S. HUXLEY
HAROLD J. LASKI A. D. LINDSAY J. H. MUIRHEAD
BERTRAND RUSSELL L. S. STEBBING G. F. STOUT
A. E. TAYLOR CLEMENT C. J. WEBB

CONTENTS

I. The Romantic Factor in Modern Politics
Professor Ernest Barker

II. Great Thinkers: (IX) Leibniz
Professor Leonard J. Russell

III. The Philosophy of J. S. Haldane
William McDougall, F.R.S.

IV. Spiritual Life: Santayana's Approach to Essence
Cornelia Geer Le Boutillier

V. Scholasticism
Felix Hope

VI. Formalism and Teleology
O. C. Jensen, M.A., Ph.D.

VII. The Missing Link in Peace Plans
Address by Professor J. H. Muirhead

VIII. Philosophical Survey

IX. New Books

X. Correspondence

XI. Institute Notes

Published Quarterly

MACMILLAN & CO. LTD., LONDON

Price 3/6

Subscription 14/- Yearly, Post Free.

University of London
Library.

PROPHECY AND RELIGION

Studies in the Life of Jeremiah

By J. SKINNER

Cheap Edition *7s. 6d. net*

"This is in all respects a great book."
The Methodist Times

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

OBITER SCRIPTA

Lectures, Essays and Reviews

Edited by J. BUCHLER and B. SCHWARTZ, 10/-

Times Literary Supplement: "The editors of this collection of essays and reviews deserve thanks from all lovers of good letters.

"There is nothing here that was not well worth rescuing. . . . It is difficult to imagine Mr. Santayana writing anything really trivial. He has a peculiar gift for putting the whole of himself into every piece from his pen. There is scarcely one of his substantial essays that does not contain the whole of *The Life of Reason* in miniature."

by GEORGE SANTAYANA

N.B.—George Santayana's novel *The Last Puritan*, published some months ago, is still selling well.

Constable

MACMILLAN

HOLISM AND EVOLUTION

By the Rt. Hon. J. C. SMUTS. New and Revised Edition. 12s. 6d.

Reviews of an earlier edition:

"A remarkable and important work which should be read by all interested in the philosophy of the world in which they live."—Prof. J. Graham Kerr (*Nature*).

"With this volume General Smuts takes a high place in the small but distinguished company of British statesmen-philosophers."—*The Times.*

THE ESSENCE OF JUDAISM

By LEO BAECK 16s.

"A standard German work that has reached its sixth edition, from which the present excellent translation has been made. It is a serious and devout defence of the Liberal Jewish position, which is put forward as representing the religious kernel and spiritual meaning of the long history of Judaism, ancient and modern."—*Church Times.*

THROUGH SCIENCE TO GOD

By NATHAN A. SMYTH, M.A., LL.B. 10s. 6d.

The aim of this book is to show that science at last points the way towards a more rational theology and a surer-footed ethics.

THE CHURCH AND THE 20th CENTURY
Essays on various Problems of the Church's Work.

With a Foreword by the Bishop of Birmingham. Papers by Norman Sykes, Percy Dearmer, C. E. Raven, Douglas White, H. D. A. Major, Guy Rogers, Arnold Wilson, F. L. Cross, L. Elliott-Binns, and G. L. H. Harvey (Editor). 15s.

"As the Bishop of Birmingham observes in a striking foreword, they are 'written by men exceptionally vigorous alike in thought and feeling,' and it is not too much to say that though they do not maintain quite the same high level throughout, there is something unusually arresting to be found in each."—The Bishop of Truro (*Church of England Newspaper*).

THE GOD WHO SPEAKS: Warburton Lectures, 1934-35.

By Dr. BURNETT HILLMAN STREETER, *Provost of the Queen's College, Oxford.* 5s.

This work is a re-affirmation of the belief that God has a purpose of which the individual can make himself the conscious instrument.

"A book of great interest. . . . The chief interest lies in the connexion of the book's teaching with that of the Buchman Groups, and especially with their teaching about divine guidance."—*Church Times.*

THE CHURCH AND ITS TEACHING TO-DAY:
Being the Nobel Lectures delivered in the Memorial Church, Harvard University, 1935.

By Dr. WILLIAM TEMPLE, *Archbishop of York.* 4s. 6d.

"Those who desire the satisfaction of heart and of mind at the same time will find rich treasure in this volume, which sets forth a faith that is at once the fruit of experience and reflection, definite, honest and generous."—*The Guardian.*

(*All prices are net*)

MACMILLAN & CO. LTD. LONDON

PRAEVALEAT
SAPIENTIA